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Industries are working more and more in project-based settings, such as for example the 
construction, aerospace, film and shipbuilding industry (Gann & Salter, 2000; Scarbrough et al., 
2004). In addition, industries are increasingly working in inter-organizational projects. These 
projects involve several organizations that work on one project. These companies share 
responsibilities, but also have diverging interests and different levels and areas of expertise (Jones 
& Lichtenstein, 2008). These companies are represented during the project by individuals that take 
part in the project. Essential in these inter-organizational projects is collaboration (Zeng & Chen, 
2003). The representatives of the companies have to collaborate with each other. How individuals 
and companies within the project collaborate and communicate affects the effectiveness of the 
collaboration (Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005). Common problem in these inter-organizational 
projects include additional work and rework, commitment issues and delays during the project that 
create ineffectiveness in the project (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000b; Rooke, Seymour, & Fellows, 2004). 
In addition, inter-organizational projects are temporary by nature. The project operates for a 
limited period of time and is completed when a pre-specified goal is accomplished (Jones & 
Lichtenstein, 2008). In the papers forming this dissertation the term multi-organizational project 
(MOP) is used. This term stresses the often large number of companies involved in one project. 
Usually one company is responsible for the coordination of the project and hires other companies 
as subcontractors. In the project representatives of these companies collaborate during the project. 
When the project is completed the project team of representatives dissolves and the 
representatives return to their own company. The temporality and changing composition of 
representatives from companies complicates collaboration between these individuals and their 
companies. Although collaboration is essential in order to complete the project on time and within 
budget, it is sometimes difficult to achieve in projects. This dissertation is interested in how 
collaboration is shaped by the individuals and participating companies working in a multi-







While collaboration in multi-organizational projects is influenced by many different factors 
(Bresnen & Marshall, 2000a; Kadefors, 2004) I focus on human factors. The motivation and social 
aspects of company representatives in a project determine how these individuals collaborate with 
each other (Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990). Important in collaboration is how these 
representatives perceive their interests (Hardy et al., 2005). Interest perceptions have a great 
impact on the behavior of individuals (DiMaggio, 1988; Medlin, 2006; Miller, 1999). Due to the 
multiple companies and individual representatives involved it is difficult to keep goals and interests 
aligned (Hardy et al., 2005). Some individuals might pursue their own interests at the expense of 
the others, while the interest perceptions of others might be in line with other participants in the 
project. This social dilemma is a problem that often occurs in projects with multiple companies 
involved (Gray & Clyman, 2003; Zeng & Chen, 2003). This brings up the question: why do 
individuals representing companies in MOPs perceive their interests in different ways?  
In this dissertation I try to answer this question by looking at interests as social constructions. 
Rational choice theories assume that the self-interest motivation of economic actors is given 
(Weber, Kopelman, & Messick, 2004). However, these theories neglect the social nature of interest 
conceptions. Social science theorists argue that what individuals see as their interests is influenced 
by the social environment (Woolgar, 1981). Following this social constructivist perspective, this 
dissertation explores the social construction process of interests in relation to collaboration.  
Although individuals participating in an MOP directly affect the collaboration process, these 
individuals do not act qua persona, but in their role of company representatives. Each company has 
its own culture and strategy in doing business. The characteristics of the company are likely to 
influence the behavior of its representatives in the project with respect to how they collaborate. 
This leads to the overarching problem statement of this dissertation: 
 
How do social construction processes of interests of individuals and strategies of companies in inter-
organizational projects relate to collaboration? 
 
INTEGRATIVE COLLABORATION 
In 2008 an initiative was set up in the Dutch Shipbuilding industry. The program that followed from 
this initiative is called “Integrative Collaboration”. Around fifteen organizations, shipyards and 
subcontractors, have joined this program with financial and managerial commitment. The aim of 
this initiative is to develop better collaboration models and instruments to strengthen the 
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competitiveness of the Dutch shipbuilding industry. In this setting integrative collaboration refers 
to the integration of collaboration between the different companies working in the shipbuilding 
industry. The program includes several areas of attention, some focusing on technological 
innovation, while others were more oriented towards social innovation.  
This program offered the opportunity for collecting data in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. A 
team of researchers from Tilburg University was allowed access to meetings and projects 
associated with the program. During four years data were collected pertaining to projects and 
companies associated with the program.  
 
PROJECTS IN THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
The setting of this research is the Dutch shipbuilding industry. This industry works in projects in 
which the main contractor, the shipyard, hires subcontractors to fulfill specified tasks related to 
building a ship. The subcontractors range in their tasks from applicators, such as painters, to 
component suppliers of for example thrusters, to system suppliers, which for instance supply the 
electrical installation. These subcontractors and their associated tasks differ with respect to their 
influence on the process, their dependency on other subcontractors and the location of their 
activities. These differences make that the subcontractors have different interests and may behave 
differently. System suppliers are highly dependent in their activities on the shipyard as well as on 
subcontractors. Their systems integrate different types of equipment delivered by other 
subcontractors. In addition, their systems run through the whole ship, which makes them 
dependent on the shipyard who builds the hull of the ship. Due to the type of system, also the 
shipyard and other subcontractors are dependent on these system suppliers. HVAC systems 
supplier and electrical engineering companies are typical system suppliers. The applicator is 
another company that is dependent on others before he can fulfill his job. A painter is a typical 
example of an applicator. Due to the fact that painting is one of the last processes in the production 
of the ship, the painter has to wait on others in order to complete his tasks. In the situation of 
‘rework’, in which tasks have to be performed again due to not meeting the quality standard, the 
painter also has to redo some of his work. Both the system suppliers and the applicators perform 
most of their activities on the location of the shipyard. The least dependent subcontractor is most of 
the times the component supplier. These subcontractor produce their components at the location of 
their own company (or at the location of their own subcontractors), and only the commissioning 
takes place at the shipyard. Due to their low interdependence with the process, they are only 
minimally influenced by the activities of other subcontractors. Of course other subcontractors can 
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be dependent on this component supplier as certain components need to be installed before the 
production moves forward. Examples of component suppliers are thruster suppliers and engine 
suppliers. Additionally, the dependency between parties is related to their specific investments 
made by a party (Bensaou, 1999). While some companies use materials that can be used in many 
different industries, others have equipment and thus investments specifically used in the 
shipbuilding industry. These investments make these types of subcontractors more dependent on 
the industry. 
The project of building a ship has several phases. The project life cycle of the ship starts when 
the shipyard receives the order for a ship. Subsequently, the shipyard chooses the subcontractors 
that will participate in the construction of the ship. The shipyard and some of the subcontractors 
start the design phase in which the shipyard and some of the subcontractors draw and design the 
ship. During this phase also the purchasing of the materials start. This includes basic materials such 
as bolts and nuts. As the design progresses and more information becomes available also the bigger 
equipment is ordered. The following phase starts with the construction and assembly of the ship. 
This phase takes place at the location of the shipyard, so the representatives from the 
subcontractors that work on the ship are located at the shipyard during this phase. During 
production the commissioning of the electrical components also starts and the purchasing of 
equipment continues. After the completion of the production the finishing of the ship starts in 
which all the remaining issues with the ship are solved. After this phase the ship receives a trial sail 
to test the functions of the ship. When the trial sail is completed successfully the ship will be handed 
over to the client. After the completion of the project the representatives return to their own 
company. Figure 1.1 illustrates the project life cycle of a ship. Notwithstanding the project-based 
nature of the industry, most companies have a long history of working together. This common 
history also influences their collaborative behavior. In most of the projects interviewees refer to 
their previous experiences with individuals and companies to explain why project participants 
behave in a certain way.  
This dissertation examined different projects at different shipyards at different phases in the 
projects. The data in chapter 2 was collected after the completion of the four copy ships. During the 
interviews the respondents were asked to look back at the different ships and the process of the 
completed projects. These four ships were built at two different shipyards, shipyard A and B. The 
data in chapter 4 is collected as the project progressed. The data collection took place during the 
design and partially during the production phase of one project. The design and production phases 
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of this project took place at different locations. This project was part of shipyard C. Shipyards A, B 








The next chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 2) is based on a pilot study that examines the 
perceptions of interests in MOPs and the ability to learn to collaborate. In this chapter the factors 
that influence the perceptions of interests are explored. Additionally, with the use of interviews 
from all participating companies associated with the construction of four ships that were assumed 
to be copies of a vessel built earlier, the relationship between the social construction of interests 
and the capability to learn to collaborate effectively is examined.  
Chapter 3 is a conceptual paper that theorizes how “consummate collaboration” (distinguished 
from “perfunctory collaboration”) is influenced by social construction processes. More specifically, 
the chapter explores theoretically how discourse through the construction of interests is related to 
collaboration. Different kinds of discourse are argued to be related to different types of 
collaboration. This brings up the question how discourse congruent with consummate 
collaboration may be expected to arise. Hypotheses regarding the likelihood that particular 
accounts of interest are produced by particular types of actors under particular conditions are 
formulated.  
Whereas Chapter 3 is purely theoretical, Chapter 4 is an empirical study in which perceptions of 

















large ship over a period of eighteen months, insights into the social construction of perceptions of 
interests over time are gathered. 
After looking at individuals participating in MOPs in chapters 2, 3 and 4, Chapter 5 takes a 
company perspective. In this chapter the strategic intent of companies working in MOPs is explored 
using a mental map approach. The contents and structural position of elements related to 
collaboration in the mental maps of managers responsible for business units are explored.  
The dissertation concludes with a chapter in which general conclusions across the various 










Behavior in multi-organizational projects has the characteristics of a social dilemma. In a social 
dilemma parties choose between the non-cooperative strategy of pursuing their own interests and 
the cooperative strategy of pursuing the collective interests. All parties are better off when they all 
cooperate than if they all defect, but individually they are better off if they defect. The possibility to 
realize a collaboration strategy depends on how those involved in the project define their interests. 
In this paper it is proposed that these interests are socially constructed. In an empirical study of 
multi-organizational projects in the Dutch shipbuilding industry this paper inductively explores the 
relationships between social constructions of interests and the capability to learn to collaborate 
more effectively. By identifying mechanisms at both the organizational and the project level this 
study makes a first step towards the articulation of a theory of social construction of interests in the 
context of multi-organizational projects. 
  
                                                             
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Niels Noorderhaven. It appeared in 2011 in the International 




An increasing number of organizations is working in project-based settings (Gann & Salter, 2000; 
Scarbrough et al., 2004). In project-based settings the production process is organized around 
projects, usually for the production of one-off products, and operating in coalitions of companies 
(Gann & Salter, 2000; Hobday, 2000). Although the products are each unique, companies may over 
time collaborate on multiple projects. In these settings learning within and across projects is 
important for the competitive success of the organizations involved (Brady & Davies, 2004; 
Levinthal & March, 1993). Also for the progress of each individual project it is essential that the 
organizations learn throughout the project (Cherns & Bryant, 1984). Different types of inter-
organizational learning can be distinguished (Inkpen & Tsang, 2007). This paper focuses on 
learning aimed at collaborating more effectively (Doz, 1996; Knight, 2000). For this to occur, 
organizations must learn both about the general processes of successful collaboration and about 
the specific characteristics of their partners (Inkpen & Tsang, 2007). 
However, multi-organizational projects constitute a context in which learning is particularly 
difficult (Hobday, 2000). In multi-organizational projects (MOPs) representatives from several 
organizations have to collaborate during the execution of the project, forming a multi-
organizational project team. This multi-organizational team dissolves after every project to be 
reformed, often in a different composition, for the execution of a new project. Learning within the 
project is difficult because activities are distributed over several companies. And even if learning 
within the project takes place, there is the risk that mistakes are repeated when the lessons learned 
are not transferred to following projects (Brady & Davies, 2004). Moreover, the temporary nature 
of the project team may decrease the commitment of the organizations involved to collaborate 
effectively. Even though the organizations need to collaborate for the duration of the project, 
exchange of experience and sharing of knowledge and information between the different 
organizations necessary for learning may be jeopardized (Brady, Marshall, Prencipe, & Tell, 2002). 
The temporary nature of the project may focus organizations on short-term gains for their own 
organization over long-term collective gains for all organizations collectively within and across 
projects.  
A crucial issue with multi-organizational collaboration therefore is the possibility of clashing 
interests of the parties. In an MOP each party is an independent company with its own goals (Artto, 
Kujala, Dietrich, & Martinsuo, 2008a). Thus each party has its own interests, as well as its own 
perspective on the interests of the others (Medlin, 2006). Individuals within the organizations are 
driven by the utility of their actions in order to pursue individual or organizational interests 
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(Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Self-interests have a great impact on the behavior of individuals 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Miller, 1999; Van Vugt, 2009), and it may be assumed that also the self-interests 
of the representatives of organizations in a project team influence their behavior. What is essential 
in collaboration is that the organizations overcome their conflicting interest and focus on their 
common interests that are centered around the project goals (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000a; Clegg, 
Pitsis, Rura-Polley, & Marosszeky, 2002). Thus, the collaboration between the different parties of 
the MOP is dependent on the interests of the organizations. 
Project-based settings where multiple organizations have to cooperate to finish the project bear 
the characteristics of a social dilemma (Zeng & Chen, 2003). Two properties hold for a social 
dilemma: a) each individual receives a higher payoff for the socially defecting choice than for the 
cooperative choice, no matter what the other individuals do; b) all individuals are better off if all 
cooperate than if all defect (Dawes, 1980). However, although mutual cooperation leads to a higher 
payoff for all group members than the mutual choice for non-cooperation, an individual can receive 
a higher payoff in the short-term if he does not cooperate (Weber & Murnighan, 2008; Wit & Kerr, 
2002). These characteristics can also be recognized in MOPs such as in the construction or 
shipbuilding industry. The tension between cooperation and competition as seen in a social 
dilemma can also been seen in multi-party collaboration forms, such as interorganizational 
alliances and MOPs (Larsson, Bengtsson, Henriksson, & Sparks, 1998; Zeng & Chen, 2003). In an 
MOP organizations and individuals also have two options. They can collaborate and choose for the 
cooperative choice that focuses on the interests of all organizations. The other option they have, is 
that they decide not to collaborate and choose the competitive strategy that puts their own 
interests ahead (Wong, Cheung, & Ho, 2005).  
What does it mean in this context to make the cooperative or non-cooperative choice? 
Collaboration, or the cooperative choice, infers a process in which organizations and individuals 
come together to interact for a mutual gain or benefit (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995). In addition, 
the participating organizations and individuals should have the willingness to collaborate by aiming 
for the joint interests of the participating organizations (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Zeng & Chen, 
2003). This choice prioritizes the collective interests. Defection, the non-cooperative or competitive 
choice, means the choice that satisfies the individual interests, even if this harms the collective 
interests. Defecting in an MOP involves choosing the action and behavior that does not have the 
intention of maximizing the joint interests but instead focuses on only individual interests. 
A difficulty with a social dilemma is that although the highest payoff occurs when all 
organizations collaborate no one wants to be the ‘sucker’ who puts himself in a vulnerable position 
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by being the first to collaborate without the certainty that the others will collaborate as well (Brady 
et al., 2002; Kollock, 1998; Lanzara, 1998; Miller, 1999; Weber & Murnighan, 2008). 
Although the social dilemma literature assumes that interests are objectively given, this paper 
will consider the possibility that effective collaboration depends on subjectively perceived interests, 
and that these perceptions are influenced by the social environment (Scott, 1987). An individual’s 
perception of interests is associated with desired or anticipated future outcomes. Individuals tend 
to look at each other to decide what a logical, acceptable definition of self-interest is. If other 
players are perceived to give priority to their individual gains, even if at the expense of the project, 
this will likely also guide one’s own behavior. In the context of a social dilemma the relative 
emphasis on short-term versus long-term gains plays an important role. If all parties perceive the 
others to focus on short-term gains, this will be seen as rational, and a suboptimal outcome is 
unavoidable. However, if other parties are perceived to focus on longer-term gains, this is more 
likely to guide one’s own behavior, too, and the social dilemma dissolves (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; 
Zeng & Chen, 2003). In particular in situations where collaboration patterns have not stabilized yet 
individuals have difficulty deciding where their self-interest really lies (Lanzara, 1998). In these 
situations perceptions of interests of self and others are likely to strongly influence behaviors, and 
changes in these perceptions are often necessary in order to learn to collaborate more effectively. 
This paper believes that these issues go to the core of the problem of learning to collaborate 
effectively in a multi-organizational project. Hence the research question is:  
 
What are the factors that influence perceptions of interests in multi-organizational projects, and how 
do these perceived interests affect the ability to work together effectively? 
 
In this paper, following a path paved by a few researchers (Justice, 2006; Kleppestø, 2005), it is 
argued that interests in the context of multi-organizational projects are social constructions. This 
implies that the perceptions and the behaviors of individuals in organizations in this context are 
influenced by the behavior of individuals in other organizations (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970c). It is 
purported that it is not a-priori clear to the individuals representing organizations in such projects 
what their roles should be and what interests they should pursue. Rather, these individuals decide 
in interaction with their relevant social environment what are rational and appropriate interests to 
strive after. This is in line with social constructivist and institutionalist perspectives on 
organizations (Gergen, 1985; Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000; Kleppestø, 2005; Scott, 1995, 2008).  
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This paper will discuss more in detail in later sections how the process of social construction of 
interests takes place. At this point it is important to explicate how the analysis of the influence of 
socially constructed interests relates to other important factors affecting multi-organizational 
projects, particularly more formal factors, such as the contracts linking together the organizations 
involved in the project. At first sight, such formal arrangements may seem to be more formative of 
interests than vice versa. After all, formal contracts define interests. But one could also say, 
conversely, that the step to more collaborative forms of contracting (such as partnering and 
alliancing contracts) can only be made if the parties concerned first define their roles and interests 
accordingly (see, e.g., Bresnen & Marshall, 2000a; Critchlow, 1998; Myers, 2001). This discussion is 
not pursued here, but it is assumed that an exploration of social construction of interests in multi-
organizational projects is relevant, in its own right, as well as possibly as a factor associated with 
the formation of collaborative forms of contract. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the articulation of a theory of factors influencing the 
ability of organizations to learn to collaborate more effectively in multi-organizational projects. The 
focus is on projects for the execution of unique and complex tasks because in these tasks there is 
the most potential for increasing the collective gains from the project. At the same time these 
projects, which often have a long duration, can create specific conditions that hamper learning to 
collaborate. The shipbuilding industry operates in multi-organizational projects that are 
characterized by social dilemma properties. This industry therefore presents a suitable empirical 
context. This paper empirically explores several projects from two different shipyards in the Dutch 
shipbuilding industry, to help flesh out the relationships between social constructions of interests 
and the capability to learn to collaborate.  
 
INTERESTS AND PROJECT RELATED BEHAVIOR 
In the previous section social dilemmas were described as situations in which participants have to 
choose between pursuing their own interests by choosing a non-cooperative strategy and pursuing 
the collective interests by following the cooperative strategy (Fleishman, 1988; Van Lange & 
Joireman, 2008; Wong et al., 2005). However, these interests are not just formed objectively (Ahola, 
2009); individuals behave according to their definition of their own interests as well as their 
perceptions of the interests of others (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; DiMaggio, 1988; Kelley & Stahelski, 
1970b; Medlin, 2006). Each individual may have a different perspective on what actions and 
outcomes represent self-interests and collective interests (Medlin, 2006). Hence the social dilemma 
is a social construction arising from the perceptions of interests (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970c, 1970a; 
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Scott, 1987; Wong et al., 2005). This collective social construction can be a product of design, as in 
the project alliance studied by Clegg and colleagues (Clegg et al., 2002; van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, 
& Veenswijk, 2008). These authors describe how through the manipulation of incentives and 
material as well as symbolic aspects of the project culture individual participants’ interests were 
subordinated to the collective project interest. As will be clear from the description below, in the 
context of this study there was no central authority aiming at such manipulation. Instead, any 
subjugation of individual to project interests needed to come from decentralized efforts. Hence this 
paper is interested in the question why and how processes of social construction of interests of 
parties in multi-organizational projects make a collaborative solution to the social dilemma more or 
less attainable. 
Looking more closely what it means to say that interests are “socially constructed”. Berger and 
Luckmann (2002: 43) describe the process of social construction of reality as follows: “A watches B 
perform. He attributes motives to B’s actions […]. At the same time, A may assume that B is doing 
the same thing with regard to him”. The important elements in this description are the mutual 
observation and the attribution of motives. The attributed motives refer to interests. Hence, in a 
social constructivist view actors construct their interests by looking at each other and by 
responding to what they see (Scott, 1995: 137). In this way perceptions and actions based on these 
perceptions are constitutive of the choice the participant organizations make with regard to 
collaboration. An example helps to make this clear. 
In an analysis of business district improvement projects Justice (2006) shows that many 
individual business owners initially have a narrow conception of self and interests. This is 
associated with a lack of willingness to engage in collective efforts to improve the business district, 
an activity that ultimately is to the benefit of all. However, Justice (2006) also shows that socially 
constructed interests are malleable. This was in particular the case in self-governed improvement 
projects (i.e., improvement projects not managed by municipal governments). 
 
[These projects caused] participants to develop understandings of themselves, their interests, 
and their situations that [led] them to greater cooperation. Through more intensive, widespread, 
purposive, face-to-face interactions, participants in self-governing [business district 
improvement projects] constructed understandings of their identities and interests that made 
cooperation both a natural-seeming way to serve their own interests and an inherently 
rewarding activity (Justice, 2006: 35) 
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Turning to the empirical context, MOPs in the shipbuilding industry, this paper purports that three 
factors are likely to influence the social construction process: the explicit and implicit guidance that 
individuals participating in the project receive from their organization, the observed behaviors of 
others within the focal project, and personal experiences beyond the focal project. 
Firstly, individuals participate in the project on behalf of their organization, and hence are likely 
to receive instructions regarding their project-related behavior. Instructions do not always have to 
be explicit. In many cases individuals participating in projects will accept as self-evident what is 
expected from them by their organizations on the basis of observations of what behaviors tend to 
get rewarded and sanctioned. The organization may discipline the boundary spanner through 
formal control mechanisms or the inculcation of organizational norms, or both (Adams, 1976). 
Organizational instructions to project participants, in turn, can be expected to be linked to the 
strategic role that the organization has defined for itself. 
In many sectors technological and other developments destabilize given role sets of incumbent 
organizations. As a consequence, these players may come to question their existing strategy and 
redefine the ‘architecture’ of the industry. Industry architecture refers to ‘the templates that 
determine “who does what” in a sector’ (Brusoni, Jacobides, & Prencipe, 2009: 211). New roles are 
strongly associated with new knowledge and technologies, and each organization has to decide 
what role it can and wants to play, in relation to the knowledge it has or wants to acquire. A 
particularly important question in many sectors is who takes on the role of ‘systems integrator’, i.e., 
who has the capability to design and integrate internally and externally developed components 
(Brusoni et al., 2009; Davies, 2004; Takeishi, 2002). The role or strategy an organization wants to 
implement will influence the incentives and directions the organization will give to its 
representatives in a multi-organizational project team. These instructions and incentives may be 
geared towards the immediate interests of the own organization (e.g., in case the organization 
defines its own role as that of a subcontractor), or more towards the overall collective project 
interests (e.g., in case the organization defines its role as that of a co-maker). The time perspective 
employed plays an important role here (Medlin, 2006). A short-term strategic orientation often 
emphasizes the individual organization’s immediate interests, even if at the expense of the 
collective project interests (Ahola, 2009). In a long-term perspective, if organizations anticipate to 
collaborate across a series of projects, the conflict between organizational and collective project 
interests dissipates (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000a).  
 Secondly, individual project-team members observe behaviors of other individuals in the 
project, and will define their interests based on these observations. If they witness, for instance, 
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that other individuals strive after their own interests at the expense of the project, they will be 
more likely to also define their own (and their organization’s) interests in such a way (Fleishman, 
1988). Ahola (2009) studied responses to ‘critical incidents’ in multi-organizational projects, and 
reports that the observed behaviors of other parties has a strong influence on future collaborative 
behavior. Knight (2000) observed in a case study of two supply relations that at the level of the 
individual employee beliefs, knowledge and motivating factors (i.e., the personal stake) specific to a 
particular supplier strongly influenced the quality of the interorganizational relationship. An 
important factor identified by this author was “personal reliance”: the extent to which the 
individual needed the relationship to attain personal goals (i.e., what this paper calls perceived self-
interest). “Those managers […] who needed the contractor to perform well seemed capable and 
willing to collaborate” ((Knight, 2000: 132, emphasis in the original). To the extent that individuals 
identify a common interest they will be better able to collaborate (Engwall & Jerbrant, 2003). 
Barriers between the organizations represented in the project team, due to divergent interests and 
contractual roles, can be easier overcome if there is a sense of common purpose (Gann & Salter, 
2000).  
Finally, it is expected that personal experiences of individual project members beyond the focal 
project will play a role (Grabher, 2002). In particular positive or negative experiences with the 
same organizations in previous projects may be expected to have a bearing on the definition of self-
interest in the focal project. This idea is closely related to the literature on experience-based 
interorganizational trust (Gulati, 1995; Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). Analogous to the 
relationship between positive prior experiences and the propensity to trust, it is posited that 
positive experiences with a specific organization or individual prior to the focal multi-
organizational project increase the likelihood that a project member will perceive his or her own 
interests to be aligned with the collective interests at the project level.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the articulation of a theory of social constructions of 
interests in multi-organizational projects. Following the spirit of grounded theory development, our 
data collection was based on the general perspective sketched above rather than on a preconceived 
theoretical framework (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This study asked broad, open-ended questions 
pertaining to interests, as well as some other questions pertaining to causes of problems in the 
projects and possible remedies. As this study was guided by a social-constructionist perspective the 
interviews were not used to reconstruct an objective reality but to explore how our interviewees 
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constructed and acted upon their views of reality (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This empirical study 
aimed to identify examples of the three processes of social construction of interests described 
above. These three process of social construction of interests are used as “sensitizing concepts” 
(Blumer, 1954). These concepts are not definitive in nature but give a direction along which to look. 
They provide a starting point for the research with respect to interests (Bowen, 2006). 
Furthermore, this study tries to ascertain what forms these processes of social construction of 
interests could take, and what mechanisms play a role. Moreover, this paper endeavored to gauge 
the relative importance of the various social construction processes. If a particular type of factor is 
spontaneously mentioned more frequently than other factors, it may be concluded that this factor is 
particularly salient to the interviewees, and therefore probably also especially impactful. 
 
Research Design and Setting 
This paper studied projects in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. In the shipbuilding industry the 
main contractor, the shipyard, traditionally hires the subcontractors such as the electricians, 
painters, and suppliers of components such as engines, thrusters and electrical installations. For 
every ship that is built, different subcontractors of different specializations can be selected to form 
the new project team. Every shipbuilding project thus can have its own combination of 
subcontractors (Gann & Salter, 1998, 2000).  
At present the traditional structure of the shipbuilding industry is subject to changes. This is 
particularly true of that part of the Dutch shipbuilding industry that specializes in complex, custom-
made ships, e.g., for the offshore sector. In these specialized ships complex components like 
dynamic positioning systems and diving installations need to be integrated. The shipyards no 
longer have all the knowledge necessary for fulfilling this integrator role, with the effect that many 
project outcomes are suboptimal (behind schedule, over budget, or with functional imperfections). 
To overcome these problems a number of organizations (suppliers, subcontractors and shipyards) 
in the Netherlands have united to work towards what is called “Integrative Collaboration” 
(“Integraal Samenwerken”). Although the Integrative Collaboration group has multiple aims a 
common thread is that to safeguard the future of the Dutch shipbuilding sector, a shift to an 
emphasis on shared project responsibilities is necessary. In this paper’s terminology, the 
organizations in the Dutch shipbuilding industry want to reconstruct their interests in order to 
focus on the common project goal instead of focusing on their own organizational interests. The 
present study was a pilot project for a larger, longitudinal study of the factors that influence the 




The data comes from thirty-nine interviews in two rounds of data collection. In the first part of the 
study twenty-four interviews took place with a total of fifty-six representatives from fourteen 
organizations involved in the construction of a series of four ships. These include eleven external 
organizations, such as blasting and preservation companies and the companies responsible for 
delivering and installing, e.g., thrusters, as well as two divisions with separate profit responsibility. 
Additionally, representatives of nine internal departments of the shipyard were interviewed.  
At the shipyard where the first part of this study was conducted, four ships have been built in 
the last couple of years that were sold as copy ships. This means that the ships contracted to be 
built for the clients were initially planned to be copies of a ship constructed earlier. Due to the fact 
that the four ships were initially thought to be copy ships (although in practice this proved to be not 
the case), almost the same organizations were involved with building each ship. This created an 
opportunity to look at the learning regarding collaboration that occurred across these four projects. 
The interviews took place after the completion of the four ships. A difficulty with asking about past 
behaviors is that issues with the last ship were probably more present in their minds, and might 
have distorted their perspective on issues in earlier ships. The four ships were mostly built 
consecutively. The original idea was to build one after another, however, due to some problems at 
the second ship, production of the third ship started before the second ship was finished. 
The shipyard building these four ships is organized as a corporate group with two semi-
independent production locations and a number of divisions (e.g., for piping, and for the production 
of metal sections) that have profit responsibility, and a number of different departments (e.g., 
Engineering, Purchasing, Production). Representatives of all parties involved in the four projects, 
both internally (at the shipyard) and externally were interviewed. 
In the second part of the study fifteen interviews with representatives from several departments 
of another shipyard, as well as its most important suppliers were conducted. These interviews were 
not focused on particular projects, because this shipyard and its suppliers were involved in multiple 
projects over time. All interviews were recorded and later transcribed. Table 2.1 gives an overview 
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TABLE 2.1 
Number of Parties, Interviews, and Individuals 







Shipyard I    
Internal departments of the shipyard 9 10 22 
External parties 11 12 29 
Sister companies 2 2 5 
Shipyard II    
Internal department of the shipyard 7 7 7 
External parties 5 8 8 
TOTAL 34 39 71 
 
 
The first round of interviews consisted of open-ended questions that revolved around several 
general themes related to collaboration. Examples of questions were, “What is your personal feeling 
about the collaboration in this project?”, “Can you give us examples of positive or negative incidents 
that influenced the collaboration between the different parties in the project?”, and “Are there 
differences in interests between your organization and another organization that influenced the 
collaboration between these organizations?” (see Appendix I for the interview protocol). 
The second round of interviews was focused more on issues related to interests. Questions such 
as “Do you have the feeling that there are differences of interest in the project?” and “How do these 
differences of interest reveal themselves in the project?” were asked. 
All interviews were held at the premises of the interviewees’ companies. All interviewees had 
managerial status in their organization, including both team leaders as well as higher-level 
managers. During the first round of interviews usually several people from the same organization 
were present at an interview to make the perspectives more representative for the focal 
organization. The unit of observation was the organizational level. This choice was made because 
the aim was to get a complete and consistent view of the organizational interests involved. 
Together the individuals represent the perspective of the organization as the aim of the research 
was to explore collaboration between companies. The disadvantage was that the presence of 
several representatives from one organization in one interview may have been a barrier to the 
individual perspectives. Individuals may be more inclined to discuss only the organizational 
interests when other people from their organization are present. This might be the reason that 
individual interests were hardly mentioned. We adapted our data collection in the second round of 
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interviewing. In this round only a single respondent was present in each interview to be better able 
to get a sense of interests at the individual level. 
 
Analyses 
Guided by the three broad types of social construction this study expected to be present, the 
interview data was inductively analyzed. The research started with several sensitizing concepts 
(Blumer, 1954; Bowen, 2006). These sensitizing concepts were taken as a starting point to guide 
the research. These concepts were not defined clearly yet, so as the interview progressed the 
boundaries of these concepts became clearer. The first concept was based on the notion of roles of a 
company in a project (Brusoni et al., 2009). This concept led to the idea representatives being 
instructed by their companies in line with these roles. The second sensitizing concepts was interest 
construction based on observations (Fleishman, 1988). This concept was more clearly defined in 
the literature and therefore needed less defining. The third concept that was used was based on the 
role of personal experiences (Grabher, 2002). These three sensitizing concepts were used to 
explore the processes of social construction of interests.  
The data is analyzed at the organizational level. The steps in the analysis were as follows. First 
all the transcriptions were read to get an idea of how the interviewees perceived the projects and 
their relationships with the other participants. Next the focus was on the identification of interests, 
and all the text fragments in which interviewees, directly or indirectly, referred to interests of self 
and others were marked. This study was particularly interested to see if the characteristics of the 
social dilemma would resonate in the interviews. In the subsequent step the text fragments were 
coded, when possible, as examples of interest constructions associated with organizational 
instructions, with observations of other project participants, and with previous experiences 
(outside the context of the focal project). In the final step of the analysis the text fragments within 
each of the three types of social construction of interests were looked at, to see if different subtypes 
or mechanisms could be identified. Moreover, the interviews were scanned to see if proposed 
solutions to the social dilemma were found. In Appendix II a coding example is given to illustrate 
the coding process used in this dissertation. 
 
FINDINGS 
The first round of interviews showed that in the construction of the four “copy” ships interests were 
closely linked to the interaction patterns in these projects. Participants were inclined to focus on 
their organization’s interest instead of the interests of the project. This was caused, first of all, 
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because at the pre-contractual phase the shipyard, based on the false believe that the ships to be 
built would simply be copies of an earlier order number, failed to ask or fully take into account 
inputs from the side of suppliers. The result was a contract that in most cases specified the separate 
inputs to be delivered, but not always sufficiently the interfaces between the various components. 
This led to disruptions of the construction process that increased costs, which the shipyard tried to 
shift to the subcontractors, who in response restricted their role to what formally was contracted, 
even if this led to further problems. Hence, clashes of interests were clearly present and openly 
discussed in the interviews. Also in the second round of data clashes of interests came to the fore in 
the interviews. Some participating organizations were nevertheless seen as highly collaborative 
and inclined to focus on the project interests, while other organizations were perceived to be 
looking only at their own organizational interests. 
Below this paper first reports what the interviewees told about conflicts of interest in the 
projects. After that this paper looks at the three processes of social construction of interests: 
organizational instructions, observations in the project at hand, and previous experiences. Finally 
the solutions to the conflicts of interests the interviewees suggested are discussed. 
 
Conflicts of Interests between Organizations 
This study is based on the expectation that the interests as they are constructed by the individuals 
involved will have an important influence on patterns of collaborative behaviors. Interestingly, 
various respondents explicitly referred to the interaction process in terms of a game in which 
characteristics of a social dilemma could be recognized. Some individuals were aware of the fact 
that all organizations could benefit from an integrated approach to collaboration: 
If you would look at the project from an integrated perspective […] then you would have a win-win 
situation, and not a looser and a winner (HVAC systems supplier) 
Now it is suboptimal in certain areas, you could move towards a global optimum. This is something 
of the shipyard, they are not used to the fact that there are parties that can think and work with 
them at their level. In the end it is an advantage for everybody, and then you create a win-win 
situation (propulsion systems supplier)  
The importance of clashes of interests was frequently expressed during the interviews: 
Because we are separate companies each of us tries to further his own interests as much as possible 
(propulsion systems supplier) 
Everyone has their own agenda, and everybody knows that (electrical engineering company) 
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Our interests sometimes collide; I think that is the basis of the troubles we have (internal piping 
division) 
To a certain extent even within companies each division puts its own interest ahead, as evidenced 
by the piping division of the shipyard declaring “for us the bottom line is leading”, and a propulsion 
systems supplier’s sales agent who laments that he is dependent on an unwilling internal 
production department. 
Some interviewees however observe behaviors pursuing the interests at the project level and 
believe in the long term benefits of this.  
They have realized that it was wise to try to look at the interest of all organizations instead of their 
own interests. In addition, in the long term it would be most optimal for them to collaborate and 
not let the situation escalate (project management department of the shipyard) 
Pursuing the project interests might be the much-needed improvement for the Dutch shipbuilding 
sector to survive. However, many find it difficult to work towards that situation. They all wait for 
other parties to take the first step, while sometimes also acknowledging that it is difficult for the 
other to move first, too.  
You should be able to focus all parties on the same goal and show them that it is about the total 
project. You do the right thing if you choose for a more expensive solution if that means that the 
other parties are better off, which in turn leads to a decrease in the total production costs of the 
ship. As long as you do not reach that point, everybody is sub-optimizing. They look at their own 
interests and search for the most efficient method for themselves, which does not serve the whole 
(electrical engineering company) 
All in all, the situation as sketched by the interviewees reflects many of the characteristics of a 
social dilemma. 
 
Categories of Factors Influencing Interests  
The three factors that were expected to influence the interests were also expressed by the 
individuals during the interviews. The first category that influences the perceived interests of the 
members of the multi-organizational project teams are the instructions they receive from their own 
organization. The lack of incentives on the level of the project as a whole makes it difficult for 
individuals to pursue this, because they would put themselves in a vulnerable position. A prevailing 
incentive mentioned by many respondents is the bottom line of their own organization. This 
perspective makes that the individuals are inclined to act according to the perceived organizational 
interests and not the project interests.   
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Previously there was unity; they [the shipyard and the subcontractors] had the feeling of being part 
of a team. […] Thirty years ago the shipyard sold a complete product; the different disciplines were 
then part of the shipyard. After that these disciplines were outsourced. It is difficult to create a 
feeling of unity with these subcontractors. Everybody has their own budget, which they are held 
responsible for. Every subcontractor only looks at their own budget (certification company) 
No matter how upright a person is, if he is on the payroll of another company […] there is a 
potential confusion of interests (electrical engineering company) 
This study found three underlying issues related to instructions in the interviews. The first is the 
dependency of the organization on the project. Some organizations only serve the shipbuilding 
market. These organizations tend to be highly dependent on the shipyard. Other organizations have 
diversified into several markets, and the projects studied were only a small part of their business. 
Suppliers that are highly dependent on shipbuilding stimulate boundary-spanning employees not to 
antagonize the shipyard. Less dependent suppliers steer their representatives more in the direction 
of the organizational interests. Hence employees of an organization that is highly dependent on the 
project might receive instructions to pursue the interests more in line with project interests than 
individuals of a less dependent organization. 
The second issue refers to the profit expectations of the focal organization. Suppliers expecting 
to make a profit on a project perceive their interests differently than organizations that expect to 
make a loss. Profit-making organizations can afford to put the project interests and long-term gains 
ahead of their own short-term organizational interests. 
If your financial leeway is reduced you will assume a less flexible position towards the shipyard 
(HVAC systems supplier) 
There are parties where you notice when they are tight on their budget and they get the instruction 
to get as much out of the project as possible. You can see it if a party has calculated the hours and 
costs correctly [or not], you see it in their behavior (production department of the shipyard) 
The question can be asked whether these first two factors are social constructions or rather 
“hard” objective facts. This paper purports that this is at least partially the case. It’s not the “real” 
dependency and future profits of a company participating in a project that influence behavior, but 
what individuals believe on the basis of what they say to and hear from others. This of course does 
not negate that companies can also objectively be put under pressure and/or incur losses on a 
project, however, in an ongoing project much of this exists mainly as perceptions. Moreover, this 
paper surmises that these two issues mentioned above are subsidiary to the third and more 
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fundamental factor, the strategic role an organization defines for itself, and this is without doubt a 
social construction. 
Since the interviews were restricted to the project level the present study has not been able to 
uncover the processes leading to a particular strategic stance at the different organizations 
involved, nor at the mechanisms linking that strategic identity to the instructions and incentives 
given to their representatives in the projects. But this seems to be a necessary step for future 
research in order to develop a more complete understanding of the factors hampering a way to 
overcome a social dilemma in the Dutch shipbuilding industry.  
We focus on the product as such, not on the integrated solution (propulsion systems supplier) 
Why, for instance has the propulsion systems supplier quoted above chosen to define itself as a 
component supplier, rather than as a provider of integrated solutions? 
The second prevalent issue that forms the interests of the individuals in the organization is the 
observation of behavior of other participants in the project. From the interviews it appears that it is 
important how other individuals behave. The interviewees indicate that they mirror the behavior of 
other individuals. 
If he does not participate then I am also not going to participate (electrical engineering company) 
When there is somebody at the other side of the table who is resisting we can also do that 
(electrical engineering company)  
When it gets busy, everybody gets a bit… you have to go for yourself at that moment and then it 
becomes … embittered is not really the right word (electrical engineering company) 
In particular the behavior of the shipyard is important for the perceptions and behavior in the 
project. The shipyard is the coordinating party and therefore sets an example of the type of 
behavior expected. This is mentioned by several interviewees: 
The attitude of the shipyard is very important. If the shipyard takes on the project with the 
intention of doing it together, and carries out that message in the project meetings effectively, only 
then, provided that the parties are open for the idea, it can go much easier (HVAC systems supplier) 
Additionally, the contracts governing the project have an impact on the behavior and consequently 
on the interests in the project. Ambiguously defined contracts make that organizations might take 
decisions by themselves about what is or is not included in the contract. Issues that might fall 
between the contractual tasks of two collaborating organizations have to be solved by the shipyard. 
Organizations act as implied by their contracts. The contracts can give incentives to the 
organizations to act in the interests of the project, or not. The form of the contract is therefore 
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important for the pursuit of interests of the individuals in the project (but, as stated earlier, the 
contract is also a reflection of pre-existing social constructions of interests). 
 
The last category of factors influencing the perceptions of interests of the partners is the personal 
experiences from previous projects. The relationships that individuals build with other individuals 
are essential for the collaboration in the project. Individuals are more inclined to ‘give and take’ 
with individuals from other organizations when they have positive past experiences. 
I do believe that certain feelings from the past have played a role with that person. If something 
was wrong, it stayed wrong, it could not get better anymore (engineering department of the 
shipyard) 
In the past I was really flexible with that, but I got a smack in the face several times. Now as long as 
they do not give an assignment I do not do anything. It is a rigid disposition, but it is the only fair 
one. In the past we were flexible with that (HVAC systems supplier) 
But some respondents also mention good experiences, and that these form the basis of a good 
working relationship in the present project: “That is something you have built up over the years” 
(electro technical supplier). 
Interviewees seemed to find it difficult to overcome negative feelings stemming from bad 
experiences. These were often associated with particular individuals from other organizations. For 
future research it might be interesting to examine the difference in impact of bad experiences with 
organizations or with specific individuals. It would also be interesting to analyze cases in which 
there is a contradiction between personal experiences and the instructions given by the own 
organization. For instance, what happens if a boundary spanner has good personal experiences 
with a counterpart, but is instructed to focus on the interests of the own organization only? 
Comparing the three types of social construction as reflected in the interviews, it is striking us 
that many respondents spontaneously refer to organizational influences. When asked about 
interests related to the project, individuals tend to stay within their organizational role, and to 
identify with the goals of their organization. Expressions of individual interest were rare, and even 
if pressed interviewees were reluctant to differentiate between their own personal interests and 
those of their organization. Observations of behaviors of other parties in the project were also 
mentioned quite readily, but specific experiences from past projects surfaced less frequently. From 
these observations it can be concluded that the instructions individuals receive from their 
organizations were the predominant source of social construction of project-related interests in 
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this study. It has to be emphasized, however, that the strong identification of interviewees with 
these organizational interests implies that they actually did not need “instructions”. 
 
Towards Integrative Collaboration? 
There are indications of a gradually deteriorating relationship between the shipyard and a number 
of (internal and external) suppliers, suggesting vicious cycles of decreasing cooperation: 
We are not compensated for the additional work we do. As a result we stick to the contract. […] 
Next time we will not be eager any more to help solve a problem (internal piping division) 
In earlier order numbers we have tightened the screws on them and refused to pay for certain 
things. If you do that you can expect the same response, but if it happens we think it’s not fair 
(production department of the shipyard)  
As noted when describing the fragmented interests of the organizations, many respondents 
stated that it would be desirable to overcome these conflicting interests, and move towards 
integrated collaboration. However, interviewees also identified a number of obstacles: 
Shipyards are afraid that if they select suppliers early in the process, they will not pay market rates 
(electrical engineering company) 
We are willing to take the risk of system integration, but not in the role we are currently playing 
(electrical engineering company) 
In the construction phase the shipyard is willing to share knowledge, but less so or not at all in the 
pre-contractual phase. Then they stick to the commercial game (HVAC systems supplier) 
These quotes illustrate that many project participants recognize the social dilemma aspects of the 
shipbuilding process, but that they don’t see a way out of it. As far as solutions are mentioned, two 
interrelated suggestions are made. First of all, the shipyard would need to select key suppliers at a 
much earlier stage, before the final contract with the client is finalized, and commit to these 
suppliers. 
What is needed is that in a very early stage one says, we will participate, then we will also be open 
concerning costs and benefits, etc., and then we also want a commitment [from the shipyard]. Are 
we going to bring in the order together? (HVAC systems supplier) 
This approach implies a “structural solution” (Kollock, 1998), changing the incentive structure in 
such a way that the suppliers would be certain that investments made early in the process would 
not remain without compensation. However, this solution has the serious drawback that it would 
bring the shipyard in the vulnerable position “not to pay market rates”. 
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Secondly, many interviewees suggest that the quality of the relationship needs to be improved, 
in terms of transparency, trust, and respect for each other’s knowledge and expertise.  
 [If you want to create a win-win situation] you need to be transparent, you need to trust each other 
(HVAC systems supplier) 
This second type of observations reverberates with what Kollock (1998) calls “motivational 
solutions”. Looking at these statements it is striking that respondents are often ambivalent, for 
instance, a purchaser from the shipyard states “we need to move towards partnership, look beyond 
a single project”, but in the next sentence he also says “commercially we can still improve, get the 
maximum out of it financially”. 
Finally it was observed that self-defined organizational identities were important. This was true 
even within the shipyards. At one of the production locations of a shipyard it was observed that 
“pre-contractually suppliers talk like co-makers, but once there is a contract they talk like 
subcontractors”. The piping division of the shipyard, however, stated “if we want payment we are 
subcontractors, but if they do acquisition we are part of the Group”. These quotes relate to who 
organizations or parts thereof want to be, the strategic role they want to play. This points in the 
direction of the third type of solutions to social dilemmas described by Kollock (1998): strategic 
solutions. If the principal organizations involved in a shipbuilding project define themselves as 
players involved in longer-term relations, this will be conducive to the realization of structural as 
well as motivational solutions to the social dilemma. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Social dilemmas are situations in which each individual party in a collaboration receives a higher 
payoff for the socially defecting choice than for the cooperative choice, no matter what the other 
parties do, and in which all individuals are better off if all cooperate than if all defect. The 
interviews show that these characteristics apply to multi-organizational projects in the 
shipbuilding industry. 
Furthermore, this paper expected that perceptions of interest of self and others in the context of 
these shipbuilding projects would be influenced by three types of social construction: explicit and 
implicit instructions organizations give to their boundary spanners participating in the project 
team (Adams, 1976), observed behaviors within the project team (Fleishman, 1988), and previous 
experiences with the same organizations or individuals (Grabher, 2002). All three of these social 
influences could be identified, but in the interviews the instructions from the interviewees’ 
organizations were featured particularly prominently. This points to the self-definition of these 
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organizations’ identities and roles as a significant issue (Ahola, 2009). This “strategic” aspect of 
finding a solution to the shipbuilding social dilemma is all the more important as it seems to be 
indispensable for “structural” and “motivational” solutions to their part of the job (Kollock, 1998). 
The interviewees were also questioned regarding the possible solutions to the social dilemma 
situation, and their answers appeared to reflect a deep understanding of the intricacies of this 
predicament. 
This study is characterized by several limitations, each of which suggests future research 
directions. Those that seem the most prominent are mentioned. First of all, this study has 
conducted a limited number of interviews that offer only a cross-sectional view of collaboration 
processes that are of an inherently dynamic nature. This is all the more important since several 
respondents pointed at the strong influence of an organization’s financial expectations on their 
attitude towards the project. This means that an organization that early in the project had a 
collaborative stance can become more focused on its immediate self-interest if a loss on the project 
is expected. Thus a snapshot of perceived interests at only one point in time may fail to reveal the 
whole picture. This limitation calls for a more longitudinal approach, in which the parties involved 
in a multi-organizational project are followed over time. 
Secondly, one could ask the question to what extent a sensitive issue like conflicts of interests 
can reliably be gauged in interviews. There is a risk that interviewees would rhetorically adhere to 
a collaborative stance, while in reality focusing on their own immediate interests. Sometimes such 
rhetorics were revealed when respondents made conflicting statements in a single interview. But it 
cannot be exclude that in some instances a declared collaborative approach may have been no more 
than verbal behavior. In this respect, too, a more longitudinal approach in future research would be 
recommended. Even if collaborative intentions can be feigned in a single interview, they would 
likely be revealed as false in a series of interviews over time with multiple stakeholders involved in 
the same shipbuilding project. 
Overall, the interviews revealed a pattern of perceived interests that make a shift to “integrative 
collaboration” problematic. Nevertheless, many of our interviewees declared that such an approach 
would be preferable, and maybe even necessary for the Dutch shipbuilding industry to survive. The 
shift to integrative collaboration seems to be predicated on an early selection and involvement of 
key suppliers, who would then openly share knowledge and share in the risks of the project. This 
calls for a new definition of the strategic roles and even identities of both the shipyards and the 
suppliers. More insights into how companies (in the shipbuilding industry as well as elsewhere) 
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come to define and change their strategic identities are therefore needed, and this seems to be an 







ACCOUNTS OF INTEREST: DIALOGUE AND COLLABORATION  





In multi-organizational projects (MOPs) problems may arise due to divergent interests of the 
different parties. These differences of interest often have the characteristics of a social dilemma. In 
this paper it is argued that perceptions of interests of self and others in such situation are 
influenced by discursive social construction processes, and this paper focuses on the accounts 
participants in an MOP give of these interests. The aim is to theorize under which conditions 
dialogue leading to perceptions of interest commensurate with collaboration is most likely to arise 
in the context of an MOP. Temporal embeddedness, equality, scope of mandate and co-location of 
actors are important design parameters conducive for productive dialogue. The likelihood for 
productive dialogue to arise varies between different types of organizational roles in MOPs. 
Particular combinations of design parameters and organizational roles are argued to lead to the 
production of accounts compatible with collaboration, which in turn increases the likelihood of 





                                                             




Many industries become more project oriented, in which different disciplines work together in a 
team while working on one project. A multi-organizational project, or “MOP”, is a project in which 
multiple organizations work together on a single product. For each project, the project team may be 
different, composed of different organizations. Examples of MOPs can be found in the construction, 
aerospace, motion picture, defense, and shipbuilding industries (Gann & Salter, 2000; Scarbrough et 
al., 2004).  
Essential in these multidisciplinary and multi-organizational teams is collaboration (Zeng & 
Chen, 2003). However, effective collaboration between organizations is not easy. One problem in 
these interorganizational relationships is keeping the goals and interests of the participants aligned 
(Hardy et al., 2005). This tension is particularly salient in project-based industries where multiple 
organizations come together in a temporary coalition to carry out a particular project (Kenis, 
Janowicz-panjaitan, & Cambré, 2009). Coordination problems among others may arise because the 
interests of the different parties are typically only partly aligned, frequently giving rise to situations 
with social dilemma-like characteristics (McCarter, Mahoney, & Northcraft, 2011).  
A social dilemma is a game defined by two characteristics: (1) each player receives a higher 
payoff for a socially defecting choice than for a socially cooperative choice, no matter what the 
other players do; and (2) collectively all players are better off if all cooperate than if all defect 
(Dawes, 1980). Social dilemmas are situations in which the rationality of an individual leads to 
collective irrationality (Kollock, 1998). The construction industry, for instance, is notorious for the 
incidence of social dilemma-like problems. These problems arise because in a construction project 
of some complexity the tasks of the various participants can never be fully specified ex ante. During 
project execution this can create opportunities for holdup, claims for additional work, or other 
forms of opportunistic behavior (depending on the contractual medium). This behavior can assume 
quite extreme forms: “One device is to move any idle plant and labor onto a job where a delay is 
anticipated. Thus, when the delay occurs, the contractor is able to claim day rates for the idle 
resources” (Rooke et al., 2004: 659). As a result costs of failure and rework in construction projects 
are high (Love & Edwards, 2005; Zaghloul & Hartman, 2003), and everybody would be better off if 
the social dilemma could be resolved through some form of collaboration (Hardin, 1968; Weber et 
al., 2004).  
A social dilemma involves multiple players and makes it therefore different from two–player 
games in three ways. Firstly, all harm of the non-cooperative choice (defection) is spread out 
between the players, instead of focused on the other player in a two-player game. Secondly, the 
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defecting behavior is more likely to be kept anonymous than in a two-player game (Jap, 2001). 
Thirdly, players cannot as easily shape the behavior of other players by punishing or rewarding 
players (Dawes, 1980; Kollock, 1998; Zeng & Chen, 2003). Due to the lack of punishment and 
reward and the difficulty of shaping other individual’s behavior it is more difficult to achieve 
collaboration in a multi-player setting than in a two-player dilemma (Zeng & Chen, 2003). Two 
individuals might collaborate in an MOP. However, collaborative behavior towards the collective 
interests of all players is needed to solve the social dilemma. The interdependence of the players 
makes that all the players need to collaborate and work together towards their collective interests 
in order to overcome the social dilemma characteristics present in an MOP.  
Several authors have applied a social dilemma approach to collaboration situations such as 
multi-party alliances (McCarter et al., 2011; Zeng & Chen, 2003). Characteristic of these 
collaboration situations is the dependence of the participating organizations on each other. The 
behavior of the participants affects the outcome of all participants. Project based settings differ 
from organizational relationships predominantly by its limited temporality. This temporality 
involves milestones and deadlines that shape the collaboration in projects (Lundin & Söderholm, 
1995). Additionally, the team in an MOP consists of representatives from different organizations, 
who can have diverging goals and interests (Hardy et al., 2005). The limited temporality in 
combination with the team consisting of representatives from different organizations makes these 
MOPs different from multi-party alliances, intra-organizational teams, cross-sector partnerships or 
meta-organizations (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2005).  
Possible solutions to the social dilemma as identified by Kollock (1998) are structural, 
motivational and strategic solutions. Structural solutions aim at changing the pay-off structure, 
which would involve strict monitoring and sanctioning (Kollock, 1998). However, when there are 
many parties, such as in the situation of a MOP, it may be difficult to identify a defector (Zeng & 
Chen, 2003) and the ability and willingness to administer punishment may be questionable 
(Osterloh, Frost, & Frey, 2002). This paper focuses on the behavior of individuals in these social 
dilemmas and is not concerned with changing the payoff structure. Motivational and strategic 
solutions focus on making collaboration more attractive (Kollock, 1998). This gives reason to 
believe that such social dilemmas need to be solved through some form of collaboration (Hardin, 
1968; Weber et al., 2004). 
Rational choice theory assumes that the self-interest motivation of economic actors is given 
(Monroe, 2001; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Weber et al., 2004). However, many authors have 
questioned this perspective on interests (Justice, 2006; Monroe, 1994; Whittle & Mueller, 2011). 
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They argue that the social context of individuals influences the perceptions of interests. In addition, 
if interests of self and others are products of discursive social construction processes (Whittle, 
Suhomlinova, & Mueller, 2010), the dilemma is at least partly of the participants’ own making (cf. 
Gore & Cross, 2011). According to Clegg (1989: 181) “It cannot be maintained that interests are 
formulated outside the conditions of particular discursive practices and struggles”. This paper will 
make a case that the construction of interests is closely linked to the type of collaboration in a 
project. Particular discursive processes are more likely to lead to socially constructed notions of the 
interests of self and others that are congruent with the common interests. 
Economics literature assumes that in the context of a social dilemma different types of 
collaborative behavior can be distinguished. One way the literature characterizes collaborative 
behavior is the continuum of “perfunctory collaboration” to “consummate collaboration” 
(Williamson, 1975). Perfunctory collaboration refers to job performance according to minimally 
acceptable standards. Consummate collaboration, in contrast, refers to “an affirmative job attitude – 
to include the use of judgment, filling gaps, and taking initiative in an instrumental way” 
(Williamson, 1975: 69). Another similar continuum existing in the bargaining literature ranges 
from distributive to integrative collaboration. Distributive collaboration competes for the joint 
outcome, while integrative collaboration aims for jointly making the pie as large as possible 
(Larsson et al., 1998; Walton & McKersie, 1965). This paper uses the terms perfunctory and 
consummate collaboration because the focus on the job attitude fits the purpose of this paper. 
In many instances moving towards more consummate collaboration seems to be imperative in 
order to solve the social dilemmas in MOPs. As this paper discusses in more detail further on, 
consummate collaboration consists of precisely those behaviors that are needed to prevent or solve 
social dilemmas (see Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2010). Therefore it is no surprise that there are 
many initiatives to improve collaboration in MOP-based industries. In the construction industry, for 
example, programs for improving collaboration have been initiated in many countries (Dewulf & 
Noorderhaven, 2011, describe four such programs). Research has shown it has become more 
pressing to answer questions of what it actually is that is tapped into with these interviews, and 
how what the respondents say can be assumed to relate to (changes in) the level of collaboration in 
the MOP have become increasingly more pressing. This paper aims to contribute to the formulation 
of an answer to these questions. 
The starting point is formed by the accounts given by actors, where accounts are defined as 
“story-like” interpretations and explanations social actors give for the behavior of self and others in 
specific situations (see Orbuch, 1997, for a discussion of the use of the concept in sociological 
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research). Accounts of participants in MOPs can be of many different natures, and pertain, e.g., to 
technical expertise or to legitimate and illegitimate courses of action. Given the interest in social 
dilemmas this paper is specifically focusing on accounts of interests. A social dilemma can be seen as 
a mental representation of interrelated interests: “if I cooperate it will be in his interest to defect, 
but then it is also in my interest to defect, etc.”. This paper employs a discursive perspective, i.e., 
this paper is interested in how the discourse reflected in these accounts is related to social 
dilemmas in MOPs and to possible ways to resolve these dilemmas. A “discourse” can be defined as 
“a connected set of statements, concepts, terms, and expressions which constitutes a way of talking 
and writing about a particular issue, thus framing the way people understand and act with respect 
to that issue” (Watson, 1994: 113). This paper will discuss the concept more deeply further on. 
Adoption of a discursive perspective is based on the assumption that what participants in MOPs say 
in an interview is more than just “cheap talk”. If it is assumed that the realities individuals deal with 
in collaboration are socially constructed and maintained as well as changed through discourse 
(Hardy et al., 2005), changing a complex social system like an MOP will first and foremost take the 
form of changed conversations, resulting in changed accounts of reality by participants. These 
changed accounts are associated with the possibility of changed behavior, but this also depends on 
the change of accounts and behaviors by other participants in the MOP, as well as of actors in the 
wider social environment. The questions now are what causes accounts by some participants to 
change, and others to remain unchanged, and what configuration of changes in accounts is 
ultimately able to tip the balance, and move an MOP or even an entire organizational field towards a 
discourse of consummate collaboration. 
The purpose of this paper is firstly to theorize under which conditions productive dialogue 
leading to consummate collaboration accounts is most likely to arise in the context of an MOP. This 
paper formulates propositions concerning the likelihood that particular accounts of interest will be 
produced by particular types of actors under particular conditions. Several authors have discussed 
factors that lead to productive dialogue (Habermas, 1979; Mansbridge, Hartz-Karp, Amengual, & 
Gastil, 2006). Productive dialogue is assumed to be achieved in a similar manner for different 
hierarchical levels. However, Corley (2004) argues that individuals from different hierarchical 
levels have different frames of reference. This leads to the conclusion that individuals from 
different hierarchical levels have different perceptions. Few authors have investigated the aspect of 
roles or hierarchical levels in relation to collaboration (Hardy et al., 2005). Therefore, this paper is 
interested in how the hierarchical level of individuals influences the conditions of productive 
dialogue to come to consummate collaboration. Additionally, the relationship between dialogue and 
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collaboration has been researched before (Hardy et al., 2005). What is still missing is how dialogue 
can contribute to consummate collaboration. This paper takes the next step by developing 
hypotheses about conditions leading to consummate collaboration.  
Secondly, this paper will conjecture what type of constellation of consummate and perfunctory 
collaboration accounts will be most likely to lead over time to an overall change in discourse 
(towards more consummate types of collaboration), and what type of constellation is more likely to 
revert to perfunctory types of collaboration. The complex change processes that we are considering 
here cannot easily be captured in straightforward statement of cause-effect relations. Hence this 
paper formulates more tentative conclusions concerning the likelihood that particular 
configurations of accounts of interests will ultimately tip the balance, and shift the organizational 
field to a more consummate mode of collaboration. 
The next section elaborates on the view of MOPs as socially constructed dilemmas, and discusses 
the process of social construction of interests through discourse. Next this paper turns to accounts 
of interests and explores discursive processes that may give rise to accounts of interests congruent 
with consummate collaboration in MOPs. This paper distinguishes between different types of 
conversation, and singles out dialogue as the type most likely to be generative of accounts of 
interest congruent with consummate collaboration. Subsequently, it is examined where in the 
context of an MOP, conditions for dialogue are more and less promising, and speculate on how 
discourse needs to change in order to make a shift to consummate collaboration possible at the 
level of an MOP or even the organizational field. This paper ends with a discussion and conclusions. 
 
MULTI-ORGANIZATIONAL PROJECTS AS SOCIAL DILEMMAS 
Generally the interests pursued by an individual can range on a continuum from self-interest to 
collective interest (Hardin, 1968; Monroe, 1994; Polzer, 2004; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Self-interested 
actions are defined as actions that aim at fulfilling a personal benefit, goal or desire (Cropanzano, 
Goldman, & Folger, 2005). Collective interests satisfy the goals of the collective of players, which 
means that the self-interests of the individual are aligned with the collective interests (Monroe, 
1994). Self-interests and collective interests may be perceived differently by each actor involved 
(Medlin, 2006). In a social dilemma each player can choose from a continuum of behaviors ranging 
from a non-cooperative, defecting choice where the individual player pursues his self-interests, to a 
cooperative choice which maximizes the outcomes for all players collectively (Dawes, 1980). 
Two types of conflict of interests can be observed in a social dilemma. The first conflict of 
interest pertains to a conflict between the individual and collective interests (Van Lange & Joireman, 
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2008). In the cooperative choice the actor chooses to pursue the collective interests, while in the 
non-cooperative choice only the individual interests are fulfilled. The second type of conflict is a 
temporal conflict between short-term and long term interests (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). 
Although a non-cooperative choice may be beneficial for the individual in the short term, repetitive 
interaction makes the cooperative choice more beneficial in the longer run (Weber & Murnighan, 
2008). Individual self-interested action undermines the cooperation, however, which causes the 
“cooperation problem” (Weber & Murnighan, 2008: 1340). The two conflicts of interests are linked: 
the temporal conflict only exists if cooperative behavior of others in both the current and future 
games is believed to be possible. Actors thus face several dilemmas when making the choice on a 
continuum of cooperative and non-cooperative types of behavior. 
The tensions that exist in situations associated with social dilemmas can also be seen in multi-
party collaboration forms such as MOPs (McCarter et al., 2011; Zeng & Chen, 2003). On the one 
hand parties need to collaborate if they want to achieve the best overall project result. On the other 
hand, parties may have a tendency to compete with each other or withhold efforts, because the 
benefits of the collaboration are shared among the parties, in contrast to the benefits directly 
associated with a socially defecting choice (Zeng & Chen, 2003). Conceptualizing MOPs as social 
dilemmas implies that it is assumed that MOPs are frequently characterized by constellations of 
interests such that the pursuit of individual goals leads to collectively suboptimal outcomes. In this 
context this paper prefers to use the concepts of perfunctory and consummate collaboration, rather 
than defecting and cooperating choices, as the issue is not so much that parties may choose not to 
cooperate at all, as that they may cooperate insufficiently to maximize the outcomes of the MOP to 
all participants. Defecting behavior is comparable to perfunctory collaboration. This type of 
behavior typically involves greater immediate individual gains, but smaller mutual payoffs for the 
collective. Defecting and perfunctory behavior both aim at the individual interests. These types of 
behavior can include collaboration with others, but with only the goal of furthering one’s own 
interests. Aiming for minimally acceptable standards in a job often satisfies the individual’s 
interests and may hinder the collective interests, and thus corresponds with the defection option. 
Examples of defective and perfunctory behavior in an MOP could be finding solutions only 
beneficial for their own organization and performing actions that further the accomplishment of 
one’s own task, but hinder others in their work. Consummate behavior is analogous to a 
cooperative choice, which means a certain degree of self-renunciation, where a part of the 
individual payoff is sacrificed for a larger collective gain (Brown et al., 2010). Going beyond they 
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contract by using an affirmative job attitude would be beneficial for the collective interests and thus 
corresponds to the cooperative choice in the social dilemma. 
This paper sees perfunctory and consummate collaboration as part of a continuum. Larsson et al 
(1998) argue that the traditional division between competition and collaboration neglects the 
perspective that these can exist together. Although in a project both competitive and collaborative 
behavior can exist at the same time, this paper assumes that both types of behavior cannot be 
portrayed simultaneously in an encounter with another individual. Consummate and perfunctory 
behavior can be seen as opposite types of behavior rather than mutually reinforcing concepts. The 
conflicts of interests as described above, individual versus collective interests and short term 
versus long term interests, indicate the opposite intentions between perfunctory and consummate 
types of behavior. Each end of the continuum aims for opposite goals. Therefore, perfunctory and 
consummate collaboration are opposing concepts and are constructed as a dualism. 
So far, this paper has discussed social dilemmas in MOPs as structures of incentives that are 
taken as given by the participants. However, as indicated in the Introduction of this paper, it is 
argued that these situations are socially constructed through discourse. For instance, as noted by 
Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) the time frame within which the decision to cooperate is placed may 
strongly influence the collaborative choice. Such a frame is by definition not objectively given, but 
becomes focal as a result of psychological and social factors (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011). This paper 
wishes to make a more general argument here, viz., that what an individual considers her self-
interest is the result of discursive social processes. Individuals participate in collective meanings 
through discourse, hence the mediation of language plays a pivotal role in the social construction 
process (Patriotta & Spedale, 2009). This is even the case when social influences are ostensibly not 
mediated by language, for instance, if someone observes the behaviors of others. Observed 
behaviors of self and others (including discursive behaviors) are integrated in a person’s “self-
narrative” (Bruner, 2004) in a sensemaking process that is of a fundamentally linguistic nature 
(Robichaud, Giroux, & Taylor, 2004).  
Theories based on (rational) choice implicitly or explicitly assume that the individual is 
transparent to herself. I know who I am, and what I want is self-evident to me. However, the 
increasingly radical questioning of the possibility of complete self-understanding is one of the 
dominant motives of twentieth-century social philosophy (see, e.g., Gadamer, 1976; Ricoeur, 1991). 
What one’s interests are, or one’s ordering of preferences, is something one needs to discover or 
even invent. Going a step further, this paper assumes that our conception of what is in our interest 
is largely a social construction. This was also suggested by Bagozzi (1995: 274) when he tentatively 
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hypothesized that “some felt desires are in fact implicitly (i.e., mentally through vicarious or similar 
processes) or explicitly (i.e., through negotiation or other social processes) constructed jointly with 
others”. In a social constructivist view actors construct their interests by looking at each other and 
by responding to what they see (Scott, 1995: 137). Wildavsky (1994) takes issue with the 
assumption of rational choice theory that interests are self-evident, and mainly associated with 
personal material gain. Outside of a social context interests have little meaning. This paper agrees 
with Wildavsky, but where this author links social construction of interests to “cultures” or “ways of 
life”, this is deemed to be a too general approach. For the purpose of this study it is important to 
look more precisely how interests are socially constructed, not within a society or culture, but in a 
much more circumscribed group of individuals, like the managers and employees involved in an 
MOP. It is also important to highlight the fundamentally discursive nature of the process of social 
construction of interests. Language is not merely an instrument to communicate desires and 
preferences, it is the meaning expressed in language through which these desires and preferences 
come into being (Gadamer, 1976). Consequently, “interests cannot precede the discourse but are an 
effect of it” (Lawrence, Phillips, & Hardy, 1999: 491). 
At this juncture it is appropriate to indicate the position this paper assumes in the debate on 
discursive approaches. First of all, this paper adheres to the general notion of discourse analysis 
that any view of language as just reflecting the “reality” is inadequate (Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2000a). Far from simply reflecting the reality (even such as it is subjectively perceived by the 
speaker), language can distort, hide, select or even invent realities (Lawrence et al., 1999). The last 
point is fundamental to discursive analysis: language constructs reality, rather than simply 
reflecting it (Hardy et al., 2005), and discourses “do not just describe things; they do things” (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987: 6). Two quite different types of discourse analysis share this foundation of the 
constitutive nature of language. On the one hand there are approaches that are strongly focused on 
texts. Elements of discourse are seen to influence other elements of discourse, but not necessarily 
any reality outside of the text. The second type of approach studies social reality as discursively 
constructed and maintained (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000b). Given the interest in processes of 
collaboration within MOPs it is clear that a purely textual analysis cannot be satisfactory. Imagine, 
for instance, that it would prove to be possible that an organizational field would shift completely to 
a discourse of consummate collaboration, while practices of collaboration (e.g., in the sense of the 
holdup tactics in construction projects sketched in the Introduction) would continue to display the 
features of perfunctory collaboration, or worse. If that were the case “talk” would be completely 
isolated from “action”. Hence, the analysis is predicated on the assumption that “talk is not cheap” 
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(Ford & Ford, 1995), and the link between accounts and action is crucial. Actors who are opaque to 
themselves and live in an ambiguous social world need stories that tell them what they are and 
what is the appropriate thing to do in a particular situation (Beadle & Moore, 2006). This “logic of 
appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 2004) is very different than the logic of consequence supposedly 
followed by a fully rational actor who has absolute certainty about his preferences (Weber et al., 
2004). Hence, making sense of these stories is necessary to come to meaningful action. 
Before moving to a discussion of the type of discourse that might lead to these new accounts of 
the interests of self and others, further explication on the position regarding the ontological status 
of discursive constructions is needed. Many industries produce very tangible material products like 
buildings, ships, or technical installations. Are these material objects more “real”, or “real” in 
another way, than the discursive social constructions this study focuses on? Watzlawick (1976, 
1990) distinguishes between “first-order” and “second-order” realties. The term first-order reality 
refers to “the physically demonstrable and publicly discernible characteristics, qualities, or 
attributes of a thing, event, or situation” (Ford & Ford, 2009: 228). The second order reality is 
created through discursive social construction, by giving meaning to the first-order reality. For 
instance, the fact that contractor A has located particular equipment and employees on a particular 
construction site and at a particular date is part of first-order reality. Whether this constitutes a 
legitimate ground for claims or opportunistic behavior is part of the second-order reality. A change 
of discourse implies a change of the second-order reality and thus of interpretations of the first 
order reality. And as people act on the basis of their interpretations (Watzlawick, 1990), this will 
also impact on the first-order reality. 
If changing a discourse were an easy process, social reality would become intolerably fickle. But 
in fact socially constructed second-order reality is quite resilient. Under conditions of business-as-
usual, actors tend to make no distinction between first-order and second-order realities, i.e., events 
and their interpretations of these. Only when these two realities are pulled apart through reflective 
discourse the possibility of attaching a different meaning to a given first-order reality becomes 
clear (cf. Senge, 1990). What makes this so hard, is that over time and across a multitude of 
conversations and sensemaking episodes a given interpretation of issues, interests and identities 
becomes increasingly “laminated” (Boden, 1994: 76) or “sedimented”, and hence extremely hard to 
dislodge (Lawrence et al., 1999: 498). Such a “connected set of statements, concepts, terms, and 
expressions which constitutes a way of talking and writing about a particular issue, thus framing 
the way people understand and act with respect to that issue” (Watson, 1994: 113), is in discourse 
analysis sometimes indicated as the “Discourse” (with capital “D”), while “discourse” stands for the 
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separate contributions to this ongoing conversation (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000b; Fairhurst & 
Putnam, 2004). In the next section this paper will argue that one particular type of conversation, 
dialogue, has characteristics that privilege it for changing a Discourse.  
 
CONVERSATIONS AND ACCOUNTS OF INTEREST 
This paper is interested in accounts of interests of self and others of participants of MOPs because it 
takes the narratives individuals produce about their collaboration with business partners to be a 
strong factor influencing their behavior. Accounts pertaining to (self-) interests are bound to take a 
central position in these narratives, because of the dominance of the assumption of self-interest, at 
least in Western societies. This causes individuals to overstate the extent to which their own 
behavior is guided by self-interest, and to assume self-interest from others when no clear counter-
information is available (Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001; Vuolevi & Van Lange, 2010). This 
paper does not purport that shifting from perfunctory to more consummate collaboration in an 
MOP requires a renunciation of self-interest (in self and others). Instead, what is needed is a change 
in the contents of what are believed to be rational and legitimate self-interests in the context of 
collaborating in an MOP. 
To make this more concrete, this paper takes a closer look at what is implied with “consummate 
collaboration” (or “cooperation”). This concept was introduced by Blau and Scott (1962), and taken 
up by Williamson (1975) and many other scholars in organizational economics. Brown, Potoski & 
Van Slyke (2010) applied the concept to interorganizational collaboration in the production of 
complex products, and equated perfunctory collaboration with a defective move in a game and 
consummate collaboration with a cooperative choice. Consummate collaboration includes 
behaviors like exerting efforts beyond what can be contractually enforced, taking initiatives when 
opportunities for mutual gains arise, and assuming responsibility when matters fall between the 
cracks of formal arrangements (see Blau & Scott, 1962; Clague, 1993). More generally, consummate 
collaboration in the context of an MOP would seem to require a shared social construction of what 
good collaboration is (Keller & Loewenstein, 2011). This could for instance include an emphasis on 
longer-term, rather than short-term interests, which steers participants away from immediate 
material self-interest (Hunt, Kim, Borgida, & Chaiken, 2010). In accounts of interests congruent 
with consummate collaboration, then, interests of self and others could be associated with the 
longer term outcomes, with effort exertion beyond the contractually enforceable, with initiative 
taking and with assuming responsibility when necessary. 
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Whereas all conversations may be expected to impact on accounts rendered by the participants, 
not all types of conversations are equally likely to contribute to accounts of interests congruent 
with consummate collaboration. Franco (2006) distinguishes five types of conversation: 
negotiation, debate, persuasion, deliberation and dialogue. Negotiation conversations may vary in 
the extent to which they are of a more competitive or “integrative” nature (Clopton, 1984). 
According to Gergen, McNamee and Barrett (2002: 81) parties in negotiations “are encouraged to 
identify their basic interests, what they want from the negotiation and how important it is for them”. 
This implies that interests are assumed to be taken as given. Note also that exploring assumptions 
underlying basic interests is not part of the negotiation conversation. In debate (or discussion) the 
issue is who wins, and proves the other side wrong. This form of conversation leads to separate, 
rather than shared points of view (Isaacs, 2002; Roberts, 2002). The third conversation type, 
persuasion, is not characterized by a situation in which the parties are pitted against each other, 
like in the first two. In persuasion, “each participant tries to legitimize their particular proposition 
or point of view through evidence or persuasive argument. A persuaded party will thus change his 
or her initial positions and commit to that of the persuader party” (Franco, 2006: 814). Hence, 
persuasion does imply that one of the parties has to give in, if the persuasion is to succeed. Due to 
the focus on own interests with little exploration of shared interests these first three forms of 
conversation do not seem to be very conducive to a change of discourse towards consummate 
collaboration. 
This leads to the final two conversation types, deliberation and dialogue. These types have some 
similarities, and in practice it will not always be easy to distinguish between them. Deliberation is 
often seen as more closely linked to action (Franco, 2006; Roberts, 2002). Dialogue in contrast is 
not (necessarily) linked to a concrete decision or solving a concrete problem (Burkhalter, Gastil, & 
Kelshaw, 2002). It “is not about judging, weighing, or making decisions, but about understanding 
and learning. Dialogue dispels stereotypes, builds trust, and enables people to open to perspectives 
that are very different from their own” (Heierbacher, 2007: 103). Hence, although the concepts are 
closely related (and sometimes used interchangeably) this paper will reserve the term deliberation 
for conversations linked to the need to make a decision concerning an action, while dialogue is a 
type of conversation aimed at jointly creating meaning and shared understanding between 
participants (Franco, 2006). In order to come to consummate collaboration exploration and sharing 
of common interests are necessary. Therefore, the conjecture of this paper is that of all types of 
conversation, dialogue is most likely to conduct parties to consummate collaboration. For this 
reason this paper will look more closely at the characteristics of and conditions for dialogue. 
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A dialogue can be described as “a form of consciously constructed conversation in which 
participants engage in a sustained and collaborative investigation into the underlying assumptions 
and certainties that underlie their everyday experiences and relationships with the intent of 
creating more effective interactions” (Ford, 1999: 490). The willingness to dig into one’s taken-for-
granted truths and often hidden (to oneself as well as others) assumptions is a crucial aspect of 
dialogue. Emulating the Socratic dialogue, interlocutors can access meanings covered by 
sedimented layers of tacit assumptions (Linder, 2002). Thus, dialogue is a process that enables 
reflection upon, and potentially alters self-made limits (Isaacs, 2002). As Mansbridge (2006) argues, 
it is only by discussing experiences with others that individuals can develop a language to 
understand their interests. The result is self-distanciation (Tsoukas, 2009): taken-for-granted 
truths can be looked at from the perspective of the other. This, of course, implies not only a 
willingness to distance oneself from one’s own basic assumptions, but also to try to understand 
those of the other. Taking the response of the other seriously makes one understand one’s own 
utterance in a different light, and hence produces cognitive change. This can of course be trivial 
(when taken-for-granted ideas are or seem confirmed), but can also be profound. First-order and 
second-order realities, which previously occurred as one seamless reality, can now be distinguished, 
providing the opportunity to collectively generate a new second-order reality (Ford, 1999).  
Dialogue may seem “motherhood and apple pie”, but the reality is that in everyday life, and 
specifically in business life, it is not easy to have a genuine, “productive” (Tsoukas, 2009) dialogue. 
The idea of having a dialogue that uproots fundamental assumptions might evoke resistance, 
because of its potentially destabilizing effect (Cayer, 1997). It also is “a disturbance of everyday 
reasoning habits” (Ryfe, 2005: 56). Consequently, for an entire business conversation to be a 
dialogue may be rare, and this is more often realized only partially or for a limited duration. In an 
interorganizational context, like that of an MOP, there may be additional barriers. Clopton (1984) 
argues that individuals acting as representatives of their organization will be less inclined to engage 
in integrative bargaining than individuals acting on their own behalf. Factors producing this effect 
are that the representative is held accountable for the outcome of the negotiation, and the 
representative’s loyalty and commitment to his organization (Clopton, 1984). It seems plausible 
that these observations with regard to bargaining style can be generalized to the propensity to 






CONDITIONS FOR DIALOGUE WITHIN A MULTI-ORGANIZATIONAL PROJECT SETTING 
The interest in conversations is based on the notion that accounts are produced through 
conversations – even if these are conversations with oneself.2 In principle, as conversations are the 
primordial mechanisms producing accounts, one should be studying these, but there are two 
reasons to focus on accounts instead. First of all, every individual actor is involved in many different 
conversations with many different others, and possibly with contradicting contents. What counts in 
the end is how all of these together are collated into an account that gives meaning to the actor. 
Secondly, there is a methodological reason: conversations are fleeting and most often remain 
hidden from the researcher, accounts can be evoked and documented. Compared with more 
structured types of data accounts are more likely to yield also non-conscious meanings and motives 
(Orbuch, 1997). This paper should not be naïve about the veracity of what people say in interviews. 
As Alvesson (2003) notes, interview responses may be an effort to construct a valued, coherent self-
image, rather than an unbiased reflection of the interviewees’ mind. However, this does not mean 
interview responses are not important. The self-constructions an actor wishes to convey in an 
interview reveal much of what he considers to be a meaningful rendering of the situation and what 
are appropriate thoughts and actions for an actor with her identity. 
Mansbridge, Hartz-Karp, Amengual and Gastil (2006), summarizing the normative literature, 
state that an ideal situation for a productive dialogue is characterized by consensus, rationality, 
freedom and equality. The rationality presumption is foundational to the conditions of the ideal 
speech situation as discussed by Habermas. According to Habermas dialogue is characterized by a 
“gentle but obstinate” claim to reason (Habermas, 1979: 3). Rationality (and rejection of emotional 
discourse) is also characteristic of business interactions (Gillette, 1984; Gratton & Ghoshal, 2003). 
This paper assumes rationality to be present, and focuses on the other factors mentioned by 
Mansbridge et al. (2006), and reflect upon these in the context of social construction of interests in 
an MOP. A presumption of rationality (and rejection of emotional discourse) is characteristic of 
business interactions (Gillette, 1984; Gratton & Ghoshal, 2003). Regarding the other factors 
mentioned by Mansbridge et al. (2006), consensus, freedom and equality are important in order to 
establish a productive dialogue.  
The first condition that is mentioned by Mansbridge et al. (2006) is consensus. For consensus to 
be likely to arise the instrumental calculative engagement typical for business relations should 
make way for a more “relational engagement”, in which the interlocutants take responsibility for 
                                                             
2 Watson (1995) gives a good example of a manager having a conversation with himself, leading to an account 
fitting a particular course of action. 
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both the joint task in which they are involved and for their relationship (Tsoukas, 2009). Taking 
responsibility for the relationship implies making investments to maintain the relationship over 
time and into the future. Hence the “temporal embeddedness” (Rooks, Raub, Selten, & Tazelaar, 
2000) is increased. An MOP is by definition of limited duration, but may be embedded to a stronger 
or a lesser degree in a series of projects between the same participants. The same companies 
and/or individuals representing them may have worked together before, and there may be an 
expectation to work together again in the future (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). Experimental as well 
as field research indicates that the effects of the “shadow of the past” (the duration, frequency, 
volume and success of previous transactions between the same parties) and the “shadow of the 
future” (the expectation of future transactions) are mutually reinforcing (Batenburg, Raub, & 
Snijders, 2003; Rooks et al., 2000). It is expected that to the extent that there is more temporal 
embeddedness, there will also be more relational engagement and hence a stronger motivation to 
engage in productive dialogue. The first condition for productive dialogue that this paper considers 
is therefore temporal embeddedness.  
Two other conditions that were mentioned by Mansbridge et al. (2006) were freedom and 
equality. These conditions relate to the equality and scope of mandate that are considered in this 
paper. The freedom and equality conditions may be expected to be problematic in the context of an 
MOP. The freedom of many actors may be restricted in so far as they are acting as boundary 
spanners representing their organizations (Levina & Vaast, 2005). In these cases the scope of their 
mandate will be important. If boundary spanners are given a narrow scope, the possibility to come 
to a genuine dialogue with counterparts from other organizations in the MOP is undermined, and 
the possibility of coming to consummate collaboration becomes more remote. Equality, finally, may 
ostensibly exist between representatives of different companies engaged in an MOP, but in reality 
there often is a clear pecking order between companies, as for instance is the case between main 
contractor and subcontractors in a construction project (Stinchcombe, 1985). Nevertheless, 
productive dialogue could come about if all participants in a conversation at least temporarily treat 
each other as equals (Roberts, 2002). Equal parties feel more free to disagree (Kabanoff, 1991), 
increasing the possibilities of coming to productive dialogue. Treating each other as equals is 
facilitated when there is a dialogue between actors from the same organizational hierarchical level, 
with assumingly mostly the same responsibilities. Productive dialogue may be particularly difficult 
if several representatives of a single organization, who are in a hierarchical relationship, are 
engaged in a dialogue. Equality and scope of mandate are the second and third condition that 
influences productive dialogue and are used in this paper. 
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In addition, there seems to be an implicit assumption in much of the dialogue literature that the 
conversation takes place face-to-face. In MOPs this is the case for some conversations, but not for 
others. Some of the employees and managers involved in MOPs like construction projects or 
shipbuilding projects work side-by-side with colleagues from other organizations on the 
production site, while others remain at the premises of their own company. Physical proximity is an 
important factor influencing collaborative processes (Kraut, Fussell, Brennan, & Siegel, 2002) and 
should be taken into account. Specifically, face-to-face conversations are superior in terms of the 
possibility “to provide immediate feedback, to convey multiple cues, to support personalization, 
and to accommodate linguistic variety” (Yates & Orlikowski, 1992: 308-309). Co-location makes the 
last condition for productive dialogue that is incorporated in this paper. 
When looking at discourse within and around MOPs this paper feels it is helpful to distinguish 
between conversations between different kinds of roles (see, e.g., Paasivaara & Lassenius, 2003, for 
a comparable approach to interorganizational software development projects). Roles can be 
defined as “standardized patterns of behavior required of all persons playing a part in a given 
functional relationship” (Katz & Kahn, 1978: 43). Interorganizational relations within MOPs come 
into effect through individual boundary spanners (Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997). The 
roles these individuals play vary with their position in the organization (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). 
In addition, individuals that have different roles have a different frame of reference, which makes 
them have a different perception (Corley, 2004). Corley (2004) distinguished between three types 
of hierarchical levels: top management, middle management and operational employees. In line 
with the distinction made by Corley (2004) this paper uses three similar types of organizational 
roles. The three organizational roles are: higher manager, project managers, and project executors. 
The role of higher managers in the context of an MOP is to negotiate the overall commercial 
agreement, as well as to design the structures and systems for the operation of the MOP (Janowicz-
Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009). With higher managers this paper refers to managers at buying 
firms and commercial managers at selling firms interacting in the context of the commercial 
transactions that lie at the basis of an MOP. These managers bear profit responsibility, and by virtue 
of their function they look at the relationship with other firms in the MOP from a profit-and-loss 
frame. Project managers are lower-level boundary-spanning personnel that work within the 
conditions set by the higher managers (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Wilemon & Cicero, 1970). These 
people are those individuals who “provide the linking mechanism across organizational boundaries” 
(Inkpen & Currall, 1997). They can be team leaders from different companies, for instance engaging 
in the joint development of a new car (Hamel, 1991). In the context of MOPs many lower-level 
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operational tasks are also carried out by employees from different organizations, which this paper 
calls project executors. In the construction industry, for example, it is the rule rather than the 
exception to see employees from a number of (sub) contractors working jointly on a project. 
Turning now to the analysis of conversations in and around MOPs, this paper is interested in the 
conditions that are more or less conducive to productive dialogue, and in particular those 
conditions that can be influenced by the organizations. These conditions are called the design 
choices in the management of the MOP. This paper looks at lateral interorganizational 
conversations at three different levels. The expectations are summarized in Table 3.1. The cells 
shaded grey indicate “design choices” in the management of an MOP that this paper believes 




Conditions for Dialogue in Lateral Conversations 
 Higher Management Project Management Project Execution 
Temporal embeddedness Low or high Intermediate Low 
Equality Yes/no Yes/no Yes 
Scope of mandate Large Narrow or large Narrow or large 
Co-location No No Yes/no 
(Shaded cells indicate MOP design choices) 
 
 
Starting with the factors influencing lateral interorganizational conversations first the temporal 
embeddedness between higher managers is considered. This condition is based on the consensus 
condition for productive dialogue as indicated by Mansbridge et al. (2006). Temporal 
embeddedness, i.e., the extent to which the higher managers are inclined to take responsibility for 
maintaining their relationship with firms and individuals they have worked with in the past and/or 
expect to work with in the future (Batenburg et al., 2003; Rooks et al., 2000), is an important design 
choice at this level. Temporal embeddedness may be partly dictated by industry characteristics, but 
it can also be willfully influenced by firms. To the extent that the temporal embeddedness is higher, 
this paper believes the conditions to be more favorable for productive dialogue. This is something 
higher managers can influence. Companies can make it their policy to repeat doing business with 
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preferred partners, at least as long as experiences are positive. Alternatively, they can also opt to 
“play out” potential partners against each other, in order to improve their bargaining position.  
A second characteristic that is partly conditioned by contingencies like the relative sizes of the 
companies, and partly by the roles of client and supplier, is the degree of equality in the 
conversations. Also this condition is based on a condition for productive dialogue as mentioned by 
Mansbridge et al. (2006). Even legally independent contractors do not interact on a footing of strict 
equality if one has the role of the client and the other that of potential provider. But the parties can 
create an atmosphere in which they communicate on the basis of equality (Hardy et al., 2005). To 
the extent that they succeed in doing so, they improve the conditions for a dialogue. Higher 
managers of different firms are more likely to interact as equals and on a collegial basis if they have 
regular informal face-to-face contact. In this sense, the conditions of equality and proximity are 
linked, and reinforce each other. 
The scope of mandate condition in line with the freedom condition as discussed by Mansbridge 
et al. (2006) is another aspect for higher managers. The scope of the mandate of higher managers 
can (almost by definition) be taken to be large, as these managers are responsible for the overall 
strategic direction of the corporation (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Moreover, higher managers are 
typically not co-located with their counterparts at other firms. These two characteristics that this 
paper assumes to be given may work in opposite directions if it comes to the generation of a 
dialogue conducive to consummate collaboration. A broad mandate offers higher managers the 
opportunity to focus on long-term benefits in a given collaboration, also if this implies renouncing 
short-term gains, or even incurring short-term losses. The fact that higher managers of different 
organizations involved in an MOP tend to have relatively little face-to-face contact, in contrast, is 
not conducive to the genesis of consummate collaboration dialogues. When discussing project 
executors, this paper will discuss the benefits of face-to-face interactions for dialogue more in detail. 
Although it is unthinkable that the higher managers of the firms involved in a particular MOP will 
actually be co-located during (a substantial part of) the duration of the project, they are free to 
create more opportunities for face-to-face interactions. This paper believes that such opportunities, 
in particular when combined with temporal embeddedness and an atmosphere of equality, will 
positively influence the opportunity for higher managers to engage in a dialogue that will help them 
construct accounts of consummate collaboration. 
Higher managers therefore are expected to have the best chance to engage in productive 
dialogue with each other when there is more temporal embeddedness and if they choose to interact 
as much as possible on the basis of equality, even if they are client and contractor.  




P1a Productive interorganizational dialogue is more likely to arise between higher managers of 
companies in an MOP who are strongly temporally embedded 
P1b Productive interorganizational dialogue is more likely to arise between higher managers of 
companies in an MOP who interact on the basis of equality 
 
The second type of conversations in this paper is the lateral interorganizational conversation 
between project managers. It is expected that the temporal embeddedness of the relationships 
between project managers is often lower than that of relationships between higher managers. 
Managers at higher organizational levels usually have longer time horizons than lower 
organizational members (Voss & Blackmon, 1998). Therefore, project managers’ tendency to 
maintain long term relationships is lower than that of higher managers. However, as project 
managers work as boundary spanners between different organizations, external relationships 
might be important to project managers and the temporal embeddedness might still be of 
intermediate importance to them. Like higher managers, project managers will typically not be co-
located with their counterparts from other organizations participating in the MOP, so opportunities 
for face-to-face interaction are limited (although, just like in the case of higher managers, these 
opportunities can deliberately be created). The two main design choices regarding for this category 
of conversations are the scope of the mandate of the participants and the extent to which they 
converse on a basis of equality. Both issues, this paper contends, are strongly linked to the 
strategies of the organizations in an MOP. This leads to the following propositions: 
 
P2a Productive interorganizational dialogue is more likely to arise between project managers of 
companies in an MOP who interact on the basis of equality 
P2b Productive interorganizational dialogue is more likely to arise between project managers of 
companies in an MOP who have a broader mandate 
 
The third type of conversations this paper focuses on are those between the employees who are 
involved in the production of the product or service that forms the raison d’être of the MOP. This 
paper calls these the project executors. This paper reckons project executors to have a low level of 
temporal embeddedness, compared with higher managers and project managers. Project executors 
may be temporally embedded in the sense of having worked together earlier, on the organizational 
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or the interpersonal level, which may increase their ability to work together and the level of trust 
(Laan, Voordijk, Noorderhaven, & Dewulf, 2012). But this category of employees may be expected 
to concentrate on the job at hand, as the prospect of future common projects is less of their concern, 
because this is not their responsibility. This paper also assumes that the project executors working 
on a project will typically do so on a basis of equality. This is for instance the case in construction 
projects. In his ethnographic study Applebaum (1981) notes that construction workers do not work 
under close supervision, compared to for instance factory workers. 
The two design choices that in this paper’s view will crucially determine the conditions for 
interorganizational dialogue between project executors are the scope of their mandates and the 
question whether they are co-located or not. If the project executors and their staff are operating 
within a very detailed and rigid project plan there will be little time and use for dialogue. The work 
of project executors is predetermined, and there is little scope for collaborative behavior, even if 
they would be inclined. However, firms participating in an MOP can also opt to give their project 
executors broader mandates, allowing them more degrees of freedom in organizing the work with 
their colleagues from other firms in a flexible way. This paper contends that such a broader 
mandate creates a more fertile ground for dialogue. Regarding co-location, research shows that 
close collaboration is easier under the condition of proximity, but most of the studies look at 
collaboration between different departments within a single firm (see, e.g., Kahn & McDonough III, 
1997). But there is also some evidence that co-location is beneficial in MOPs. Laan, Noorderhaven, 
Voordijk and Dewulf (2011) describe how in a project alliance in railway construction co-location 
of design team members from different firms had beneficial effects, and that even being located at a 
different floor of the same site office created psychological distance. Therefore, this paper 
concludes that there will be better chances for a dialogue of consummate collaboration to arise 
when more managers and employees work side-by-side at a single location. Hence: 
 
P3a Productive interorganizational dialogue is more likely to arise between project executors in 
an MOP who have a broader mandate 
P3b Productive interorganizational dialogue is more likely to arise between project executors in 
an MOP who work at the same location 
 
This paper is not interested in dialogue for its own sake because, as argued above, this paper 
assumes that productive dialogue will lead to accounts commensurate with consummate 
collaboration. These kinds of accounts in turn will influence the tendency to engage in 
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consummately collaborative behaviors. First of all, for productive dialogue to lead to changed 
behavior in the MOP it needs to lead to changed accounts at the level of the individual actor. 
Accounts are generally closely linked to conversations (Firth, 1995), and in particular when it 
comes to collaboration and interests one needs to observe and talk with others to find out what is 
“normal”, “rational”, or “appropriate”. 
Secondly, actors need to act upon the new accounts produced in productive dialogue. Jacobs and 
Heracleous (2005) illustrate how dialogue can alter participants’ mental models, which in turn 
enables new behaviors. Communication is “performative”, i.e., it creates a new reality, within which 
the interlocutors now start interacting (Barrett, Thomas, & Hocevar, 1995; Ford & Ford, 1995). In 
that sense productive dialogue not only can change, but inevitably does change reality. Even if 
behaviors remain ostensibly unchanged, the meanings attached to it will have shifted. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the hypotheses as developed in this paper.  
 
P4a Organizational actors in an MOP who are involved in productive interorganizational 
dialogue are more likely to produce accounts commensurate with consummate collaboration 
P4b Organizational actors in an MOP who produce accounts commensurate with consummate 
collaboration are more likely to engage in consummately collaborative behaviors 
 
FROM PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE TO CONSUMMATE COLLABORATION 
The most difficult questions still remain. How can changes in discourse at the level of pairs of actors 
across organizational boundaries lead to behavioral change at the level of the MOP? This is an issue 
this paper can only speculate about. 
The type of change that may come about through productive dialogue is unlike top-down 
orchestrated change processes. Change agency in contrast is distributed over different role 
incumbents in and around the MOP. Buchanan, Addicott, Fitzgerald, Ferlie & Baeza (2007) describe 
such a change process with “nobody in charge” in a healthcare organization. Although interests and 
roles were manifold and complex in their case, it still is arguably simpler than changing 
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All the same, drawing some lessons from the case described by Buchanan et al. (2007) is that 
distributed change agency can be effective under a set of conditions. Among those emphasized by 
Buchanan et al. (2007) are the presence of change champions, a culture of participation and 
innovation granting a lot of leeway to those change agents, and a pre-existing network of trustful 
relationship among the change agents. The latter two conditions point, again, at the importance of 
the factors of temporal embeddedness and equality, discussed above.  
“Tipping point” dynamics, discussed by Gladwell (2000), may help understand how local pockets 
of consummate collaboration discourse may lead to larger-scale change. Gladwell singles out three 
conditions that seem to be particularly important for change processes to reach and advance 
through the tipping point. First of all, the change needs to be “contagious” as Shapiro (2010) argues. 
Secondly the tipping point is reached easier when little causes bring big effects. This may be a 
difficult condition to meet. The benefits of consummate collaboration are uncertain, and not 
immediately realized. Finally, spontaneous change processes are most likely to succeed if change is 
sudden and dramatic, rather than gradual. Again, this is not likely to be the case in a shift towards 
more consummate collaboration, and hence the overall assessment is that this change process may 
easily stall. 
It seems likely that a change of discourse across all three levels distinguished above is needed 
for change at the MOP level to come about. Otherwise a relapse to the previously dominant 
discourse of perfunctory collaboration is likely. The situation of the organizational field of the 
construction industry appears to illustrate this. At the level of on-site operational actors 
consummate collaboration can often be found, but the attitudes of both project managers and 
higher managers is often more ambivalent (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009; Kadefors, 
2004). In this situation operational actors are between a rock and a hard place: in their daily work 
they tend towards consummate collaboration, however their off-site colleagues and bosses keep 
them from “going native” in the project, and they may be confronted with directions to limit 
collaboration in particular if the financial situation of the project is precarious for their organization.  
Above this paper indicated the attitude of project managers and higher managers in the 
construction industry to be “ambivalent”. Ambivalence of accounts is more probable with higher 
managers than with the other categories: higher managers are involved in discourses concerning 
the long-term viability of the organization and need to report on short-term profitability. They 
relate to higher managers of other firms in the MOP and the organizational field as exchange 
partners and as colleagues. In addition, they converse with managers and employees in their own 
organization who are predominantly driven by financial results (and need to be addressed in that 
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way) and managers and employees who are predominantly driven by (technical) task achievements. 
This points also at an aspect not yet mentioned in our discussion: discourse can also be self-
disbelieved, i.e., hypocritical. Brunsson (1993) sees hypocrisy as a solution when talk and action 
cannot be aligned, but a less benign interpretation is that hypocrisy is used when managers do not 
want to act in accordance to what they say. In a social dilemma situation this may happen because 
an actor by making self-disbelieved statements about cooperation hopes to make the other actors 
select this action, while opting for defection himself. Brunsson (1993) notes that hypocrisy is more 
viable as a strategy to the extent that a manager is more remote from action, which also makes it 
more likely that higher managers engage in hypocrisy than project executors. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Before starting with the conclusion, it must be explicitly conceded that intra-MOP dialogues are but 
one of the sources of influence on accounts and behaviors of organizational actors. Managers and 
employees at all levels are also engaged in conversations with others outside the focal MOP, and 
even outside the organizational field in which the MOP is embedded. Hence, any conclusion this 
paper can draw has to be at the level of enhanced or diminished chances of productive dialogue to 
arise. Under this proviso this paper has identified temporal embeddedness, equality, scope of the 
mandate and co-location of actors as important factors for productive dialogue to come about. 
These factors are built on the conditions developed by Mansbridge et al. (2006) in order to achieve 
productive dialogue. This paper contributes to the literature on dialogue and collaboration by 
taking into account the roles that managers and employees at different levels typically play in an 
MOP (Corley, 2004; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). This paper has argued that temporal embeddedness 
is a design parameter at the level of company management, i.e., the management of a firm can 
choose for repeated projects with the same partners, leading to increased temporal embeddedness. 
Equality is a factor that can be influenced at both the level of company management and project 
management. If representatives of the firms participating in an MOP choose to interact on the basis 
of equality, productive disagreement, leading to better knowledge of each other’s preferences and 
assumptions, becomes possible. A larger scope of mandate is important both at the level of project 
management and project execution. Only then actors at these levels have sufficient leeway to both 
discursively explore ways of consummate collaboration, and act upon them. Finally, this paper has 
purported that co-location of actors involved in project execution is helpful, because of the 
increased possibility of rich conversations this allows. To the extent that dialogues commensurate 
with consummate collaboration arise under these conditions, these are expected to influence the 
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accounts of interests of self and others of actors involved in the MOP, and to change their 
collaborative behaviors. Whether these micro-level changes will add up to a shift towards 
consummate collaboration within the entire MOP is difficult to say, but this paper has discussed 
some factors that comes to the conclusion that such a distributed change process will not easily 
reach a “tipping point”. The result may also be hypocritical conversations and accounts that are at 
odds with collaborative practices. 
This paper has focused on conditions influencing the social construction of interests within an 
MOP, and abstracted from many other aspects. One factor that is important is the nature of the task. 
Complex tasks with unpredictable elements offer participants more opportunities for self-
disclosure in dialogue, and hence more opportunities for constructing rich and deep accounts of 
interests of self and others. Simple, predictable tasks bring about clear-cut accounts of quid-pro-
quos, deviation from which is almost unavoidably perceived as a breach (of promise, contract, good 
faith, etc.). Other factors that could influence collaboration in MOPs are described in the literature 
on social dilemmas. Kollock (1998) categorizes solutions to social dilemmas in three groups. 
Structural solutions consist in changing the pay-offs in the dilemma in such a way that cooperation 
becomes more attractive than defection. This can for instance be achieved through careful design of 
the contract. In the offshore industry experiments with project alliances have yielded promising 
results (Halman & Braks, 1999). Motivational solutions focus on changing the motivations of the 
participants, without changing the structure of the pay-off. For instance identification with the 
project team can be cultivated, e.g., through rituals like project kick-offs (Hamburger, 1992). In 
effect, this introduces an alternative index of preferences, next to the calculation of self-interest in a 
more narrow sense (Kollock, 1998). The emphasis on the social construction of interests seems to 
fall in Kollock’s third category: strategic solutions that resolve the dilemma by increasing the 
salience of long-term collaboration, thus overcoming the temptation to defect in the present. 
Changing a discourse is a slow and complicated process, and if some shortcut existed that would 
have been found long ago. All the same, it seems to us that learning to collaborate better across 













This paper focuses on four conditions for discourse, temporal embeddedness, scope of mandate, 
equality and co-location, and explores how these differ between participants in multi-
organizational projects in their social construction of interests. This paper takes a process 
perspective by looking how these conditions and conceptions of interest evolve over time within an 
MOP. The accounts of interest reflecting diverse discursive processes are considered to explore 
which conditions are most likely to lead to interest construction conducive to consummate 
collaboration. This study followed one large shipbuilding project over a period of 1,5 years and 
analyzed the accounts given by representatives of three large companies across disciplines and at 
different hierarchical levels. This paper focused on conditions that are conducive to open and 
constructive dialogue, like temporal embeddedness of relationships, the scope of mandate of 
company representatives, equality in the discourse between client and contractors, and co-location 
of representatives of the organizations involved. The findings suggest that these conditions are 
indeed associated with accounts of consummate collaboration. 
  
  
                                                             




Many industries become progressively more fragmented, increasing the need but at the same time 
also the difficulty of coordinating activities (Jones, Kierzkowski, & Lurong, 2005). This tension is 
particularly salient in project-based industries, where multiple organizations come together in a 
temporary coalition to carry out a particular project (Kenis et al., 2009). In such a multi-
organizational project, or “MOP”, organizations from different disciplines work together in a team 
to create a product. For each project, the project team may be new, composed of representatives 
from different organizations. Examples of MOPs can be found in the construction, aerospace, 
motion picture, defense, and shipbuilding industries (Gann & Salter, 2000; Scarbrough et al., 2004). 
Coordination problems may arise because the interests of the different parties are typically only 
partly aligned, frequently giving rise to situations with social dilemma-like characteristics 
(McCarter et al., 2011).  
A social dilemma is a situation that is defined by two characteristics: (1) each player receives a 
higher payoff for a socially defecting choice than for a socially cooperative choice, no matter what 
the other players do; and (2) collectively players are better off if all cooperate than if all defect 
(Dawes, 1980). In these situations the rationality of an individual leads to collective irrationality 
(Kollock, 1998). One possible solution in order to solve the social dilemma is strict monitoring and 
sanctioning (Williamson, 1985). However, identifying a defector may be difficult when there are 
many parties, such as in the situation of a MOP (Zeng & Chen, 2003). In addition, the ability and 
willingness to administer punishment may be questionable (Osterloh et al., 2002). Hence, some 
form of collaboration could give the answer to social dilemma type of situations.  
There are different ways to characterize collaboration (Larsson et al., 1998; Monroe, 1994; 
Walton & McKersie, 1965). This paper uses the continuum ranging from “perfunctory collaboration” 
and “consummate collaboration” (Williamson, 1975). Perfunctory collaboration refers to a job 
attitude which is in line with minimally acceptable standards. Consummate collaboration, in 
contrast, refers to “an affirmative job attitude – to include the use of judgment, filling gaps, and 
taking initiative in an instrumental way” (Williamson, 1975: 69). In many instances behavior in line 
with consummate types of collaboration seems to be imperative in order to solve the social 
dilemmas in MOPs.  
Experimental research shows that collaboration in social dilemma-like situations is much more 
prevalent than rational choice theories assume (Camerer, 1997), but how this works “remains a 
mystery” from this perspective (Ledyard, 1995: 172). This paper puts forth that in order to solve 
the mystery one needs to depart from the rational choice perspective of game theory in three ways. 
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Firstly, in game theoretical accounts interests are seen as given (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Weber et 
al., 2004) and transparent to the individual, while this paper purports that conceptions of interests 
are social constructions that arise in the context of the individual (Gadamer, 1976; Monroe, 2001). 
Secondly, rational choice approaches focus on the individual, and neglect the social nature of 
interest conceptions. This paper argues that actors shape conceptions of interests of self and others 
in inherently social discursive processes (Whittle et al., 2010). Thirdly, rational choice approaches 
to social dilemmas tend to be static, as all relevant data are assumed to be already contained in the 
payoff matrix. In this paper the view is that perceptions and evaluations of contingent payoffs 
change over time as a result of discursive social processes (Lawrence et al., 1999; Salvatore, 
Davanzati, Potì, & Ruggieri, 2009), and hence the games people play are not given, but socially 
constructed and continuously reconstructed. 
This paper focuses on factors influencing this discursive process of social construction of 
interests in MOPs, and is particularly interested in why social construction processes in some cases 
lead to perceptions of interests conducive to consummate collaboration, while in other cases more 
perfunctory types of collaboration prevail. Several authors question the static nature of rational 
choice theory with respect to interests and argue that interests are products of social construction 
processes (Justice, 2006; Monroe, 2001; Whittle & Mueller, 2011). However, few authors have 
examined how collaboration is discursively constructed by participants (Lotia & Hardy, 2008). This 
paper contributes to the literature by exploring how the interests of individuals are socially 
constructed through discourse. In line with the focus on discursive processes this study theorizes 
that factors identified as encouraging open and constructive dialogue increase the likelihood that 
interest perceptions conducive to consummate collaboration will be collectively constructed. This 
paper explores how these factors are associated with accounts of interest given by representatives 
of three companies engaged in a large shipbuilding project, across diverse disciplines and 
hierarchical levels and over time. The findings suggest that these conditions are indeed conducive 
to the social construction of interests congruent with accounts of consummate collaboration. 
Additionally, this paper shows how two types of dynamics influence how collaborative processes 
evolve: inherent project life cycle effects in which the tension tends to increase over time, and path-
dependencies that cause early problems to lead to vicious cycles. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the view of MOPs as social dilemmas is 
elaborated on, and the process of social construction of interests through discourse is discussed. 
Next this paper explores under what conditions discursive processes are most likely to lead to 
construction of interest conceptions congruent with consummate collaboration in MOPs. This leads 
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to the two research questions in this paper. Subsequently, this paper empirically examines 
conceptions of interests of actors from different companies and at different hierarchical levels 
involved in one shipbuilding project, at two different points in time. This paper concludes with a 
discussion of our findings and conclusions. 
 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INTERESTS 
Several authors discussing multi-party collaboration forms have applied a social dilemma approach 
(McCarter et al., 2011; Zeng & Chen, 2003). Similarities between social dilemma games and multi-
party collaboration forms such as MOPs are the multiple participants and their interdependence on 
each other. The behavior of a participant has an effect on the outcome of all participants in the 
project. While other scholars examining multi-party alliances have taken a social dilemma approach, 
few authors have taken this perspective in project based settings. MOPs differ from intra-
organizational teams, cross-sector partnerships, meta-organizations, and multi-party alliances on 
various aspects. First of all, MOPs face limited temporality. This temporality involves milestones 
and deadlines and affects the collaborative behavior of the individuals (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). 
Secondly, the team of the MOP consists of representatives from different organizations, who can 
have diverging goals and interests (Hardy et al., 2005). While members of an intra-organizational 
team work towards a shared goal, members from different organizations may have their own target 
in a project. Conceptualizing MOPs as repeated social dilemmas implies that it is assumed that 
MOPs are frequently characterized by constellations of interests such that the pursuit of individual 
goals leads to collectively suboptimal collective outcomes.  
In a social dilemma two types of conflicts of interests can be observed. First of all, there can be a 
conflict between individual and collective interests (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). A cooperative 
choice focuses on aligning the individual interests with the collective interests, while with a 
defective choice an individual aims to only fulfill the individual interests (Monroe, 1994). The 
second type of conflict occurs in repeated social dilemmas, and pertains to a temporal conflict 
between short-term and long term interests (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). Although a defective 
choice may be better for an actor in a single round of the game, it may foreclose a more 
advantageous cooperative equilibrium in the longer run (Weber & Murnighan, 2008). The pursual 
of the individual interests of the short term gains competes with the collective interests in the long 
run. The two conflicts of interests are linked: the temporal conflict is caused by the tendency to 
revert to defective decisions in the current game. 
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The tension between cooperation and competition that exists in social dilemmas can also be 
seen in MOPS (McCarter et al., 2011; Zeng & Chen, 2003). Parties need to collaborate if they want to 
achieve the best overall project result. However, parties may have a tendency to compete with each 
other for the benefits, as these are shared among the parties (Larsson et al., 1998; Zeng & Chen, 
2003).  
This paper conceptualizes cooperative and defective choices as “consummate” and “perfunctory” 
collaboration, respectively. This distinction was introduced by Blau and Scott (1962), and 
subsequently by Williamson (1975) and many other scholars in organizational economics (Brown 
et al., 2010). This paper sees these concepts as part of a continuum where perfunctory and 
consummate collaboration satisfy different opposing interests. As indicated above, perfunctory 
collaboration aims for the individual, short term interests, whereas consummate collaboration aims 
for the collective, long term interests. Nevertheless, as Monroe (1994) indicates behavior of an 
individual is not purely self-interested. Individuals behave not purely in line with the extreme ends 
of the continuum of perfunctory and consummate behavior. Their behavior may have elements that 
satisfies both their self-interests as well as the collective interests. These types of behavior 
therefore form a continuum. Consummate collaboration includes behaviors like exerting efforts 
beyond the contract, taking initiatives, sharing of knowledge, and creating shared representations 
of actions with respect to joint goals (see Blau & Scott, 1962; Clague, 1993; Lindenberg & Foss, 
2011). In line with this, consummate collaboration in the context of an MOP would seem to require 
a shared social construction of what good collaboration is (Keller & Loewenstein, 2011). “Good 
collaboration” could for instance include emphasizing longer-term, rather than short-term interests. 
This would steer individuals away from immediate material self-interest and focus more on 
collective interests (Hunt et al., 2010).  
This paper argues that consummate and perfunctory types of collaboration are driven by 
different conceptions of the interests of self and others. The interests pursued by an individual can 
lie on a continuum ranging from self-interest to collective interest (Hardin, 1968; Polzer, 2004; Wit 
& Kerr, 2002). Self-interested actions are defined as actions that aim at fulfilling a personal benefit, 
goal or desire (Cropanzano et al., 2005). Collective interests satisfy the goals of the collective of 
players, including the interests of the individual (Monroe, 1994). These self-interests and collective 
interests may be perceived differently by each actor involved (Medlin, 2006). If in a social dilemma 
players focus on their own interests only (and assume the others to do so, too), defection is the 
rational choice. In this situation every individual competes for the highest individual part (Larsson 
et al., 1998). A focus on individual interests is associated with perfunctory cooperation, in which 
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individuals compete with each other. A cooperative choice entails a certain degree of self-
renunciation, where a part of the individual payoff is sacrificed for a larger collective gain (Brown et 
al., 2010). With consummate collaboration the individuals aim for jointly creating a larger pie 
(Larsson et al., 1998). In a repeated social dilemma players can either focus exclusively on the 
present game, or on future rounds (at the same time). Here consummate collaboration is associated 
with a long-term perspective, so that cooperation in the present round is valued also because it 
leads to better outcomes in future rounds of the game. Thus consummate collaboration requires a 
focus on collective interests, as well as a conception of self-interest that includes the longer term. 
Perfunctory collaboration is associated with a focus on the immediate self-interest. But where do 
these conceptions of interest come from?  
From a game-theoretical perspective the constellation of interests is a given that is transparent 
to the players, and that can be represented in succinct form in the payoff matrix (Pruitt & Kimmel, 
1977). Such an approach must assume that the individual is transparent to herself. I know who I am, 
and what I want is self-evident to me. However, the increasingly radical questioning of the 
possibility of complete self-understanding is one of the dominant motives of twentieth-century 
social philosophy (see, e.g., Gadamer, 1976; Monroe, 2001; Ricoeur, 1991). What one’s interests are 
is something one needs to discover or even invent. This issue has been taken up in various 
literatures (Justice, 2006; Monroe, 2001; Woolgar, 1981). The idea that people can have a false 
concept of their self-interest was developed in Marxist theory, and Dobbin (1994) affirms that 
interest articulation was traditionally envisioned as a process between social classes. More recent 
approaches focus on individuals, and concede that preferences are not immediately transparent to 
actors, but may in the process of “elicitation” be biased or framed, depending on situational factors, 
the order in which alternatives are presented, or the words in which they are described (Slovic, 
1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). This view suggests that preferences are present in the self in 
their pure form, but depending on various factors become biased in their effect on actual choices, in 
an automatic, subconscious process, without appreciable psychic effort. Some researchers go much 
further, and acknowledge that “people have a difficult time, not merely selecting an alternative, but 
more fundamentally knowing what their own desires are” (Bagozzi, 1995: 274). 
Hence learning to know one’s interests requires sensemaking, defined by Weick (1995) as the 
complex processes through which organizational actors socially construct their realities. This 
definition stresses the performativeness of sensemaking, i.e., sensemaking does not so much lead 
actors to an already existing reality, but rather creates that reality. This paper asserts that this also 
holds true for interests. Salvatore, Davanzati, Potí & Ruggieri (2009: 169) refer to the power of 
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sensemaking to “shape the payoff”. Whereas standard rational choice theory holds that the payoff is 
known before the choice is made, in a sensemaking perspective payoffs and hence conceptions of 
interests of self and others are largely social constructions. Bagozzi also suggested that interests are 
social constructions (1995: 274) when he tentatively hypothesized that “some felt desires are in 
fact implicitly (i.e., mentally through vicarious or similar processes) or explicitly (i.e., through 
negotiation or other social processes) constructed jointly with others”. This is in line with 
Wildavsky’s (1994) view that outside of the social context interests have little meaning.  
Sensemaking processes can take a variety of forms (Maitlis, 2005), and this paper explores the 
question whether construction of conceptions of interest conducive to consummate collaboration 
are based in different sensemaking processes than construction of interests congruent with 
perfunctory collaboration. Analyses of sensemaking have tended to focus on the extent to which 
these processes are guided, i.e., the influence of sensegiving activities (Maitlis, 2005; Vaara & Monin, 
2010). However, in an interorganizational context there is less scope for such sensegiving as the 
sensemaking takes place among representatives of organizations who are not in a formal 
hierarchical relationship. Nevertheless, discursive sensemaking processes are equally important in 
this context (Jørgensen, Jordan, & Mitterhofer, 2012). As expounded in the next section, this paper 
sees equality between actors as an important characteristic of discourse congruent with 
consummate collaboration and as one of the factors stimulating participants to open up their basic 
assumptions to scrutiny by self and other. 
There are two additional aspects of the conception of interests as social constructions that is 
important to highlight. Firstly, social construction of interests is a process. From a process 
perspective, organizational phenomena are continuously created and changed through the 
interactions of agents (Langley & Tsoukas, 2010), and the same seems to apply to conceptions of 
interests of self and others. In a social constructivist view actors construct their interests by looking 
at each other and by responding to what they see (Scott, 1995: 137). Hence, interest conceptions 
are not static but change in response to observed behaviors of self and others. Secondly, the process 
of social construction of interests is of a fundamentally discursive nature. Language is not merely an 
instrument to communicate desires and preferences, it is the meaning expressed in language 
through which these desires and preferences come into being (Gadamer, 1976). Consequently, 
“interests cannot precede the discourse but are an effect of it” (Lawrence et al., 1999: 491). 
Whereas in a traditional game-theoretic analysis the structure of the game – the frame of 
contingent pay-offs – is taken to be exogenous, the dilemma is at least partly the participants’ own 
making if interests of self and others are products of discursive social construction processes (cf. 
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Gore & Cross, 2011). According to Clegg (1989: 181) “It cannot be maintained that interests are 
formulated outside the conditions of particular discursive practices and struggles”. 
Looking at discursive interest constructions it is important to distinguish between different 
roles within the company (Hardy et al., 2005). Individuals have different perceptions and 
expectations on how other individuals behave in the project. These perceptions are a function of 
their organizational role (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). An organizational role can be defined as 
“standardized patterns of behavior required of all persons playing a part in a given functional 
relationship” (Katz & Kahn, 1978: 43). In addition, Corley (2004) argued that individuals at 
different hierarchical levels can have different frames of references. He used three types of 
hierarchical levels: top management, middle management and operational employees to show the 
differences of identification between these levels. Therefore, this paper also distinguishes between 
different hierarchical levels, to explore the different social construction processes of interests.  
In the next section ideas about how conditions for discourse may influence social construction of 
interests are developed.  
 
TYPES OF DISCOURSE 
Communication influences people’s preferences (Sally, 1995), and an individual discovers her 
conception of self-interest through a discursive sensemaking processes. The mediation of language 
plays a pivotal role in any social construction process (Patriotta & Spedale, 2009), and this is even 
the case when social influences are ostensibly not mediated by language, for instance, if someone 
observes behaviors. Observed behaviors of self and others are integrated in a person’s “self-
narrative” (Bruner, 2004) in a sensemaking process that is of a fundamentally linguistic nature 
(Robichaud et al., 2004).  
Whereas all conversations may be expected to impact on conceptions of interests, not all types of 
conversations are equally likely to contribute to accounts of interests congruent with consummate 
collaboration. In his paper Franco (2006) distinguishes five types of conversation: negotiation, 
debate, persuasion, deliberation and dialogue. The first three seem to revolve around the individual 
interest rather than the collective interests. In their definition of negotiations Gergen, McNamee 
and Barrett (2002: 81) conclude that parties in negotiations “are encouraged to identify their basic 
interests, what they want from the negotiation and how important it is for them”. This implies a 
stress on the individual interests of the parties involved in the negotiations. Prior to negotiations 
parties may explore the assumptions underlying the individual interests of the different parties 
involved. These explorations are, however, not part of the negotiation conversation. The second 
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type of conversation, debate, is also not aimed at creating a shared point of view (Isaacs, 2002; 
Roberts, 2002). The intention of a debate is to prove your own point and prove the other party 
wrong. Persuasion is the third type of conversation and, again, stresses the individual interests. 
Unlike the previous two, persuasion does not set the parties against each other. In persuasion, 
“each participant tries to legitimize their particular proposition or point of view through evidence 
or persuasive argument. A persuaded party will thus change his or her initial positions and commit 
to that of the persuader party” (Franco, 2006: 814). In order for the persuasion to be successful one 
of the parties has to adopt the vision of the other party. There does not seem to be an a-priori 
reason to link this type of conversation with the construction of either shared, long-term interests 
or individual short-term interests. Persuasively advocating a point of view regarding interests, if 
successful, could lead to more consummate or to more perfunctory collaboration. 
The last two conversation types, deliberation and dialogue, seem to be concerned less with the 
individual interest and more likely to prove helpful in solving a social dilemma. These types share 
some commonalities and as a consequence are very hard to disentangle in practice. The difference 
between the two is the concreteness of the underlying decision process. Deliberation has a stronger 
association with concrete action (Franco, 2006; Roberts, 2002). According to Franco (2006) 
deliberations follow from the need to come to a decision concerning a specific action. Dialogue, in 
contrast, does not have this strong link with a concrete decision or problem (Burkhalter et al., 
2002). It “is not about judging, weighing, or making decisions, but about understanding and 
learning. Dialogue dispels stereotypes, builds trust, and enables people to open to perspectives that 
are very different from their own” (Heierbacher, 2007: 103). Franco (2006) claims that a dialogue 
is aimed at the creation of a joint meaning and understanding between the participants. Due to the 
arguments put forward it is felt that out of the five types of conversation deliberation and dialogue 
are the most helpful for parties to resolve a social dilemma by engaging them in a joint sensemaking 
process which leads to the creation of shared, long term interests. For this reason this paper will 
look a bit more closely at the characteristics of and conditions for deliberation and dialogue. 
Deliberation is “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in 
which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and 
claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers, 2004: 309). While deliberation always takes place 
in the context of a concrete issue, mostly an issue that requires a decision, a deliberative process 
may also include an episode of dialogue, during which the participants do not focus on the problem 
at hand but try to reach a deeper understanding of self and other (Burkhalter et al., 2002).  
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An essential aspect of dialogue is that all parties involved are willing to re-assess their own 
vision and often hidden (to themselves as well as others) assumptions. Ford (1999) explains that a 
dialogue is “a form of consciously constructed conversation in which participants engage in a 
sustained and collaborative investigation into the underlying assumptions and certainties that 
underlie their everyday experiences and relationships with the intent of creating more effective 
interactions”. The positions of interlocutors are often covered with layers of tacit assumptions 
(Linder, 2002). By participating in a dialogue the interlocutors are able to develop a language to 
understand their own interests by discussing their individual experiences (Mansbridge, 2006). 
Isaacs (2002) describes dialogue as a process which enables reflection on ones assumptions with 
the power to alter self-made limits. The perspective of the interlocutors on taken for granted truths 
result in self-distanciation (Tsoukas, 2009). This reasoning implies an underlying willingness to 
distance oneself from one’s own basic assumptions, as well as the willingness to understand those 
of the other. By taking the response of the other party seriously one is able to understand one’s own 
utterance in a different light and therefore produces cognitive change. Therefore this paper 
continues with the concept of dialogue.  
 
CONDITIONS FOR DISCOURSE IN MULTI-ORGANIZATIONAL PROJECTS 
In order to reach productive dialogue certain conditions need to be met. Mansbridge, Hartz-Karp, 
Amengual and Gastil (2006), state that an ideal situation for productive dialogue is characterized by 
consensus, rationality, freedom and equality. The rationality assumption is also mentioned by 
Habermas as part of the ideal speech (1979). He argues that dialogue is characterized by a “gentle 
but obstinate” claim to reason (Habermas, 1979: 3). Business interactions are also characterized by 
rationality (Gillette, 1984; Gratton & Ghoshal, 2003). In this paper it is assumed that rationality is 
present, and the focus is on the other factors of consensus, freedom and equality, mentioned by 
Mansbridge et al. (2006).  
 
Temporal Embeddedness 
First of all, the question is: which conditions lead to consensus. Consensus seeking implies that 
parties forego, on the one hand, the option of exercising power, and on the other hand of 
withdrawing from the discourse without coming to a resolution. This implies a commitment to the 
discourse that goes beyond the instrumental calculative engagement typical for business relations. 
“Relational engagement” is necessary, in which the interlocutants take responsibility for the joint 
task in which they are involved as well as for their relationship (Tsoukas, 2009). Taking 
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responsibility for the relationship implies that investments in order to maintain the relationship 
over time and into the future need to be made. Hence the relationship needs to be  “temporally 
embedded” (Rooks et al., 2000). Any MOP is by definition of limited duration, but may be embedded 
to a stronger or a lesser degree in a series of projects. Representatives from companies may have 
worked together before, and there may be an possibility to work together again in the future (Jones 
& Lichtenstein, 2008). Research indicates that the effects of the “shadow of the past” (duration and 
frequency for example) and the “shadow of the future” (the expectation of future transactions) 
mutually reinforce each other (Batenburg et al., 2003; Rooks et al., 2000).  
This paper expects that the temporal embeddedness of relationships within an MOP influence 
the conditions of the discourse, and through this the sensemaking processes with regard to 
interests. Parkhe (1993) mentions that individuals rely on cumulative past experiences as a guide 
for future behavior in order to overcome opportunistic behavior. Temporal embeddedness may be 
partly dictated by industry characteristics, but it can also be influenced by managers. Companies 
can make it their policy to do business with preferred partners, as long as experiences are positive. 
Alternatively, they can also let potential partners compete against each other, in order to improve 
their bargaining position. Players at higher organizational levels may vary in both forward-looking 
and backward-looking temporal embeddedness. At lower levels project executors may have 
experiences from having worked together earlier, on the organizational or the interpersonal level, 
which may increase their ability to work together and the level of trust (Laan et al., 2012). But at 
this level the prospect of future common projects is of less concern, and hence less likely to 
influence social construction of interests. 
 
Scope of Mandate 
The second condition mentioned by Mansbridge et al. (2006) for productive dialogue is freedom. 
The freedom condition may be expected to be precarious in the context of MOPs. The freedom of 
actors may be restricted in so far as they are acting as boundary spanners representing their 
organizations. Clopton (1984) argues that individuals acting as representatives of their 
organization will be less inclined to engage in integrative bargaining than individuals acting on 
their own behalf. Factors producing this effect are that the representative is held accountable for 
the outcome of the negotiation, and the representative’s loyalty and commitment to his 
organization (Clopton, 1984). It seems plausible that these observations with regard to bargaining 
style can be generalized to the propensity to engage in dialogue, as generally “people fear being 
judged inadequate by their ‘tribe’” (Isaacs, 2002: 205). Hence, the freedom of the actors involved in 
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discourses within MOPs is a factor worth studying. In practical terms this means that this paper 
needs to consider the scope of the mandates of boundary-spanning actors in an MOP. If boundary 
spanners have a narrow scope, the possibility to come to a genuine dialogue with counterparts 
from other organizations in the MOP is undermined, and the possibility of coming to conceptions of 
interests conducive to consummate collaboration becomes more remote. 
The scope of the mandate will vary strongly with the hierarchical level of participants. A broad 
mandate offers players the opportunity to focus on long-term benefits in a given collaboration, also 
if this implies renouncing short-term gains, or even incurring short-term losses. At higher levels the 
scope of the mandate is typically large, although even here some top managers may be under high 
pressure from, e.g., investors to deliver financial results. The degree of freedom given to project 
executors in contrast is to a large extent a design variable. If project executors operate within a very 
detailed and rigid project plan there is little scope for collaborative behavior, even if they would be 
inclined. However, companies participating in an MOP can also opt to give their project executors 
broader mandates, allowing them more degrees of freedom in organizing the work with their 
colleagues from other firms in a flexible way. This paper contends that such a broad mandate 




Presence of the equality condition (Mansbridge et al., 2006) is also far from self-evident in the 
discourse within MOPs. MOPs mostly consist of a company that acts as client, and other companies 
that act as contractors. There often is a clear pecking order between these companies, as for 
instance is the case between main contractor and subcontractors in a construction project 
(Stinchcombe, 1985). Client firms are generally unwilling to relinquish their more powerful 
position in the implicit hierarchy, mainly because they fear opportunism from the side of the 
contractors (Crespin-Mazet & Portier, 2010; Kadefors, 2004). This may lock parties in the MOP into 
an equilibrium of perfunctory cooperation. Nevertheless, productive dialogue could come about if 
all participants in a conversation at least temporarily treat each other as equals (Roberts, 2002). 
Equal parties feel more free to disagree (Kabanoff, 1991), which increases the possibilities of 
coming to productive dialogue. When individuals are from different hierarchical levels it may be 
more difficult to come to productive dialogue. On the other hand, when actors are from the same 
hierarchical level, treating each other as equals is facilitated.  Hence, equality is also a factor to take 
into account when studying social construction of interests in MOPs. 
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The degree of equality between companies and individuals participating in an MOP will be partly 
conditioned by contingencies like the relative sizes of the companies, and partly by the roles of 
client and supplier. Even legally independent contractors do not interact on a footing of strict 
equality if one has the role of the client and the other that of (potential) provider. But the parties 
can create an atmosphere in which they communicate on the basis of equality. To the extent that 
they succeed in doing so, they improve the conditions for social construction of interests congruent 
with consummate collaboration. Boundary spanners from different firms are more likely to interact 
as equals and on a collegial basis if they have regular informal face-to-face contact. In this sense, the 
conditions of equality and co-location are linked, and reinforce each other. 
 
Co-location 
An implicit assumption in the dialogue literature seems to be that the conversation takes place face-
to-face. Physical proximity is an important factor influencing collaborative processes (Kraut et al., 
2002) and should be taken into account. Specifically, face-to-face conversations are superior in 
terms of the possibility “to provide immediate feedback, to convey multiple cues, to support 
personalization, and to accommodate linguistic variety” (Yates & Orlikowski, 1992: 308-309). 
Experimental studies confirm the importance of face-to-face communication for establishing 
cooperation (Brosig, Weimann, & Ockenfels, 2003; Sally, 1995). Research shows that close 
collaboration is easier under the condition of proximity (Kahn & McDonough III, 1997). Laan, 
Noorderhaven, Voordijk and Dewulf (2011) describe how co-location of design team members from 
different companies in a project alliance in railway construction created beneficial effects.  
 In MOPs some discourses typically take place face-to-face, but others not. Some of the 
employees and managers involved in MOPs like construction projects or shipbuilding projects work 
side-by-side with colleagues from other organizations on the production site, while others remain 
at the premises of their own company. It is expected that in face-to-face social construction of 
interests conducive to consummate collaboration is more likely to take place. Therefore, this paper 
concludes that there will be better chances for a dialogue of consummate collaboration to arise 
when more managers and employees work side-by-side at a single location. 
All in all, the extent to which the conditions of the discourse are conducive to consummate 
collaboration are likely to vary between MOPs, as well as within MOPs across diverse settings and 
over time. In the next section the effects of the presence or absence of conditions that this paper 




Cross-Sectional Differences in Conditions 
This paper expects conditions for constructive deliberation and dialogue to vary between and even 
within MOPs. Acknowledging these differences, this paper aims to look at the social construction of 
interests at the micro level.  
 
Hence the first research question: 
How do conditions for discourse differ between (groups) of participants in an MOP, and how 
does this influence the social construction of interests? 
 
As indicated above, some conditions, like scope of mandate, may be expected to differ 
systematically between hierarchical levels. Moreover, scope of mandate may also differ between 
companies, as some companies give more strict instructions to their boundary-spanning employees 
than others. Co-location will also vary, as some employees in MOPs work side-by-side with 
colleagues from other companies. The same is true for temporal embeddedness, in particular 
backward looking, and equality. The expectation is that these differences will lead to differentiation 
in the social construction of interests, even within a single MOP. 
 
Changes in Conditions over Time 
Apart from these cross-sectional differences, this paper expects the conditions for discourse to 
change over time. Like organizations, MOPs can be seen as consisting in the mutually interlocking 
behaviors of the participants, and these behaviors will transform over time in response to each 
other as well as to changes in the environment (Schultz, Maguire, Langley, & Tsoukas, 2012). There 
are several factors that may lead to dynamic development of the conditions for discourse and the 
associated social construction of interests. First of all, every project has its life cycle and behaviors 
differ between phases (Adams & Barnd, 2008). On one hand, in the early phases of an MOP parties 
still need to get adjusted to each other, which would indicate that the conditions for discourse may 
improve over time. On the other hand, towards the end of the project some participating firms may 
run out of their budget, which may result in a strong focus on the own bottom line, and less 
openness to discourses associated with consummate collaboration. Which of these two effects 
dominates may depend on many factors. 
Secondly, there may be several feedback loops. In one of these feedback loops the discourse as it 
takes place within (a particular part of) the MOP could lead to the conditions for further 
conversations (e.g., if parties decide that they need to create more opportunities for face-to-face 
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interactions). Moreover, conceptions of interest as formed in a discourse may subsequently start to 
influence that discourse, as well as its conditions, e.g., when parties conclude that it is not in their 
interest to freely share information. Finally, the collaboration as it evolves over time and under 
influence of the conceptions of interest formed may in turn affect new discourses and reinforce or 
undermine earlier conceptions of interests (e.g., if observation of defective behavior cause a 
participant to calibrate earlier ideas concerning the interests of self and other, and make her less 
willing to converse openly. Due to these feedback mechanisms conceptions of interests and the 
associated collaboration may evolve in a path-dependent way. Hence the second research question: 
 
How do conditions of discourse and conceptions of interest evolve over time within (groups of 
participants in) an MOP? 
 
In the next section the empirical study is described to explore these two research questions. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Differentiation and Changes in Accounts 
This paper is interested in the accounts that are produced through conversations. In principle, one 
should study the conversations as these are the primordial mechanisms that produce accounts. 
However, there are two reasons to focus on accounts instead. First of all, every individual actor is 
involved in many different conversations with many different others, and possibly with 
contradicting contents. What counts in the end is how all of these together are collated into an 
account that gives meaning to the actor. Secondly, there is a methodological reason: conversations 
are fleeting and most often remain hidden from the researcher, accounts can be evoked and 
documented. Compared with more structured types of data accounts are more likely to yield also 
non-conscious meanings and motives (Orbuch, 1997). Nevertheless, it is important to think about 
the veracity of what people say in interviews. As Alvesson (2003) notes, interview responses may 
be an effort to construct a valued, coherent self-image, rather than an unbiased reflection of the 
interviewees’ mind. However, this does not mean interview responses are not important. The self-
constructions an actor wishes to convey in an interview reveal much of what she considers to be a 
meaningful rendering of the situation and what are appropriate thoughts and actions for an actor 
with her identity. 
This paper is not interested in dialogue for its own sake because it is assumed that productive 
dialogue will lead to accounts commensurate with consummate collaboration. These accounts in 
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turn will influence the tendency to engage in consummately collaborative behaviors. First of all, the 
accounts at the level of the individual are important in order for productive dialogue to lead to 
changed behavior in the MOP. These accounts are generally closely related to conversations (Firth, 
1995). More specifically, when it comes to collaboration and interests one needs to observe and talk 
with others to find out what is “normal”, “rational”, or “appropriate”. Secondly, individuals need to 
act upon the new accounts produced in productive dialogue. Jacobs and Heracleous (2005) 
illustrate how dialogue can alter participants’ mental models, which in turn enables new behaviors. 
Communication is “performative”, i.e., it creates a new reality, within which the participants start 
interacting (Barrett et al., 1995; Ford & Ford, 1995). In that sense productive dialogue not only can 
change, but inevitably does change reality. Even if behaviors remain ostensibly unchanged, the 
meanings attached to it will have shifted. 
 
Research Setting 
This paper focuses on one construction project in the shipbuilding industry, taking a longitudinal 
approach by following the progress of the ship over eighteen months. The study started after the 
initial set up of the contracts between the main subcontractors, and the shipyard started the design 
and engineering phase. The timeline of the project with the phases of the project-life cycle and the 
moments of interviewing are depicted in Figure 4.1.  
This study uses a single case study, as the project that is observed is unique in several ways to 
make this a ‘revelatory case’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Firstly, the ship that is constructed is one 
of the largest ever constructed at the yard of investigation. Due to the magnitude of the ship and the 
complexity of systems the process of collaboration between the organizations involved is 
particularly challenging. Secondly, the size of the budget makes this project important to the parties 
involved, and representatives from the yard and the main subcontractor agree that “if this ship fails 
we have a serious problem”. Thirdly, the physical construction of the ship takes place in two 
different countries. Although the focus is on the design and engineering phase of the project, there 
is a temporal overlap with the construction activities. This study specifically follows the design and 
engineering phase of the project as it is believed that this phase shapes the collaboration in the 
remaining part of the project. Additionally, parties can make money in the design phase through 
design and engineering optimizations, while in the later phases (pre-outfitting, construction, 
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FIGURE 4.1 






















This study uses non-participant observations and two rounds of interviews over eighteen months. 
The observations are done at three types of internal meetings at the shipyard. These include project 
meetings, purchasing-engineering meetings, and engineering team leader meetings that are held bi-
weekly. The first is a meeting between the project leaders of the different departments involved to 
discuss the progress of the project. These participants come from the Engineering, Purchasing & 
Logistics, Project, Cost Control, and Planning departments. The second series of meetings is 
between Purchasing & Logistics and Engineering, with the purpose to discuss the status of all parts 
needed for the ship. The last series of meetings is between several levels of team leaders in 
Engineering. Each of the meetings observed normally takes around two hours or more. During the 
observations of the meetings, the focus was on the interaction between individuals and discourses 
that could be associated with the distinguished types of collaboration behavior. The unit of 
observation is the individual. The interest of the study is the conditions for discourse of the 
individual. 
In addition, this study included two rounds of interviews with representatives from the three 
most important partners in the project. Most participants were interviewed twice and the two 
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portray conceptions of interests of self and others and on factors influencing these perceptions. In 
the second round of interviews there was an additional focus on the types of collaborative behavior 
and the associated accounts of interest. The data consists of extensive observation notes and 
transcriptions of around fifty interviews. The first round consists of almost twenty interviews and 
the second round of thirty interviews as some additional interviewees were added in the second 
round. The interview protocol can be found in Appendix I. 
The participants in the meetings as well as the interviewees come from different organizational 
levels. In line with the hierarchical categorization of Corley (2004) the individuals are categorized 
into three groups. The three hierarchical levels are higher managers, project managers, and project 
executors. These categories are formed due to the different roles (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) and 
associated observed differences in the conditions for discourse. The highest organizational level is 
the higher manager who bears profit responsibility. The project managers are boundary spanners 
who form the link with the other organizations. The lowest organizational level that is taken into 
account is the project executor who carries out operational tasks. Table 4.1 shows the number of 
interviewees at the shipyard and the subcontractors and their hierarchical levels. 
 
TABLE 4.1 
Number of Interviews and Hierarchical Level of Interviewees 
 Higher manager Project manager Project executors Total nr of interviews 











Shipyard 5 8 9 15 3 4 27 
Subcontractors 5 8 4 6 5 8 22 




The transcribed interviews were imported into a qualitative data analysis software package and 
subsequently analyzed inductively. The data are analyzed is the individual level. First the 
interviews were read to get an idea about how the respondents perceive their interests and the 
collaborative behaviors. Next, the text fragments were coded. In these text fragments the 
interviewees expressed accounts of interests in which certain types of collaborative behavior are 
described. Subsequently, the accounts of types of collaboration were qualitatively linked to 
conditions for discourse. Firstly, the factors that the interviewees themselves connected to the 
elements of consummate or perfunctory collaboration mentioned were looked at. Secondly, the four 
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factors discussed above – temporal embeddedness, scope of mandate, equality and co-location – 
both by analyzing the participant’s accounts of these conditions and their effects and by bringing in 
information from other sources were examined. For instance, it was known who was co-located 
with whom in the project. Observations served to assess to what extent conversations between 
project participants in a natural setting do or do not exhibit the characteristics of constructive 








Consummate and Perfunctory Collaboration 
The conceptualization of consummate and perfunctory collaboration is based on the literature. The 
first question when analyzing the data was whether this distinction would be corroborated by the 
interviews. Maybe not surprisingly it was easier to find descriptions of consummate collaboration. 
References to what this paper labels perfunctory collaboration were scarcer, and more often found 
when interviewees talked about other firms or about projects in the past. 
Conditions for discourse: 
temporal embeddedness, scope of 

















A typical quote reflecting consummate collaboration is the following: 
If you start discussing these things you make a lot of administrative fuzz and all in all it’s small beer. 
So you say, it’s fine, these 400 hours we’re not going to fight about it. If it comes to 4000 hours it 
becomes a different story, then there is something going on. Then we will start a discussion, if we 
see that coming. If I receive signals from construction, about this is not going OK and those costs, 
etc. Then something is wrong, and at the least we will start to administer it. How can we restrict it? 
(Higher manager) 
Elements of consummate collaboration in the interviews include, among other things: 
- Not being unreasonable 
- Implementing smart solutions that benefit both parties 
- Solving conflicts 
- Living up to the confidence given to you 
- Pointing out possible design optimizations 
- Pointing out possible design problems 
- Helping other contractors on the ship 
- Solving problems you have caused 
- Don’t fuss about small mistakes made by others. 
In a typical quote regarding perfunctory collaboration the interviewee is talking in a general way on 
how collaboration can go wrong in shipbuilding projects: 
Mostly all problems come at the same time. Because it is more complex than anticipated, it becomes, 
the planning becomes tighter, financially, the financial room for maneuvering also becomes more 
restricted. Then all parties will in the first instance look at themselves and try to spend as little as 
possible, of course. As such it is not strange that you don’t any longer have the idea of working 
together. (Higher manager) 
Some other elements of perfunctory collaboration that are mentioned are: 
- Not doing extra work without previous agreement of extra payment 
- Stopping your work if a job is outside the scope of the contract 
- Forcing your own specifications and requirements on the other party 
- Discuss about payments before thinking about a solution. 
Of course, the absence of the various elements of consummate collaboration mentioned earlier 
can also be taken as a sign of perfunctory collaboration. The interview situation may have 
contributed to rhetorical mentioning of consummate collaboration elements in many interviews. 
Hence classification of interviewees as consummate or perfunctory collaborators was difficult. 
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Instead the focus was on the interview fragments that exemplified consummate or perfunctory 
collaboration (both sometimes occurred in one and the same interview), and connecting these to 
the conditions under which the interviewee worked. This study looked both at the four conditions 
discussed in the theory section and at the explanations that the interviewees themselves 
spontaneously offered.  
 
Temporal Embeddedness 
The time horizon (Parkhe, 1993; Zeng & Chen, 2003) is very important for the social construction of 
interests. Both past experiences and future expectations are taken into account. There are clear 
indications that positive past experiences will enhance the likelihood of taking responsibility for the 
joint task. Likewise, negative past experiences will make an individual less engaged with the 
situation and perceive his interests differently:  
In the past we have bumped our head several times, because we went along, we all knew it, this is 
how it is going to be and in the end they say sorry, it costs money and the alteration is not 
happening. However, we were already heading in that direction and the way back was longer. [..] 
Then we had to deal with the detriment. […] In the past they took advantage of us and that is the 
danger of thinking along, being customer friendly, being flexible. (Project executor)  
While all interviewees at the higher management level show temporal embeddedness in their 
accounts, there is more variety at the lower organizational levels. All interviewees give 
indications that positive and negative experiences have influenced how they perceive their 
interests. Encounters in the past, constituting the shadow of the past, thus influence the interest 
perceptions of the individuals. Most individuals mentioned that collaboration in the past with 
individuals and companies influenced their interest perceptions and collaborative behavior in 
the current project. Specifically, negative past experiences makes it more difficult to move 
towards consummate collaboration, because the other party is expected to choose for 
perfunctory collaboration. Some people have a natural antipathy against that company. […] In 
previous project they had shortcomings, specifically at those points […]. People are afraid that it 
will happen again this project. […] When something happens, X will say, “I told you so”. (Project 
manager)  
It is not that I think about it (future encounter), no, I do not consider it. (Project executor) 
Individuals at the highest organizational level explicitly take into account possible future 
dealings with partners (shadow of the future). Most interviewees from the project execution and 
project management levels in the organizations only take into account experiences in the current 
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project when they reflect upon their interests. These individuals do see the importance of 
relationships in collaboration, nevertheless, investing in these relationships is not seen as a priority. 
Higher managers in contrast look at relationships as highly temporally embedded, also towards the 
future. Their accounts of interests are commensurate with consummate collaboration. Trust 
between the companies is of importance here. If that trust is breached consummate collaboration 
may be hindered.  
Then you stand opposite each other, for a future project that is not good. […] In general, we say we 
will do it and we trust that you will handle it decently afterwards. If that trust is compromised, the 
next time you will think, if you want us to do that, we first wait for the order before we do it. 
(Higher manager)  
 
Scope of Mandate 
The scope of mandate increases with higher organizational levels. Respondents at the project 
execution level indicate that their scope is usually limited to technical aspects, excluding financial 
interests. With a limited scope of mandate the interviewees also report a restricted sense of 
responsibility. Therefore, they are less inclined to reflect upon or engage in dialogue about these 
interests. Higher organizational levels have a broader scope and are therefore more concerned with 
integrating diverging interests. Their accounts of interest seem to reflect discourse with their 
partners.  
I do not have anything to do with money issues. In principle we look at what the contract says. […] 
If the system does not comply with the contract, something has to be changed. If that costs money, 
that is not my problem, I only focus on the technical part. (Project executor)  
The more open conversations you have with each other, the better something goes and the more 
you are inclined to say: I think it is not going well, it doesn't deliver many benefits for me. However, 
I see you are heading in that direction and it is not going well, have a look at it. I am more inclined 
to say something when we have a good relationship with that company than when we are on 
opposite sides of each other. (Higher manager)  
Whereas the temporal embeddedness of relationships varies considerably, depending on both 
the question whether particular partners have worked together before or expect to do so in the 
future, the scope of mandate is strongly company dependent. Some companies give their employees 
more freedom in their decision taking, while others are very strict in their coordination. Project 
executors from one of the subcontractors have a broader scope in line with the type of collaborative 
behavior that is supported in this company. This subcontractor is a company that has a long term 
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focus with a tendency to encourage taking initiative beyond the contract to sustain the relationship 
with the client.  This broader scope in addition with the encouraging environment makes it more 
likely that employees construct their interest in line with consummate collaboration in their 
relationships with the client and with other suppliers.  
(Here in our company) we first solve it technically and then we will talk about money. (Project 
executor) 
It is not a fixed demarcation line, like when we go over X euro’s, we’re done. […] I am convinced that 
this pays off more than if you claim every hour. (Higher manager) 
 
Equality 
This paper found references to two kinds of equality in the interviews, and in both cases there was 
a clear connection to consummate collaboration. The first type of equality was that in which the 
informal hierarchy implicit in the roles of client and contractor was temporarily suspended. Several 
interviewees from the shipyard talked about the importance of collaborating as a team. 
It’s not about the relation, that we are the customer, you are the supplier, but simply about tackling 
a project together. (Project manager) 
From the side of the suppliers the point is made that if the yard strongly assumes the role of the 
boss or sticks to the letter of the contract, they will respond in kind.  
If a shipyard has a very strict attitude, last Friday we spent two hours cleaning up your mess, here’s 
the bill […], then you start thinking, wait a minute. Then we will do the same. […] They want 
something changed, the hell with them, we have done our job and we won’t do it. First send us a 
formal purchase order and then we may start doing it. (Higher manager)  
Hence, equality between client and contractor is always fragile (“when problems occur this will 
come to an end”). But at the same time this equality is clearly connected to consummate 
collaboration in the minds of the interviewees, in particular with open communication and 
acquiring a better understanding for the other’s situation. 
The second type of equality mentioned by some interviewees was that between project 
managers and project executors. The idea is that if an executor has the required capabilities it is 
counterproductive to micro-manage such a person. 
You could restrict the freedom of these people to such an extent that they will do only what you ask 
them to do. But then the interaction [with representatives from other organizations] becomes so 
difficult, to function really like a team. (Higher manager) 




Most respondents take the benefits associated with being co-located for granted. Only when the 
respondents were asked why this makes working easier did the respondents think about it. All 
lower levels respondents feel that being co-located makes working together easier because face-to-
face contact is less formal and quicker than communication at a distance. This shorter distance in 
communication, which is created by co-locating individuals from different organizations, gives a 
bigger chance to discourse in line with consummate behaviors. 
Drawing, making a sketch of the situation. It is much easier if you can draw, then if have to explain 
yourself in an email. (Project manager)  
Email is of course easy because you are quick with a lot of things, sending it to each other if you are 
and stay on the same wavelength. When there is a reason to sit face-to-face, it usually means 
friction has been created. Then it is always better to sit face-to-face because you can see each 
other’s attitude, body language and you can also see what somebody’s position is in the matter and 
how to deal with that. (Higher manager)  
What also comes to the fore when looking at co-location is that the individuals who are co-
located with representatives from other organizations feel more connected to the project. The close 
proximity of the individuals from different organizations makes that they incorporate the different 
interests in their own interest construction. The co-location of the individuals makes them feel 
more responsible towards the project, which makes them also more temporally embedded. Co-
location and temporal embeddedness are interrelated in their influence on collaborative behavior.  
You know the people, you know who they are, and you make small talk with them. Then you know 
how to approach somebody, to let’s say reach the optimal result. When you work at a distance, you 
have a different way of working. It becomes more formal, sometimes it is ok, but often it means a lot 
more time. (Project manager)  
In addition, also references to co-location in connection to an increase of insights into the 
consequences of their own and others’ actions were found. This insight into the consequences and 
consequently the associated interests makes them more likely to engage in dialogue supporting 
consummate types of behavior. With a distance in location individuals less often encounter others’ 
interests and do not have to talk and deal with these. Facing these possible diverging interests leads 
to discourse with the aim at finding a solution that satisfies both their interests.  
Because they sit here in the company the connections are very short. If we have questions we go to 
them. You often notice that if you need to take care of business, you unconsciously have ideas about 
that. If you respond via email you hold on to your own ideas. You will get an answer, however, it is 
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often not the answer you were expecting. While if you sit with the person and talk about the issue, 
he may take out a sketch, which then turns out to be a different one you had in mind.[…] That way 
of collaborating is very important. (Project manager)  
Although co-location can quite easily be established in a project, it has to be kept in mind that co-
location just by itself may not lead to consummate collaboration. Co-location can benefit 
consummate collaboration in combination with one of the other conditions present, such as a broad 
scope of mandate, an equal or a high temporal embedded relationship. 
 
Differences over Time 
Start of the Project 
At the beginning of the project, at the moment of contracting the main subcontractors, the shipyard 
considered the approach to the project. Due to the importance of the project to the shipyard and the 
experience of suboptimal outcomes in the recent past, the shipyard decided to take a different 
approach with this project. This different approach focuses on collaboration from the early stages 
of the project on, in order to try to prevent issues in the project leading to suboptimal outcomes. 
The shipyard initiated this focus by having kick-off meetings with the two main subcontractors 
before the project started (in Figure 4.1 on page 71, this is during the initial set up phase). In these 
meetings the main idea was to get insight into each other’s work and ideas, to enhance 
communication and understanding of each other further along in the project. This strong focus on 
collaboration may have set the stage for more consummate collaboration. Focusing on 
collaboration brings considerations regarding individual and organizational interests more to the 
surface. In a setting where collaboration is so explicitly emphasized, individuals might think more 
about their own roles in the collaboration with others.  
Most individuals involved are well aware how essential collaboration in this project is, and often 
compare the current way of working together with the way of working together in previous 
projects. Especially individuals in contact with other companies (from the shipyard or the 
subcontractors) are confronted with new aspects of collaboration and mention this in their 
interviews. This different approach is not apparent to everybody, however. The individuals at lower 
levels of the companies are less involved in the efforts to focus attention to collaboration in the 
project. This issue makes that individuals involved in the project at this level may look differently at 
their own and others’ interests.  
In addition to the kick-off meetings the shipyard also designated two integration managers. 
These integration managers are responsible for the contact between the shipyard and the 
Chapter 4 
80 
subcontractors.  Additionally, the integration managers are responsible for the integration of the 
different phases of the project over time. One goal of these integration managers is to look at the 
interests of the subcontractor and the shipyard and try to find a solution that fits both parties. In 
addition, their goal is to integrate the transfer of the ship smoothly of one phase associated with 
one department to another phase associated with a different department. These incentives were 
also initiated in order to prevent suboptimal outcomes. Both the shipyard and the subcontractors 
highly valued these integration managers. Especially the subcontractors express that they feel that 
their interests are more taken into account than in previous projects.  
The third issue that the shipyard changed for this project was that employees from the 
subcontractor are stationed at the shipyard. These individuals act as mediators between the 
shipyard and their own company. This exercise is a way to enhance collaboration between the 
shipyard and the subcontractors, to prevent costs associated with suboptimal outcomes. Also this 
initiative is appreciated by the subcontractors as well as by representatives from the shipyard. Due 
to the shorter communication lines between the shipyard and the subcontractors issues in the 
engineering phase were resolved quicker. 
This [kick-off meeting] was actually the first time for me, I have several years of experience and I 
have seen several times that people are at cross-purposes. I think that if they have seen each other 
and talked to each other they come more easily in contact with each other. […] I think we have 
reaped the fruits of that meeting so far, the communication is much better (Project manager) 
The approach that the shipyard together with the subcontractors took may have facilitated the 
awareness of interests in collaboration, which made discourse conducive to consummate 
collaboration in the beginning of the project more likely. 
 
Project Lifecycle 
The cycle through which the project moves is often mentioned by respondents. Project life cycles is 
an important aspect to consider as different phases have different dynamics (Adams & Barnd, 2008; 
Pinto & Prescott, 1988). Over the project life cycle time pressure is generally expected to increase 
and the budgetary constraints to become stricter. This puts pressure on the collaboration, which is, 
however, moderated by the four conditions discussed earlier. 
The effect of temporal embeddedness in the form of having worked together in past projects 
may be expected to become progressively weaker during the project, as more recent experiences 
supersede those from earlier collaborations. These experiences were studied that led to an 
approach or attitude that was difficult to explain to outsiders. Also the approach used for this ship 
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might have created a group of people that were highly embedded, which created a distance with 
others that did not work in this project: 
I notice it when I talk with people who have not worked [on this project] and explain what I want 
them to do. Then I realize, I can’t blame this guy that I have to explain it in detail because he comes 
from a different project. He hasn’t gone through it all, I talk about a completely integrated planning, 
he thinks, pooh, is that really true? Then I say, go have a look at how we work [in this project], go 
into it (Higher manager). 
This quote also suggests that respondents who are co-located during the development of the 
project, may become stronger temporally embedded in their relationships. Over the project life 
cycle activities like engineering and design (during the engineering phase of the project life cycle) 
became less co-located (see Figure 4.1 on page 71). At the same time activities like construction and 
production (during the production phase) show an increased co-location. But the effect of co-
location on collaboration in the actual production is different from that in the design and 
engineering phase, because “at the front end of the project you have to gain money [because of 
optimizations], while at the back end of the project [in production] you can only lose money” (Project 
manager). The net effect is likely to be an overall decrease of the importance of co-location over the 
project life cycle. 
Another aspect related to the co-location and the project life cycle was that the production of the 
ship took place in a different country than the design and engineering activities. Several 
representatives of the shipyard moved to the production location. In addition, new companies that 
were responsible for production activities became involved in the project. This might have had an 
effect on the temporal embeddedness. Due to the fact that the activities were shifted to a different 
location, with sometimes different individuals representing the same or new organizations, people 
might have felt less commitment to the future.  
Moreover it is not clear whether the shadow of the future in general will become stronger over 
time. This may be the case if new projects are imminent, but in this project this did not occur or 
played no role. This might also be due to the long time horizon associated in this project. Whereas, 
in most projects individuals are associated for only one or two years with the project, this project 
lasts for over five years. This long time horizon might make that individuals do not incorporate 
future encounters in their interest constructions, especially at the lower levels.  
It is likely that the scope of mandate tends to become smaller over time, especially as budgets 
are getting tighter there may be little leeway to go beyond the book in collaborating with partners. 
This may especially be expected to hold for higher organizational levels concerned with money 
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issues, and this may change their collaborative behavior. In the beginning of the project the 
interviewees at lower levels did not report strong restrictions imposed by their higher managers. 
As the project progressed parties tended to become more focused on increasing its scope of work 
(and hence, budget): 
In the design phase, as a subcontractor you don’t really have the possibility to focus on that 
(additional work2). You do your job and you try to do it in the best possible way, or as quick or as 
cheap as possible. In a later phase when [subcontractor] starts building on the basis of our 
information and our information changes, they can say, I have to do my job twice, this will cost you 
so much. (Project manager) 
When we say, this is a deviation, we have come up with this solution and now we want to have it 
like this because it only fits in the ship like this. (They say:) You are going to pay. That is very 
shortsighted, but that is how the company responds…. (Project manager) 
In this study no confirmation was found in the interviews that project executors were actually 
instructed in this sense, but this may be due to the sensitivity of the subject. Also the strong focus 
on collaboration from the start of the project may have led companies to instruct individuals to 
behave in line with consummate types of behavior. Only when the project progresses further may 
companies start forgetting about the collaboration focus in this project and individuals may be 
instructed accordingly in their scope of mandate.  
Furthermore, the involvement of higher management changed during the project. As the project 
overall went well, involvement of higher management decreased. In the beginning of the project the 
commercial aspects needed to be settled, but as the project progressed the technical aspects 
became more important. Only when changes in the project have important commercial 
consequences higher management is expected to step back in, but this has not occurred during the 
period of observation.  
Regarding equality, a possible deterioration of this condition was expected if problems occurred. 
The client will then be tempted to emphasize the client-contractor roles to put pressure on the 
contractors. Part of this game might take the form of trying to increase the contractor’s shadow of 
the future. However, no clear indications were found that this happened in the project studies, 
possibly because there already was a strong shadow of the future, at least for one of the contractors: 
Also if a project falls short, you have to say, too bad, we have to learn from that for future projects. 
If we try to get the maximum, we will upset the client and there will be no next time. (Higher 
manager) 
                                                             
2 Additional work and/or services that go beyond the deliverables that are given in the statement of work  
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Path Dependency 
The interviewees indicate that, generally speaking, what a party does early in the project has a 
strong effect on relationships later on: 
In the beginning of the project you need to deliver, then you need to deliver the drawings and the 
engineering and if that goes too slowly the trust is gone. (Higher manager) 
More specific path-dependent developments were found in the relationships between the shipyard 
and one of the main suppliers (“Supplier A”). This relationship was burdened with remaining 
disputes from a previous project. 
We have worked very intensively together to make those contracts. In doing so we have also dealt 
with some old sores between the parties. We have put a lot of effort in that, and we have succeeded. 
(Higher manager).  
However, the clean slate soon tarnished again. The shipyard was late in contracting Supplier A, and 
against expectations, the supplier never caught up with the schedule. 
We have had a false start [with Supplier A]. We had agreed when they would give us the 
specifications. Five months later we still didn’t have them, six months later they came and they were 
rubbish. Then a few people, among whom myself, have looked at it and tried to get them right. I 
have even shifted my holidays to try to catch up with the delay. We were three months behind at 
that time. But one year later we were still three months behind. (Higher manager) 
As a result the relationship gradually deteriorated. “Let’s start with the worst case, [Supplier A]. 
That’s a shitty firm, excuse me, …” (Project manager). “[Supplier A] always knows why we are the ones 
to blame” (Higher manager).  
In the end the situation was far from the ideal of consummate collaboration:  
What has deteriorated is the attitude in the project, their willingness to integrate and their 
tendency to look for extra work. This indicates that their contract is too poor. That they earn too 
little and that they try with all their might to cut their losses. (Higher manager). 
The collaborative behavior portrayed in the project was path dependent for this specific 
subcontractor. The above quotes illustrate how one subcontractor that started off with more 
perfunctory types of behavior was unable to move towards consummate types of behavior. They 
were unable to break this vicious cycle. Once the collaborative behavior moves towards perfunctory 
types of collaborative behavior in a project it is very difficult to break this motion over time. The 




Also in the observations of the different meetings a decrease in the confidence in the specific 
subcontractor over time was seen. In the beginning of the project, a few individuals occasionally 
referred to their negative experiences with the subcontractor in previous projects. Not much 
attention is given to this behavior by higher management. They express that previous experiences 
have been put aside and that they start with a clean slate. Further along in the project more 
individuals from different hierarchical levels express their annoyance with how the subcontractor 
responds. Towards the end of the study period a majority of the individuals lose their trust in the 
work of the subcontractor and their behavior towards this subcontractor changes. This example 
shows how in spite of attempts to start the collaboration in a positive way, early problems led to a 
vicious cycle of mutual recriminations. Once perfunctory collaboration has started in a project it is 
difficult to move break this process and move towards consummate collaboration. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study in the shipbuilding industry found some traces of how conceptions of interests are 
socially constructed through discursive processes. The accounts of the respondents showed 
frequent references to temporal embeddedness and equality of the relationship, and the scope of 
mandate and co-location of the individual that affect the type of collaborative behavior in an MOP. 
These conditions are largely in line with characteristics of a productive dialogue as mentioned by 
Mansbridge et al. (2006). Consummate collaboration is supported by high temporal embeddedness, 
equality between individuals, a broad scope of mandate, and co-location with individuals of other 
companies. These conditions lead to constructive dialogue between representatives of the 
organizations involved in the project, which make it more likely that they will engage in 
consummate collaboration.  
With respect to the dynamics the results indicate that project life cycle effects and path 
dependencies have an effect on collaborative processes over time. It was observed that during the 
project life cycle temporal embeddedness in the sense of shared experiences in the focal project 
became stronger, while no indications of a change in the effect of experiences in previous projects 
or of expectations with regard to future projects was found. This paper expected the scope of 
mandate of some representatives of contractors to becomes more limited over time, but found only 
some indirect evidence for this. In addition, it was discovered that the involvement of higher 
management decreased in relation to the increased focus on technical aspects of the project. Overall 
these changes over time affected the collaboration in the project. At lower organizational levels an 
increase in consummate collaboration was witnessed, while for higher managers consummate 
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types of collaborative behaviors might decline over time (although no clear evidence for this was 
found). The project that was followed in this study was unique in the sense that the participating 
companies had a strong focus on collaboration. This focus resulted in several initiatives that steered 
the companies more towards consummate type of collaboration. This may have influenced the 
project life cycles that were observed in this project. Additionally, it means that the focus on 
collaboration may have had an impact on how the individuals perceived their interests and acted 
accordingly. Furthermore, a path dependency was observed in which behavior from previous 
projects or in the beginning of the project strongly affects the relationship with other participants 
later on in the project. This paper showed an example of a deficient relationship that was 
established in earlier encounters of the relationship that negatively influenced the relationship and 
thus behavior in later stages of the project. These types of behavior were not conducive to 
consummate behavior and once established, were difficult to steer towards consummate types of 
behavior. 
The results confirm that rational choice theories are likely to offer a too restricted view on 
collaboration in social dilemma situations (Justice, 2006; Monroe, 2001). Consummate 
collaboration in MOPs that are characterized by social dilemma characteristics seems to be based 
on social constructions of interests. This seems to be in line with Kollock’s (1998) third category of 
solutions to social dilemmas: strategic solutions that resolve the dilemma by increasing the salience 
of long-term collaboration. This paper tries to contribute to solving “the mystery” (Ledyard, 1995: 
172) of collaboration by linking it to four conditions for discourse conducive to consummate 
collaboration in the accounts of interest of respondents.  
Future research should dig more deeply into the processes of social construction of interests, 
especially in relation to discourse. So far interests have largely been taken as given, and the 
possibility to change conceptions of interests ignored as a possible way to change behavior in 
collaboration. These processes should also be studied both within the life cycle of a project and 
across projects. Additionally, more insights into the nature of consummate collaboration are 
needed. What is consummate collaboration in different contexts, and what factors cause it? While 
this paper identified several factors associated with discourse, there are likely to be more factors 













This paper discusses the strategic intent of business managers in the Dutch shipbuilding industry. A 
mental mapping technique is used to examine the relation between the strategic intent and 
consummate collaboration. Most companies see collaboration as part of their strategic intent, 
nevertheless, this paper finds important differences in how concepts related to consummate 
collaboration are embedded in managers’ mental maps. Congruence between goals and time 
horizons are important elements of how managers view collaboration. Also the dependency of 
companies on the shipbuilding industry determines a perspective on collaboration with other 
companies. This paper elucidates the relationship between the strategic intent of companies and 
collaboration between companies. 
 
  
                                                             




In temporary inter-organizational projects multiple companies work together on a temporary 
project (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). For example, in a project in the shipbuilding industry a 
shipyard, an electro technical company and HVAC company, together with a number of other 
suppliers, work together to assemble a ship. Essential in these inter-organizational projects is 
collaboration between the companies (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000). These inter-
organizational projects contain multiple companies, this paper therefore uses the term multi-
organizational projects (MOPs). Although these companies share responsibilities in the assembly 
they have different interests (Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008). As an insider from the shipbuilding 
industry describes it: “The final goal is the same: completing with each other a product that has the 
best price-quality relation, however, we perceive the means towards that end differently.” 
Common problems in these MOPs are additional work and rework (Rooke et al., 2004), but also 
issues with trust, commitment (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000b, 2000a) and delays are prevalent. These 
problems may lead to ineffectiveness in the project. The temporality in these project based settings, 
with milestones and deadlines, puts even more pressure on the individuals in the projects (Jones & 
Lichtenstein, 2008; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). From these insights the Dutch shipbuilding 
industry has formulated the desire to aim for more integrative collaboration in the chain of 
companies working on a ship. With this desire a program called “Integrative Collaboration” was 
born to develop better collaboration models for the Dutch shipbuilding industry.  
The concept of integrative collaboration can also be found in the bargaining literature. Larsson 
et al. (1998) discuss integrative and distributive collaboration as part of the division between 
competition and collaboration in inter-organizational alliances. Walton and McKersie 
conceptualized the idea of integrative collaboration by examining distributive and integrative types 
of bargaining (1965). Distributive bargaining focuses on competing for the joint outcome, while 
integrative bargaining aims for together producing a greater joint outcome. In other words the 
integrative dimension aims at jointly making an as large as possible pie, while the distributive 
dimension pertains the way in which the pie is divided among the actors. Similar to these concepts 
are the concepts of perfunctory and consummate collaboration, as discussed in previous papers in 
this dissertation. Integrative and distributive collaboration come from the bargaining literature, 
while perfunctory and consummate collaboration come from organizational economics. In this 
paper we use the continuum of perfunctory and consummate collaboration. 
Pursuing consummate collaboration in an MOP aims to produce a situation where all 
participating companies can win by satisfying the common interests. With distributive 
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collaboration the conflicting interests of the companies lead to efforts to secure a greater part for 
the individual company (Larsson et al., 1998), which typically goes at the expense of all. Aiming for 
consummate collaboration leads to the most beneficial situation for all companies provided that all 
companies pursue the common interests. 
This paper focuses on the strategy of the companies in MOPs. In an MOP each company has its 
own strategy when it comes to how they do business. Representatives of the companies come 
together in a team that needs to collaborate to successfully finish the project. The strategy of the 
company sets the long term goal of the desired position it wants to establish in the competitive 
environment (Artto, Martinsuo, Dietrich, & Kujala, 2008b; Hamel & Prahalad, 2005; Porac, Thomas, 
& Baden-Fuller, 1989). The means to achieve this position are formed and constructed through the 
people within the company (Chaffee, 1985; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). The company’s strategy 
influences the perception of representatives and determines how they interact collaboratively in 
the project. The strategy of the company may therefore be assumed to have an impact on the 
collaboration between individuals and companies within a project. But whether and how the 
concept of collaboration takes shape in the strategies of companies operating in project-based 
industries remains unclear, while this will likely have an effect on the possibility of consummate 
collaboration.  
So far scholars have mainly focused on the project strategy concept in which the strategy of the 
organization that manages the project is discussed (Artto et al., 2008a; Artto et al., 2008b). This 
paper is interested in the strategies of the companies in an MOP setting. Not much research has 
examined the perspective of the participating companies’ strategy in a project, while collaboration 
may be affected by the different strategies of the companies. This paper is not so much interested in 
the formalized strategy of a company (as embodied in a strategic plan), but rather in the worldview 
underlying the day-to-day strategic actions of the firm. The strategic intent of a company represents 
the position that the company desires and aims for in the long term (Hamel & Prahalad, 2005). This 
strategic intent gives an idea of how the manager perceives the company’s strategy and how this 
strategy might guide the change towards consummate collaboration (Huff & Jenkins, 2002). This 
paper taps into the worldview of the companies focusing on the strategic intent by studying the 
mental maps of top managers. 
Hence this paper is interested in how these mental maps of top managers of companies 
operating in a project-based industry relate to consummate collaboration, because it is assumed 




The research question is therefore:  





In order to examine the strategic intent of the different companies this paper uses mental maps. A 
cognitive map, causal map, or mental model map is an individual’s conscious perception of reality 
(Langfield-Smith, 1992). A mental map consists of concepts, relationships, and statements. A 
relationship ties two concepts together and a statement describes the relationship between two 
concepts (Carley & Palmquist, 1992). A mental model deals with two types of believes: “beliefs 
about the identity of the firm and causal beliefs about what it takes to compete successfully within 
the environment” (Porac et al., 1989: 399). Both elements of a mental model are important and 
represented in the strategy of the firm. The identity of the firm is portrayed in the mental map of 
the strategy as well as the belief of the company how to compete successfully is represented in the 
strategy.  
This paper uses the mental map to tap into the worldview of the strategic intent of the company. 
Several authors (Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin, 1994; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) argue that the strategy 
of the company represents the values and cognitive bases of the CEO. A strategy of a company is an 
abstraction in the mind of managers (Mintzberg, 1987). For researchers mental maps provide a 
way to acquire insights into the strategic stance towards collaboration, as seen and expressed by a 
top decision maker. Therefore in this study CEOs of a company were interviewed to examine the 
strategic intent and its relatedness to collaboration, as reflected in his or her mental map. 
 
Strategic Intent 
The strategy of a company can be described as the behavior of the company in the market (Ritter & 
Gemünden, 2004). The concept of strategy has been defined in different ways referring to different 
aspects (Mintzberg, 1987). Mintzberg (1987) discusses five different definitions, which include 
strategy as plan, ploy, pattern, position, and perspective. The first definition of strategy as a plan 
refers to a course of action to deal with a certain situation. For example in the game theory 
literature, the plan specifies which choices the player will make in the possible situations he faces. 
Secondly, the strategy can be of any nature and can thus also be a ploy, a course of action intended 
to circumvent an opponent or competitor (Mintzberg, 1987). The third definition discusses strategy 
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as a pattern, a stream of actions. These patterns may be part of an intended plan. However, the 
patterns can also be unintended. Strategy as a position is the fourth definition discussed by 
Mintzberg (1987), which sees strategy as a means of locating a company in an environment (Artto 
et al., 2008b). In this definition, strategy is referred to as the mediating factor between the company 
and the external context in which the company operates. Lastly, strategy is defined as a perspective. 
This refers to a shared and collective perspective on how the world works (Mintzberg, 1987).  
These definitions have in common that strategy refers to “a set of guidelines that determines 
decisions into the future” (Mintzberg, 1978: 935). With the use of a strategy in a project a company 
has the ambition to achieve a desired position in its competitive stakeholder environment (Artto et 
al., 2008b). A strategy of a company sets guidelines how to deal with future situations in order to 
fulfill a certain goal.  
As said before this paper is not interested in the formal strategic plan of a company, it is 
interested in the worldview of managers responsible for the long term goals and strategic direction 
of the company. The strategic intent of a company expresses the desired position that the company 
wants to achieve. The means to achieve that goal are flexible and not necessarily defined in the 
strategic intent. The aim of the strategic intent is to define the long term goal that remains stable 
over time (Hamel & Prahalad, 2005). Therefore the concept of strategic intent fits well with the 
mental map in which the top represents the ultimate goal of the company.  
 
Strategy in Projects 
In the context of project-based organizations several papers discuss the strategy of an individual 
project (Artto et al., 2008a). These papers discuss the strategy of the project organization that 
manages the project (Artto et al., 2008a; Artto et al., 2008b). These scholars use a project 
perspective as the level of analysis and focus on the situation where there is one project 
organization that determines the strategy of the project and the associated organizations in the 
project follow this strategy. In these papers the goals of the project organization are assumed to be 
aligned with the parent organization’s strategy. This paper focuses on the context in which the 
different companies in a project each have their own strategy. Limited research has looked into the 
strategies of the different companies that are part of one project. Therefore this paper wants to take 
on a different level of analysis, namely that of the company participating in a project. This paper is 
interested in the strategies of the different independent companies that work together in a project.  
In a project each company is represented by individuals that interact on the project level with 
representatives of the other companies. Previous research showed that these representatives of the 
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participating companies are instructed from their own company on how to act in the project 
(Adams, 1976; Leufkens & Noorderhaven, 2011). A company can give formal instructions, but might 
also have informal expectations as to the behavior of a representative in the project (Ring & Van de 
Ven, 1994). These instructions and expectations might be concerned with the main objectives of the 
company in a project. For example, should an individual be flexible towards the client in their work 
or should it be strict in terms of doing extra work without money compensation?  
The strategies and the instructions that follow from the strategic intent of a company can have 
an impact on how the individuals representing their companies collaborate (Chaffee, 1985). How 
this collaboration evolves and the extent to which it approaches the ideal of “consummate 
collaboration” may be expected to be influenced by various factors. Some of these will pertain to 
characteristics of the focal project (Artto et al., 2008a) or the environment in which the project is 
executed (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000c). While acknowledging the importance of these influences, 
this paper focuses on a factor that has been neglected in previous studies, viz., the strategic intent of 
the collaborating organizations. This topic is of relevance to both theory and practice in the field of 
project management. Firstly, a number of important industries are organized on the basis of 
interorganizational projects, such as the construction and film industry. From previous work it has 
been seen that the dynamics for companies are different when working in projects (Jones & 
Lichtenstein, 2008; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). Additionally, more and more companies that 
initiate internal change do this in a project-based setting (Brady & Davies, 2004).  
 
Collaboration 
Collaboration is essential in project-based settings due to the interdependence between the 
companies working in a project. In a multi-organizational project there are multiple companies that 
together have to deliver a project. For each project the composition of the group of participating 
firms may be different, which means that for every project companies have to put effort in ensuring 
effective collaboration.  
Holweg et al. (Holweg, Disney, Holmström, & Småros, 2005) discuss factors that influence the 
effectiveness of supply chain collaboration. They argue that the effectiveness of collaboration 
depends firstly on the level to which external supply chain collaboration is integrated with internal 
production processes. The second factor affecting the effectiveness is the level to which the efforts 
are made to align/synchronize the supply chain (Holweg et al., 2005). Supply chain collaboration 
has in common with project collaboration that different disciplines interact. However, unlike 
shipbuilding projects supply chain collaborations are not necessarily characterized by limited 
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duration. Summing up what Holweg et al. (2005) claim to be important in supply chain 
collaboration is the match between the “independent” units and the supply chain. For project 
collaboration this would mean that a match between the companies and project is needed in order 
to achieve effective collaboration. This paper assumes that the strategic intent of the companies 
affects the collaboration in the project. The strategy of an individual company might affect the 
collaboration with other companies as well as the collaboration within a project. A match or 
common aspects of the strategic intent of the different companies could for instance be helpful in 
achieving consummate collaboration.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Research Setting 
The setting of this paper is the Dutch shipbuilding industry. In this industry an initiative has started 
four years ago with the aim to steer the industry towards more integrative collaboration. In fact, the 
discussion of this concept earlier in the paper was based on the ideas developed by the proponents 
of this initiative. The goal of the initiative “Integrative Collaboration” is to strengthen the 
competitiveness of the Dutch shipbuilding industry by developing better collaboration models and 
instruments. Fifteen companies took place in the advisory board to investigate initiatives that 
facilitate integrative collaboration. Besides the participation in the advisory board these companies 
provided financial means and their participation to research and experimental settings to explore 
possible solutions. These companies include several shipyards and subcontractors in different 
specializations. The shipyards fulfill the role of the main contractors in the shipbuilding industry 
and the subcontractors are hired by the shipyard.  
 
Data Collection 
In this study all companies involved in the “Integrative Collaboration” program were approached. 
From the fifteen companies twelve agreed to participate. Due to the large size of some companies 
with multiple locations, this paper focused on the business units of these companies. This meant 
that with some companies, top managers of several business units within one company were 
interviewed. The level of analysis was the individual level. The individuals interviewed were 
representative of their company. Fourteen loosely structured interviews with individuals from 
twelve different companies were done. The individuals that have the authority to make strategic 
decisions for the whole company or a quasi-independent part of it were interviewed, such as CEOs 
or managing directors, or in the case of the shipyards top managers of business units. From these 
Chapter 5 
94 
fourteen interviews, five managers are from business units from shipyards and nine come from 
subcontractor business units. The method of interviewing these top managers was chosen in line 
with previous research (Calori et al., 1994; Fiol & Huff, 1992). These authors also interviewed CEOs 
to tap into their perspectives on different issues. 
This paper is interested in the strategy of the different business units. More specifically, how the 
strategic intent of the business units relates to collaboration. The interviews focused on the 
strategic intent of the top manager of the business unit in the shipbuilding industry. The main 
questions were concerned with the ultimate goals of the business unit, the means to achieve this 
goal but also a prospective of the strategic intent of the business unit. In addition, questions were 
asked about the strategy in relation to collaboration with both the client and the subcontractors. 
The interview protocol is included in Appendix I. 
During the interviews a mental map was drawn that portrayed the strategic intent of the 
business unit. At the top of the mental map are the goals of the companies. One level below is the 
strategic directions of the mental map, which are long term directions to achieve the ultimate goal 
at the top of the mental map. At the bottom of the map are options, or the means that drive the 
directions to reach the goal (Ackermann, Eden, & Cropper, 1992; Eden & Ackermann, 1998). 
Depending on the account given by the interviewee, there may also be more than three levels. 
Almost all interviews were done with two interviewers, where one interviewer drew the mental 
map and the other focused on the questions. The interviews were recorded. After all the interviews 
were finished, the interviews were listed to again to see if the mental maps were complete and 
where needed the concepts or relationships were adapted. 
 
Analyses 
The analysis started at the top of the mental maps. The different mental maps were compared by 
going top down through the mental maps. Important in the comparison was the content of these 
maps (Langfield-Smith & Wirth, 1992). Firstly, the focus was on the ultimate long term goals, which 
represents where the strategic intent starts (Eden & Ackermann, 1998). Comparing the mental 
maps the differences in ultimate goals between the maps were indicated. Secondly, the concepts in 
the map that indicated a relationship with collaboration were searched for. Collaboration is 
important in the analysis, especially how it is represented in the strategic intent of the companies, 
but also where is it positioned in the mental map. Therefore after the first examination of the 
collaboration concepts the positioning of the collaboration concepts was examined more closely. It 
was important to know how central these collaboration concepts were located in the mental maps 
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(Eden & Ackermann, 1998). With the use of the network analysis program UCINET (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Freeman, 2002) the centrality of the collaboration concepts was investigated. In addition, 
the Visone network visualization software was used to explore the status of our collaboration 
concepts in the mental maps (Brandes & Wagner, 2004). 
In order to examine the centrality of the collaboration concepts different centrality measures 
were used. Degree centrality represents the number of relations of a concept. The mental maps 
consist of directed ties. This means that the relationship between two concepts goes in one 
direction, where one concept is influenced by another concept. In the mental maps this is 
represented by the means at the bottom of the mental map that affect the strategic direction and 
ultimate goals at the top of the map. In the situation of directed ties, indegree and outdegree 
centrality can be distinguished. Indegree and outdegree centrality measure the number of incoming 
and outgoing relations respectively. The normalized indegree centrality is used, which is a 
percentage of the degrees in a network  (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005), or in this situation the mental 
map. A high degree of indegree centrality of a concept in the mental map would mean that the 
collaboration concept is affected by many other parts in the strategic intent of the business unit.  
In addition, the status of the concept is looked at (Katz, 1953). The status index assigns each 
concept a status score, which is calculated by the weighted average of the status scores of the other 
concepts leading towards the concept in question. The contribution of each concept leading to the 
concept in question is weighted by the inverse of its outdegree. The fewer outdegree relations a 
concept has the more weight each of them receives. The status is an appropriate measure for this 
paper because of the directed ties in this paper in order to incorporate the hierarchical structure of 
the concepts in the mental map. This paper looks at the standardized status to get an idea of the 
status in comparison to the whole mental map. A high status value for a collaboration concept 
means that the collaboration concept is important in the mental map, both with respect to the 
number of relationships and hierarchically. 
Although a mental map with concepts is not the same as a social network consisting of actors 
this paper does believe that it can use these measures to get an idea of the prominence of the 
collaboration concepts in relation to the mental map. Still it has to be kept in mind that in a social 
network information flows between the actors, while in a strategic intent mental map there is no 
such thing as information or actors that have relationships. A limitation of the indegree centrality 
measure is that there is no difference in importance between the concepts in the mental map, only 
the number of relations count. Nevertheless, this paper uses the indegree centrality combined with 
the status measures as indication of how central the collaboration concepts are in the strategic 
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intent. It is believed it indicates the prominence of the collaboration concepts in the strategic intent 
for a business unit. 
Thirdly, the content of the collaboration concepts was more thoroughly examined by comparing 
these on the basis of their strength. The description of the type of collaboration relationship gives a 
better idea on how the business units perceive collaboration in their strategic intent.  
The last part that was looked into was the role of collaboration with the client in the strategic 
intent of the business units. After the analysis of the mental maps some characteristics of the 
companies in relationship with the mental maps were taken into account. The information about 
these company characteristics comes from company websites, annual report, but also from the 
interviews. This paper tries to find patterns that explain connections between the company 
characteristics and parts of the strategic intent in the mental maps. Therefore the unit of analysis is 
at the company level. With the use of this information this paper tries to explain where the strategic 
intent and the position of collaboration in a mental map come from. 
 
FINDINGS 
In the findings the focus is firstly on the top of the mental map, i.e., the ultimate goal of the company 
and thereafter on how collaboration is referred to in the mental maps. The content of the 
collaboration element is examined, the positioning of collaboration in the mental map (what 
contributes to collaboration and to what does collaboration lead), and the prominence of 




In the first step the top of the mental maps of the fourteen business units, which represents the 
ultimate goal or raison d’être of the company, is looked at. There are three types of main goals in 
the mental maps of the business units. These goals are continuity, return and growth. Almost half of 
the respondents indicate that their business unit aims for continuity. In addition to the five 
managers that explicitly mention continuity there is one business unit (#12) that is also categorized 
in the continuity goal category (see Table 5.1). Due to the lack of any monetary return goal in 
addition to their long term focus it is assumed that this business unit aims for continuity. There is 
also one business unit (#9) that has both a continuity and a return goal at the top of the mental map. 
The continuity indicates their focus on the long term, even though they have shareholders that 
demand a certain return.  
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FIGURE 5.1 
An Example of a Mental Map 
 
 
Of the other eight business units, there are an additional three units that have a financial return 
goal, indicated by their “make a profit” or “comply with return value demands” goals. The 
respondents of the remaining five business units say that they strive for growth, either by setting a 
certain monetary target or by defining their ultimate goal as “become the largest […] in the world”. 
There are a few business unit managers that bring up a different goal in addition to the 
aforementioned goals. There are several companies that strive for providing a pleasant 
environment for their employees as part of their ultimate goals.  
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The three business units that put ‘a pleasant work environment’ goal at the top of their mental map 
are all companies that also aim for continuity. Some other goals that are mentioned by the different 
managers are: “innovation” and “bring the quality of the projects of the client to a higher level”. 
Table 5.1 gives an overview of all the ultimate goals that were mentioned by the respondents. Also 
the quotes and the associated categorization of continuity, return value demand and growth are 
represented in Table 5.1. 
 
Collaboration 
In order to get an idea of how the strategic intent of the fourteen business units relates to 
consummate collaboration, this paper looks how collaboration is represented in the mental maps. 
First, how the managers describe the elements related to collaboration is compared, i.e., the 
meaning of collaboration in the mental map. Table 5.2 represents the quotes and associated labels 
in the mental maps that relate to collaboration. 
Thirteen out of the fourteen business units include collaboration in their mental maps. There is 
one business unit that does not mention collaboration with other companies as a part of their 
strategic intent. This business unit (#1) is not included in Table 5.2. This business unit for example 
mentions that it wants to be able to shift business between companies in order to lower the cost 
price.  
The references towards collaboration differ between the business units. The managers of the 
thirteen business units that do include collaboration in their mental map describe collaboration in 
relation to different stakeholders. They talk about relationships with clients, with subcontractors or 
with other companies at the same level of the supply chain. Ten mental maps incorporate 
collaboration with the client in their strategic intent. Four managers mention collaboration with 
their subcontractors. Only one mental map includes the relationship with companies at the same 
level of the supply chain: “tune in with other disciplines” (#8). Most business unit managers 
mention several collaborative elements referring to collaboration with different stakeholders. For 
example, they have goals striving for “strategic partnerships with contractors” as well as taking into 
account “the interests of the client” in their map. There are two mental maps in which only one 












Positioning of the Collaborative Element 
Secondly, a closer look is given at the positioning of the collaboration elements in the mental maps. 
This paper started by looking at how central the collaborative element is positioned in the mental 
map by examining the indegree centrality and status measure. After that the level at which the 
collaboration element is positioned in the mental map is examined, relative to the other elements.  
There are seven mental maps in which the collaboration element(s) has the most central 
position in the strategic intent. For these seven maps the indegree centrality scores as well as their 
status scores are either the highest or they place second in comparison to the other concepts. Table 
5.3 gives an overview of the indegree centrality and status measures per collaboration element. 
Strikingly, almost all of these central collaboration concepts refer to collaboration with the client. 
This means that the central collaboration elements in the strategic intent are concerned with clients 
and not so much with subcontractors. This might indicate that client relationships are more 
important for companies than a relationship with the subcontractor. These business units for 
example put “optimize customer processes”, “unburden the client” or “follow the client” central in 
their mental map. Comparing the indegree centrality and status measures both agree on the most 
central factor in the mental map. The differences between the measures can be seen with the 
positioning of the other concepts. The indegree centrality measure does not take the level in the 
mental map at which the elements are positioned into account. In the situation of the status 
measure the hierarchical level at which the element is positioned does matter. For example for 
business unit #5 in Table 5.3 the values of the indegree centrality and status measure differ for the 
item “become preferred supplier”. This concept is ranked very high in the mental map, this is 
represented in the higher status score of “become preferred supplier”. Due to the high position of 
this concept this item is prominent in the strategic intent of the business unit. Within the seven 
business units there is not much difference in the positioning of collaboration in the maps when 
comparing the shipyards to the subcontractors. Both position the client collaboration centrally in 
their strategic intent.  
The remaining six mental maps position the relationships with subcontractors and clients at the 
periphery of the map, meaning that these elements are not influenced by many other elements 
and/or they do not drive the important strategic directions. Therefore, in these maps collaboration-
related elements do not have a big impact on the ultimate goals.  
 Looking at the level at which the collaboration elements are positioned the elements are either 
located at the level of strategic directions or at the level of an option, at the bottom of the mental 
map. The relationship with clients can be positioned at all levels, but the relationship with 
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subcontractors is always located at the lowest level in the mental map, as is shown with the low 
indegree and status measures for these collaboration concepts. The four out of the five managers 
who mention their relationship with their subcontractors position this element at the level of an 
option, as a means for their strategic directions and ultimate goals. Only one business unit (#10) 
puts collaboration with the subcontractor as an ultimate goal.  
 
TABLE 5.3 
Indegree and Status Measures 
  NrmInDegree Mean Status  
#2 Strengthen competitiveness together with 
client 6,67 8,33 5,40  
 Partnership with client 6,67  7,13  
 Follow the client 6,67  5,42  
 Unburden the client 20,00   13,97 NR 1 
 Loyalty from the client 6,67   5,42  
#3 Interests of the client 23,07 8,79 21,95 NR 2 
 Strategic partnerships with contractors 7,69  3,66  
 Be present locally 23,07  10,98  
 Contractors accompany us abroad 0,00   0,00  
#4 Partnership with client 12,50 6,62 7,68  
 Follow the client 0,00   0,00  
#5 Ship-owner relation management 27,27 8,33 25,97 NR 1 
 Optimize customer processes 27,27   20,78 NR 1 
 Become preferred supplier 9,09   18,18  
#6 Have top partners as contractors 0,00 7,50 0,00  
 Contractors accompany us abroad 6,70   3,61  
#7 Maintain clients 15,38 8,79 12,95 NR 2 
 Customer intimacy 15,38   10,76 NR 2 
 Be present locally 7,69   8,35  
#8 Control risk for clients 8,33 8,33 6,12  
 Partnership with contractors 0,00  0,00  
 Tune in with other disciplines 8,33  8,15  
 Conception of process of the client 8,33   6,12  
#9 Internationalize "on the carrier" of the client 0,00 7,69 0,00  
#10 Collaboration with subcontractor and client 22,22 12,22 33,86 NR 2 
#11 Client 40,00 10,91 36,48 NR 1 
 Unburden the client 20,00   16,22 NR 2 
#12 Follow the client 31,25  6.25 26,18 NR 1 
#13 Follow the client abroad 10,00 10,91 5,71  
#14 Long term relationships with contractors 0,00 10,91 0,00  
 Go with the client abroad 0,00   0,00  
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Strength of the Collaborative Element 
In addition to the positioning of the collaboration element also the strength of the collaborative 
element indicated in the mental map is important to consider. For assessing the strength of the 
collaborative relationship the concepts that are used are examined to see whether these concepts 
hint at a stronger or a weaker type of collaborative relationship.  
It is assumed that “strategic partnership” indicates a different type of relationship than 
“following the client”. Strategic partnerships are a form of two sided or bidirectional collaboration, 
in which both parties agree on a form of collaboration with each other. This type of collaboration 
does not necessarily exist when business managers refer to “following clients”. In these situations a 
relationship exists, however, the collaboration relationship is unidirectionally initiated by the 
business unit, without necessarily including a collaborative relationship from the side of their client. 
A strategic partnership also indicates a stronger form of collaboration than “customer intimacy” or 
“optimize customer processes”. These two collaborative elements again appear to be stronger than 
simply “following the client”. 
There are six business units that discuss (strategic) partnerships with other companies, 
described as “strategic partnerships”, “top partners” or “long term relationships”. Four of these 
partnerships are with subcontractors and two include a partnership with a client. The two business 
units that mention a partnership with the client are both contractors. The shipyards thus do not 
consider partnerships with their clients. Even though the partnerships indicate a strong type of 
relationship these concepts are not centrally located in the mental maps. These partnership 
elements all have low centrality measures. Interestingly, the four partnerships with contractor 
elements have the lowest centrality measures. Three out of the four “partnerships with contractor” 
elements have a centrality measure of 0 (#6, #8 and #14) as depicted in Table 5.3. The fourth 
collaboration element that discusses a partnership with a subcontractor has a very low status 
measure (3,66). This indicates that this collaboration element is not centrally located and also 
positioned at a low level in the mental map. It appears that these business units prefer long term 
relationships over more market type of relationships as is indicated by the term “partnership”. 
However, these collaboration elements are not essential in their strategic intent as the centrality 
measures indicate. The four business units that mention contractor partnerships are both 
shipyards and contractors. 
The remaining seven business units bring up their relationship with the client or the 
subcontractor during the interviews, but do not see this as a partnership. In these situations 
managers for example mention “following the client”, “unburden the client” or “optimize customer 
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processes”. The focus of these seven business units is mainly of collaboration with the client. A 
relationship with the contractor that is not characterized as a partnership is only mentioned in one 
mental map (#10). Collaboration with contractors thus mainly takes place in the shape of a 
partnership in the strategic intent. Other types of relationships with contractors are barely 
mentioned in the strategic intent of the business units. 
There are seven business units that discuss “following the client” as an important aspect in their 
strategic intent. Following the client appears to us to be a weak collaborative relationship with the 
client. Most of the business units that follow their client are contractors. Only one of the business 
units claims to follow the client, this is a shipyard.  
 
Client Collaboration 
Twelve out of the fourteen business units mention collaboration with their client in their mental 
map. This client collaboration appears to be important for many business managers. Therefore, a 
closer look is taken at the position of collaboration with the client in the mental maps. The client 
collaboration relationships also differ in their strength. The differences of how the relationship with 
the client is described are looked at by examining their positioning and the strength of the 
relationship. There are two business units that see their client as not taking any part in their 
strategy (#1 and #6), which portrays the weakest or nonexistent form of collaboration with the 
client. One level up we see three business units that see collaboration with their client as part of 
their strategy (9, #13 and #14). However, the position of the client collaboration in the strategy is 
of small importance. The measures for centrality for these business units are quite low. These 
companies indicate that they “follow the client” (e.g. shipyard) to locations abroad and see this 
relationship as a side driver for their main goal. Another level up there are five business units that 
find their client relationship more important by describing it as a central element or referring to a 
partnership, but without a central position (#3, #4, #8 and #10). This type of client collaboration is 
stronger than in the previous levels in which the client relationship was important but not as 
centrally located. The strongest collaborative relationship with their client is indicated by the 
“(strategic) partnership with clients” or “customer intimacy” and putting this element at a central 
position in the mental map.  There is not much difference between the shipyards and the 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Interorganizational collaboration is essential in the Dutch shipbuilding industry in order to create a 
competitive advantage to compete with other shipbuilding companies abroad (Jap, 1999). This 
paper focuses on consummate collaboration in MOPs. Important in order to achieve consummate 
collaboration is the focus on common interests of the parties involved in a project (Larsson et al., 
1998). One factor that previous research indicates as important to support strategic collaboration is 
congruence in goals (Jap, 1999). Goal congruence between different companies, both contractors 
and shipyards, steers towards the common interests of these companies. In order to examine the 
goal congruence between the different business units and the relation to collaboration we consider 
the ownership structure of the companies. Ownership structure was often mentioned by the 
business managers as the explanation for their ultimate goals. 
 
Ownership Structure of the Company 
Ownership structures range from family owned companies to companies that are listed on the 
stock exchange. The companies that aim for continuity as their ultimate goal, are all family owned 
companies or limited liability companies. When looking at the six companies that aim for continuity 
they mostly use partnerships as collaborative relationships. Their long term focus in their 
partnership type of relationships is consistent with their long term continuity goal (Ahola, Laitinen, 
Kujala, & Wikström, 2008; Hunt et al., 2010). They aim for long term partnerships with their clients 
as well as with their subcontractors. Literature on family ownership confirms that these types of 
businesses do not tend to aim for growth and due to limited resources often have partnership or 
long term relationships (Astrachan, 2010; Fernández & Nieto, 2005). There are both shipyards and 
contractors that have this long term focus on continuity and partnerships. From the interviews it 
appears that most contractors often collaborate with the shipyards that have the same long term 
aim. The goal congruence between these shipyards and contractors makes that there seems to be a 
fit between these companies.  
The business units with growth and return value demand goals may have different time horizons 
than the business units that aim for continuity (Lanzara, 1998). Differences between strategic 
intents in time horizons would make it more difficult to pursue the common interests. Nevertheless, 
we see in the strategic intent of these more short-term oriented business units that they still see 
partnerships as part of their strategy. Again if there is congruence between both the goal as well as 
the type of relationship that is aimed for, shipyards and contractors may collaborate well together. 
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The strength of relationship that is aimed for is decisive for consummate collaboration, and not the 
goal the business unit strives for.  
 
Looking into the collaboration aspect in the strategic intents, thirteen out of the fourteen business 
units see collaboration as part of their strategic intent. Only one manager does not include any 
element that relates to collaboration in the strategic intent. Most companies thus value 
collaboration in their strategy in the shipbuilding industry. Of the thirteen mental maps that include 
collaboration, seven put collaboration at a central position in their maps. Besides the fact that these 
companies see collaboration as a part in their strategic intent, their collaborative element also has a 
central location and thus influence on the ultimate strategic goal of the company. Half of the 
business units (seven) that were interviewed thus see collaboration as an essential element in their 
strategic intent. These central collaboration elements are mainly focused on collaboration with the 
client, where both the contractors as the shipyards find client collaboration most important. Twelve 
of the fourteen business managers see collaboration with the client as part of their strategic intent. 
There is, however, variation in the strength of the relationship. Some managers talk about 
“strategic partnerships” while others talk about “insight into the process of the client”. In total there 
are six out of the twelve business unit managers that discuss strategic partnerships, which points 
towards a strong collaborative relationship. However, the centrality measures of these “partnership” 
elements are very low. In addition, the majority of the partnerships are with contractors, and not 
with clients.  
Even though most of the business units see collaboration as an important aspect of their 
strategic intent, it does not necessarily means all collaborate together effectively. The need for the 
program “Integrative Collaboration” in the Dutch shipbuilding industry illustrates that. Besides the 
goal congruence in line with the strive for common interests also the dependency of the companies 
on the shipbuilding industry affects the interests of the company.  
 
Dependency of the Company 
Another company characteristic that determines part of its strategic intent is the dependency of the 
company on the shipbuilding industry. There is a clear distinction between contractors and 
shipyards with respect to dependency. Shipyards firstly manage the assembly of the ship and 
therefore the contractors are always dependent on the shipyard. Secondly, shipyards operate in the 
shipbuilding industry at all times. Their collaboration is thus not influenced by the dependency on 
the industry. However, the contractors are much affected by this dependency. 
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There are two types of interdependence in the shipbuilding industry that are of importance for 
the collaboration strategies of companies that were mentioned during the interviews. Firstly, the 
interdependence between companies is important for collaboration issues. There are companies 
that are characterized as component suppliers as they supply standard components to the shipyard. 
There are also companies that typify as system suppliers. They have to integrate different 
components (e.g., pertaining to the electrical or the HVAC system) because they have been 
contracted to provide the entire system. There are also applicators, such as conservation 
applicators, which are also dependent in their operations on other companies. They can start with 
their tasks after others have finished theirs. Hobday et al. (Hobday, Davies, & Prencipe, 2005) 
discuss these interdependencies as phases in a system integration process. They make the point 
that system integration is becoming a strategic business capability, important for collaboration in 
complex products and systems such as the shipbuilding industry.  
System suppliers and applicators are more interdependent as they are dependent on other 
business units to complete their task. More interdependency means that collaboration is more 
important, but also that there are more parties involved, which makes it more difficult to make 
collaboration successful.  
The second type of interdependence relates to the dependence of the company on the 
shipbuilding industry by specific investments (Bensaou, 1999). There are contractors for whom 60% 
or more of turnover comes out of the shipbuilding industry, while other contractors have only 20% 
or less of their turnover from this industry. The contractors that are dependent on the shipbuilding 
industry are more inclined to put effort in the collaboration within a project and their strategy 
accordingly. Losses due to overtime caused by ineffective collaboration are crucial to these 
companies.  
In the results many contractors that followed their clients were seen. These were seen as a weak 
collaborative form of relationship. Nevertheless, most contractors who follow their clients are 
highly dependent on the shipbuilding industry. Following the client might indicate a weak type of 
collaborative relationship, it shows full commitment from the contractor side to their clients. 
During the interviews it appeared that the contractors that followed their client do expect 
commitment from the shipyard in return. This means that following the client is an important 
aspect in consummate collaboration. It is in the interests of both contractor and shipyard that both 
commit to a relationship where the contractor goes abroad with the shipyard. The shipyards that 
do appreciate this aspect of collaboration receive full commitment from the contractors.  
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In addition, most of these highly dependent companies have a long term focus in their strategic 
intent with their focus on continuity.  Following the client is thus seen as a long term commitment 
in line with a long term time horizon.  
 
All in all, there should be a fit between the ultimate goals of the strategic intent of the business units. 
The time horizon plays an essential role in the goal congruence as well as the type of relationships 
that business units aim for. The dependency of the company on the shipbuilding industry 
determines the importance of collaboration and consequently the fit between contractor and 
shipyard. Shipbuilding-independent companies are willing to collaborate with shipyards, which 
may have diverging goals and time horizons, while shipbuilding-dependent companies have a 
stronger focus on long term commitment in their collaboration. Strategic mental map thus show 
essential distinctions between different ways in which firms view collaboration. More specifically, 
these maps indicate the possibility of realizing consummate collaboration in the shipbuilding 
industry, as they characterize the types of collaboration relationship that the companies strive for.  
This study looked at strategic intentions as reflected in mental maps, however on the basis of the 
data it cannot be ascertained that different maps are also associated with different collaborative 
behaviors. We could only rely on the interviews and perceptions of the business managers about 
the collaborative relationship with other companies. To complement this paper it would be 
interesting to investigate the actual effect of (combinations of) strategic intents on collaborative 
relationships and project outcomes. In addition, the study took place in the shipbuilding industry 
and it would be interesting to see if the mental maps of decision makers from other industries 
based on MOPs are comparable. The shipbuilding industry is known to be strongly rooted in 
tradition, so maybe the types of relationships we found are characteristics for this industry.  
Another aspect that came to the fore in our research is the concept of “shadow of the past” in 
relation to the strategic intent and subsequently the collaborative relationship. Some business 
managers adapted their collaboration with clients and contractors to experiences from the past. 
This might give an alternative explanation for certain types of strategic intents. According to some 
interviewees, negative experiences in the past with certain partners made their companies change 
their collaborative behavior. This is especially important for companies highly dependent on the 
shipbuilding industry. It might be worthwhile to examine the effect of these experiences on the 













This dissertation explores the social construction of interests and strategies by individuals in the 
setting of inter-organizational projects. These interests and strategies influence the collaboration 
process in the project. Contributions from this investigation pertain to the theoretical, empirical 
and managerial fields.  
 
In this dissertation I have tried to answer the question how social construction processes of 
interests of individuals and strategies of companies in inter-organizational projects relate to 
collaboration. Social construction processes of interests and strategies of companies influence the 
collaboration in an MOP. Essential in both the social construction processes and the strategies of 
companies in MOPs is the aim for consummate collaboration. Aiming for more consummate types of 
collaborative behavior leads to more effective collaboration. However, consummate collaboration 
as a solution to overcome social dilemmas is contingent upon certain conditions. This dissertation 
talks about MOPs, which involve a high level of uncertainty and complex tasks. Complex industrial 
products and systems (CoPS) are characterized by interconnected, often customized parts, which 
are frequently complex and involve high costs. These types of products tend to be produced in 
projects or in small quantities (Davies & Brady, 2000; Hobday, 2000). The MOPs discussed in this 
dissertation show resemblance in their characteristics with these CoPS. The ships built by the MOPs 
we studies are customized to the customer’s wishes and one-off products. Hobday (1998) describes 
different dimensions of product complexity, ranging from more simple, standardized and 
routinized processes towards more complex and customized products. The more complex projects 
ask for different capabilities and management practices (Davies & Brady, 2000; Hobday, 1998, 
2000). CoPS and simpler projects differ in the nature of the interaction between the companies and 
also the collaboration in the project. These differences make that the need for collaborative 
behavior also differs. While consummate collaboration may be beneficial for both types of projects, 
MOPs that are simpler and less uncertain in their processes and tasks benefit less from aiming for 
consummate collaboration. In these situations the costs of consummate collaboration outweigh the 
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benefits. Therefore, consummate collaboration is not the ultimate solution for all MOPs, it is 
contingent upon the complexity and uncertainty in a project. 
For defining complexity in projects the definitions given by Williams (1999) can be used. This 
author characterizes complexity by two dimensions. The first dimension is structural uncertainty, 
which consists of the number of elements and the interdependence of elements. The second 
dimension of uncertainty is defined by uncertainty in goals and in methods (Williams, 1999). 
Positioning the shipbuilding MOPs on the dimension as given by Williams (1999), the structural 
complexity dimension is high for these projects. Both the number of elements, represented among 
others by the number of hierarchical levels and number and diversity of inputs, and the 
interdependency between the tasks and teams, are high for the MOPs studied in this dissertation. 
Also a high level of uncertainty, the second dimension of Williams (1999), can be seen in the 
shipbuilding MOPs. This level of uncertainty in goals comes from the different stakeholders in these 
projects with conflicting goals and objectives. In addition, the uncertainty of methods, which refers 
to the ‘newness of technology’ (Williams, 1999), is often present in these MOPs. These ships are 
often one-off ships, which incorporate new technology or develop new methods during the building 
of the ship. Increasing complexity in a project makes it more difficult to collaborate and therefore 
other measures have to be taken into account. In the section on managerial implications these 
practical solutions are discussed. 
 
MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation adds to the literature on interests, specifically by looking at interests as social 
constructions. In the economics literature interests are assumed to be given, and associated with 
the individual, and self-evident to him or her (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Whittle et al., 2010). However, 
the possibility of complete self-understanding is increasingly questioned in the twentieth century 
social philosophy (Gadamer, 1976; Ricoeur, 1991). Also in the behavioral sciences the concept of 
interests is more and more seen in a different light (e.g. Cropanzano et al., 2005; Medlin, 2006; 
Potter, 1996; Whittle & Mueller, 2011; Whittle et al., 2010; Woolgar, 1981). These authors argue 
that interests are influenced by the social context of the individual (Justice, 2006; Wildavsky, 1994). 
However, few authors really focus on this process of social construction of interests (Lotia & Hardy, 
2008). In this dissertation I try to do exactly that, by exploring how interests are socially 
constructed and how these social constructions influence collaborative behaviors in inter-
organizational projects. An important contribution of this dissertation is that some mechanisms of 
social construction of interests are identified.  
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A pilot study (Chapter 2) at the start of the investigation in the shipbuilding industry revealed 
the importance of interest perceptions in project settings. The many different companies involved 
in the project may have diverging goals. This situation may lead to conflicting interests (Artto et al., 
2008a) and different perceptions of interests by project participants (Medlin, 2006). Multi-
organizational project settings bear the characteristics of a social dilemma (Zeng & Chen, 2003). 
Individual participants may perceive it in their best interests to pursue the common interests, or 
they may perceive striving for their own interests as the best option. The main finding from this 
chapter is that the perceptions of interests in the social construction process are influenced by 
three factors. The three factors that are present at the organizational and project level are explicit 
and implicit instructions from the company, observed behavior during the project (Fleishman, 1988) 
and previous experiences from past projects (Grabher, 2002). Narrow constructions of self-interest 
only in line with immediate benefits to the individual project participant make it problematic to 
learn to collaborate more effectively. 
Theoretically chapter 2 adds to the concept of construction of interests. Several authors have 
used the idea of interest construction (Medlin, 2006; Zeng & Chen, 2003), however, few look at how 
this construction process works. How are perceptions of interests influenced? From this chapter it 
appears that not only social observations (Fleishman, 1988) and experiences (Grabher, 2002) are 
important for interest construction, but also instructions that are given by the organization. Interest 
construction is thus a multi-layered concept that influences collaboration. 
The main theoretical contribution of the dissertation is elaborated in Chapter 3. Collaboration in 
social dilemma settings, such as multi-organizational projects, can take on a form that lies on the 
continuum ranging from perfunctory to consummate type of collaboration (Blau & Scott, 1962; 
Williamson, 1975). Consummate collaboration seems to require a shared social construction of 
collaboration, which steers individuals away from self-interests (Hunt et al., 2010; Keller & 
Loewenstein, 2011). The social construction process that leads to these shared notions is of a 
linguistic nature. Therefore, this chapter explores the conditions under which discourse is most 
likely to lead to consummate collaboration. It is hypothesized that productive dialogue between 
individuals leads to accounts congruent with consummate collaboration, which in turn leads to 
consummate collaborative behavior. In establishing productive dialogue several conditions for 
discourse may play a role. This paper focuses on temporal embeddedness, equality, scope of 
mandate and co-location of participants as factors supporting the social construction of notions of 
interest conducive to consummate collaborative behavior. Managerial implications that follow from 
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this are that the conditions of temporal embeddedness, equality, scope of mandate and co-location 
are important design parameters that help shape the collaboration in a project. 
Implications from chapter 3 are that different hierarchical levels need different conditions to 
achieve productive dialogue. Mansbridge et al (2006) define several conditions to reach productive 
dialogue, however, no differences are made between hierarchical levels in a company. This 
dissertation hypothesizes that there are differences between these levels, which make a difference 
in achieving consummate collaboration.  
Building on the theoretical framework of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 empirically explores the links 
between the different conceptions of interest, ranging from perfunctory to consummate 
collaboration, and conditions for constructive dialogue. The impetus for this paper is the 
observation that experimental research shows that collaboration is much more prevalent than 
economic theory predicts (Camerer, 1997). But how this works “remains a mystery” (Ledyard, 
1995). By studying the accounts of interests of individuals the paper aims to explore how 
conceptions of interests are socially constructed through discursive processes. The four conditions 
of temporal embeddedness, equality, scope of mandate and co-location that are hypothesized to be 
conducive to constructive dialogue differentiate between discursive conditions around a large-scale 
ship construction project. More specifically, high temporal embeddedness, equality between 
individuals, a broad scope of mandate, and co-location with individuals of other organization 
supports consummate collaboration behavior. The empirical contribution of this paper is twofold. 
First of all, the effect of conditions to discourse on collaborative behaviors is empirically explored. 
Secondly, due to the longitudinal approach this study also starts to shed light on how interest 
construction processes evolve over the lifecycle of a project. At lower organizational levels an 
increase in consummate collaboration was observed, while it is expected that higher managers 
decrease in their consummate types of collaborative behavior over time. Additionally, a path 
dependency was found in which previous experiences from other projects strongly affect the 
collaborative relationship with other participants later on in the project. The results indicate that 
project life cycles and path dependencies influence collaborative behavior over time.  
The implications that can be drawn from chapter 4 are the importance of the project life cycle 
(Adams & Barnd, 2008) in interest construction and subsequently collaborative behavior. In the 
different phases of the project life cycle, different aspects of interest construction are essential. 




Chapter 5 looks at the role and position of concepts of collaboration in the mental maps of key 
decision makers in the shipbuilding industry. This paper elucidates the relationship between the 
strategic intent and collaboration between companies. In order to survive in a competitive world 
collaboration is essential in inter-organizational project settings (Phillips et al., 2000). Therefore 
the Dutch shipbuilding industry has formulated the desire to move towards more integrative 
collaboration. Integrative collaboration, similar to consummate collaboration, focuses on the 
common interest of jointly making the pie as large as possible (Larsson et al., 1998; Walton & 
McKersie, 1965). By using a mental mapping technique this study investigates the strategic intent of 
companies, with specific attention to concepts related to collaboration. Key findings are that the 
temporal perspective (Hunt et al., 2010) with respect to the goals (Jap, 1999) and collaboration in 
the strategic intent of the companies, as well as in the case of supplying companies, their 
dependency on the shipbuilding industry shapes collaboration in a project. This paper contributes 
to the understanding of the influence of the strategies of companies on collaboration in a project. 
Both instructions given to and informal expectations regarding the representatives in a project may 
translate the strategic intent in more or less collaborative behaviors, and the interaction between 
companies within a project may further reinforce or counter such tendencies. 
Chapter 5 adds to the literature by exploring the strategy of family owned business versus non-
family owned business (Astrachan, 2010). Previous research has distinguished family owned 
business from non-family owned business (Astrachan, 2010). This research adds to this steam by 
giving insight into the choice of strategy made by these companies. Family owned businesses make 
different choices and therefore have different strategies from non-family owned businesses. These 
different relate to their goals and their time horizon related to collaboration. 
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Several managerial implications can be drawn from this dissertation. These practical solutions are 
categorized in line with some of the aspects mentioned by Mattessich and Monsey (1992). These 
authors discuss along six categories several factors that make collaboration work. Here only the 
factors that are relevant for this research are used. At the end of each factor a solution for moving 
towards consummate collaboration is mentioned: 
1. History of collaboration 
First of all, a history of collaborating together creates understanding and expectations about the 
interaction between companies and individuals. As discussed in this dissertation the shadow of 
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the past creates opportunities, but may also form hindrances for future collaboration (Rooks et 
al., 2000). 
 Individual relationships: these are essential in moving towards consummate collaboration and 
should be created and stimulated by for example using integration managers. These individuals 
are able to create a relationship that involves giving and taking, which is needed for consummate 
collaboration. A caveat is that these relationships can easily be broken if employees change roles 
or companies. 
 
2. Members see collaboration as in their self-interest 
Participating individuals and companies have to believe that they will benefit from involvement 
in collaboration with other individuals. Thus collaboration should be satisfying their own 
interests, and at the same time serve the collective interests. In this situation collaboration 
would be in line with both the collective and the self-interests. Important here is also another 
factor that is mentioned by Mattessich and Monsey (1992), namely multiple layers of 
participation. If actors at all hierarchical layers participate in consummate collaborative 
behavior it is more likely to work than if only the managers act in this way. 
 Instructing employees: higher management levels often see these longer term collective interest 
as parallel to their self-interests. However, lower-level individuals may not. Therefore, 
instructing employees in line with behaviors that aim at solving problems, finding solutions that 
benefit the collective etc. will create behavior that is in line with consummate collaboration. 
 
3. Members share a stake in process and outcome 
In order for individuals to be involved with a group they should share a stake in both the process 
(in the context of this dissertation: building the ship), as well as in the end result. 
 Early stage involvement of subcontractors: this makes subcontractors part of the whole process 
and make them feel that they can help in making decisions that are beneficial for all parties 
(including themselves). Helping in making these decisions in turn creates self-interests that are 
more in line with the collective interests. 
 Combined meetings between project life cycle phases: integration individuals between different 
departments and different phases in the project life cycle gives them insight in the consequences 
of their own actions. This makes it easier to define their interests in a way that takes these 
consequences into account and helps to move towards behavior that satisfies the collective 
interests. For example, purchasing-engineering meetings can be initiated. 
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4. Open communication 
Communication is very important in collaboration. Hardy et al (2005) discuss the importance of 
language in effective collaboration. How the communication takes place shapes the interests and 
consequently the collaborative behavior in projects. 
 Co-location: this is very important to facilitate communication and move towards consummate 
collaboration. The collective interests become clearer when individuals work at the same 
location, which makes it easier to align the self-interests with these collective interests. 
 Discourse: the language and accounts that individuals use determine the interests of individuals. 
Therefore it is important to take this notion into account. While this may seem to be a “soft” 
factor, consciously promoting language and the accounts that emphasize collective interests help 
individuals to be aware of these interests and to construe self-interests commensurate with 
consummate collaboration.  
 
5. Shared vision 
Partners that collaborate need to have a shared vision and clear objectives and goals to work 
towards (Jap, 1999). 
 Match strategies: the strategies of the different companies working together should match with 
respect to their perspective on collaboration. This match should be present with respect to the 
importance of collaboration and how to collaborate. Partnerships are a different form of 
collaboration than market relationships. This is also related to the time horizon that the 
companies use. It is difficult to align a long term perspective with short term perspectives. 
Therefore, companies should try to find equivalent companies with similar perspectives on 
collaboration. Collaborative relationships are then easier to establish. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This dissertation has started to explore the social construction of interests, but unavoidably still 
many aspects remain unexplored. For example, how do interests constructions evolve across 
projects? Can shared conceptions of interests commensurate with consummate collaboration be 
carried forward from one project to the next? Under what conditions does this happen, and under 
what conditions not? In addition, more insights into the development of interests over time are 
needed. This dissertation took a longitudinal approach of eighteen months in one of the papers, but 
it might be interesting and necessary to explore a project from the beginning, the earliest contract 
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negotiations, until the end. How do interests change during a project and how does this affect the 
collaboration in this project, but maybe also in future projects? 
One important limitation of this dissertation is that the findings on interests are based 
exclusively on interviews. It could be questioned to what extent sensitive issues like conflicts of 
interests can reliably be gauged in interviews. There is a risk that interviewees express adherence 
to collaborative stances (consummate and integrative types of collaboration), while in reality they 
focus on their own interests. It is difficult to exclude that in some situations a declared collaborative 
approach may be just verbal behavior.  
Additionally, I have to be careful in generalizing the results to other industries. The shipbuilding 
sector is an industry characterized by companies that stay in the industry for a long time, and many 
suppliers are also dedicated to the sector. This commitment may have various effects. On the one 
hand, it may lead to conservatism, making it difficult to change patterns of behavior that are deeply 
rooted in a common history. On the other hand, the stability of the composition of players in the 
sector should also make it easier to recognize the shared interests. However, moving towards 
consummate collaboration is possible only when supported by the strategies of the firms involved. 
New definitions of the strategic roles and even identities of both the shipyards and the contractors 
are called for. More insights into how companies (in the shipbuilding industry as well as elsewhere) 
come to define and change their strategic identities are therefore needed, and this seems a 
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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS 
 
PROTOCOL: LEARNING TO COLLABORATE IN  
MULTI-ORGANIZATIONAL PROJECTS (CHAPTER 2) 
 
Questions Round I: 
 
Own strengths and weaknesses 
1.1 Communication 
• What are, in your opinion, the strong/weak points of the internal communication in your 
department/company? 
• Can you give examples of these strong and weak points? 
• What are, in your opinion, the strong/weak points of the external communication of your 
department/company? 
• Can you give examples of these strong and weak points? 
 
1.2 Dependency 
• On what parties are (were) you dependent during the construction, and caused this 
dependence? 
• Could you exert influence on these parties? 
• Did this dependence have a negative or positive influence on your work? 
 
Quality of the relationships 
2.1 Internal 
• On what departments do you depend the most, and what caused this dependency? 
• What do you think of the quality of those relations? (positive and/or negative) 





• On what external companies do you depend the most, and what caused this dependency? 
• What do you think of the quality of those relations? (positive and/or negative) 
• Can you give examples illustrating the quality of the relationships? 
 
2.3  Interests 
• Are there any conflicting interests between your company and the external companies that 
(have) influenced the construction process? If so, what conflicts were there and how were 
they handled? 
 
2.4  Knowledge and information 
• Did you receive the necessary information from external parties on time? If not, how was that 
handled? 
• Did external companies share specific knowledge with your company when it could be 
relevant? And vice versa? 
 
Threats 
• Can you indicate if and how the not so good performance of other parties had a negative 
influence on the performance of your company/department? 
 (for example: not keeping to agreements, substandard work, mismatch between output from 
other parties which serves as input to you)  
• Can you give an example of the positive and negative results of the cooperation between the 
different parties/departments in this project? 
 
Experience of the cooperation 
• What is your personal feeling regarding the cooperation so far? 
• Do you think that the feelings concerning other companies before the start of this project 
have influenced the way in which people/companies cooperated? And which feelings were 
that? 






• Is it possible that the feasibility of the scope of your tender has played a part in the way in 
which companies worked together? 
• Is it possible that, as a consequence of the discrepancy between the offered scope and the 
actual workload, the cooperation with other companies was put under pressure? 
• Can this discrepancy arise because of yourself or other parties, and can you exemplify this? 
 
Improvement 
6.1 Own organization 
• Can you exemplify what your own organization (company or department) should improve to 
improve the cooperation with other parties? 
• How do you think these improvements can be implemented and who is responsible for the 
development and implementation of these improvements? 
 
6.1 Temporary Project Organisation 
• Can you exemplify what needs to be improved in the project organization (Construction 
numbers) in order to improve the cooperation with the involved parties? 
• How do you think those improvements should be implemented and who is responsible for 
the development and implementation of these improvements? 
 
6.2 Customer  
• What could the customer change/improve in order to improve the cooperation between the 
involved parties? 
 
Questions Round II: 
 
General 
1. Can you tell me something about your work? 
2. What do you like about the way people and companies cooperate in this project?  







4. What are your goals during the project; what do you have to produce, to what extent were 
you able to influence or involved in the formulation of these goals? 
5. At what level (who) are those goals formulated (level of the individual, organization or 
project)? 
6. What are the differences in goals between parties/departments? How do these 
differences influence the collaboration in the project? 
7. To what extent are the consequences for future projects taken into account? 
8. Whom do you identify most strongly with / with what group do you feel most connected 
with (team/work floor/own organization/project team/department) and why? 
 
Satisfaction 
9. To what extent are you satisfied with the cooperation within this project?  





PROTOCOL: ACCOUNTS OF INTEREST AND  
COLLABORATIVE BEHAVIOR IN PROJECTS (CHAPTER 4) 
 
Questions Round I: 
 
Interests 
1. What is your contribution in the project? 
 
2. How would you define your interest in this project? 
For example: 
a. Cooperative/non-cooperative 
b. Own interest/organizational interests/project interests 
c. Profit/ship 
 
Ask: when is this project for you as an individual a success? Why? (role/career in the 
company, role within the project, social and economic factors). Do you also recognize this 
with others? 
 
3. What is the interest of the company that you represent? 
Ask: how does this interest compare itself to your own interests? Is the interest of your 
company clear (short term/long term)? Did the company made clear how you are supposed 
to serve your company’s interests? 
 
4. Can you give an example of a situation in which your own interest or the interests of your 
company would conflict with the interests of this project? 
 
5. Is it clear to you what the interests of the other parties in this project are?  
How do you know? (observations, experiences, “common knowledge” etc.) 
 
6. Do you see conflicts of interests? Do you see congruence in the interests?  
Can you give examples? What could be a solution to a situation with conflicts of interests? 




7. How do you portray your interest in this project? 
 
Identity 
1. How long do you work for this company? Do you feel a strong commitment?  
2. With whom do you feel most connected (which group of people)? Why? 
3. Is there something like a “we-feeling” at the parties within this project? 
4. Is there something like a “we-feeling” at the companies in the shipbuilding industry? 
5. How do you see the future of the shipbuilding industry in the Netherlands? What is needed 
to stay successful, or even to survive? 
6. Are there people we should interview according to you? 
 
 
Questions Round II: 
 
1. Did your role change in comparison to the beginning of the project? 
 
Collaboration 
2. With which parties (companies) do you usually collaborate? 
3. What has changed (improved/decreased) in the collaboration with company x, y 
(mentioned at 3)? 
4. Can you give examples of what goes well in the collaboration with company x, y (mentioned 
at 3)? 
5. Can you give examples of what does not go as well in the collaboration with company x, y 
(mentioned at 3)? 





6. To which extent do you have to discuss with others concerning (within and outside your 
company) a good execution of your job? 
For example: you have to make a choice between 2 alternative solutions. 
7. To which extent are these conversations on the basis of equality? How does that follow? 
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8. Does it make a difference if you have worked previously with somebody of a company 
before? How does this affect your collaboration? 
9. Does it make a difference if you expect to work with a person or company in the future? 
How does this affect your collaboration? 
10. Have you got enough freedom to fill in your job in consultation with others? Do you think 
the people you talk to feel the same? 
11. With whom do you discuss your approach (and vice versa)? 
12. Management: do you encourage people to conform to a certain approach? 




14. When is the project a success for your company? 





PROTOCOL: STRATEGIC MENTAL MAPS IN PROJECTS (CHAPTER 5) 
 
Strategic direction: 
1. Can you shortly indicate what the strategy of your company is? 
a. Question upwards to what the ultimate goal(s) is? 
b. Ask about the relationships between the goals. 
c. Question downwards which means are necessary to reach the goal(s) 
d. Ask about the relationships between the means. 
 
2. What makes your strategy change? 
a. Projects, parties: ask how these influence the strategy.  
 
Collaboration: 
3. What is the role of collaboration and competition in your strategy? 
a. Ask how collaboration and competition affect each other. 
 
4. What is the influence of working in projects on your strategy? 
a. Ask about the differences in strategies in different sectors. 
 
Personal goals: 
5. What are your personal drives? 
a. Ask how these personal drives relate to the company’s goal(s). 
 
Shipbuilding industry: 






APPENDIX II: CODING EXAMPLE  
